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This article examines some difficult issues concerning property 
rights that arise in modern securities markets and suggests some re-
forms of the legal regime. Current rules on the transfer and pledge of 
interests in securities, found in Articles 8 and 9 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code (U.C.C.)l and the federal regulations applicable to 
book-entry United States Treasury securities, 2 are cut from the famil-
iar fabric of property law. However, as we shall see, traditional legal 
garments fit poorly on the frame of current practice. 
Securities market participants typically eschew direct relation-
ships with securities issuers and instead rely on financial in-
term.ediaries, such as stockbrokers and banks, to control their 
secur:i-cies. This article focuses on transfers and pledges of interests in 
fungible bulks of securities that are controlled by intermediaries. 3 
The following example, of necessity some'.vhat complex but not un-
realistic, lnustrates some important relationships and issues involved 
• B.A ... 1969, University of Oklahoma; J. D. 1972, Harvard University. Professor of Law . 
Univ<:rsicy of ?t:nnsylvania L~w School. American Bar Association Liaison-Advisor to the 
"Pen-nan<;m Editori?J Board ior the Uniform Commercial Code. I would like to thank Peter 
A k:::s , tY1artin Aronstein, Dav·id Carlson, Michael Don, Dennis Dutten!r, John Honnold, 
JonathMl .Kailman, Friedrich K ubl:::r, Fairfax L.~-ary, Jr., Morris Mendelscn, Robcti Mendel-
sor,, .Robert Mnndbeim, Richard Nesson, Curtis Reitz, Edward Rock, l\-Jark Roe, James Rog-
;~:rs, ::<.an:n Saper.scein, :N.!ichael Schill, Richard Smith, Michael Wachter, Elizabeth Warren, 
Jf,Y \Vestbrook, James White, Robert Woldow, Barry Zaretsky, and the participants at a 
facut ry ·wo.:kshop at the University of Pe11nsylvania Law School for their helpfui comments on 
e;;;;lic:r drafts of this article. I also wi:;h to thank the University of Pennsylvania Public Poiicy 
-~niti:n ives ?uad fer generous resea rch support, and Chris Nakamura, J.D. 1989, University of 
Pc;,nsyi v«.n~a Law Sciw-ol, a11d Stephanie Abrutyn, •:lass of 1991, University of Pennsylvania 
Law Schc-oL :for valuable rc."'earch assistance. All errors that remain are mine. 
l The Amtr1~.;an Law Institute, Nat '! Conference of Comm'rs on Uniform State Laws. 
Urdoc:n Cor.r;mercic.1 Code: Official Text 1989 With Comments (11th ed. West 1989). The 
T:·:-~.ifo,Te: Cotnnl.;rcial Code hereinafte! is refen·ed to as the ·u.C.C.; a!l citations to 1.he U.C.C. 
src ·~::) ·{he 1989 ()fficial 'Text '.Yith 1-:o.m·meins u:nlcss other·Nise noted 
2 Sc:c~ 3i C.F. R. §§ 306.115-306 . .122 , 350.2-3 50.6 (1S·90). 
3 ·~~-1:roug)lout this article ~t1 l references to an "\intermediar-;H or "interrnediariesH ar"= in-
tend~G to .~rnbrncr; sc:·.:uri::ies firTns (;-; ri·::h as stG~~!:Cbrokers and securitie; dealers) ?.S ?;~Has co rn-
cn.:::rcl ~:'l.~ ~-:-an Xs \ ..'lf.:!.J ccnt:(Cd sc~:~.:..riti:::-5 on b--e ~1alf of their c;..tst·:::~rn~rs. 
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in the transfer and pledge of these interests. The example is discussed 
throughout this article. 
Example 1 
Certain investors (C-1, C-2, C-3, and C-4) buy and sell securi-
ties through a securities firm intermediary, 1-1. (1-1 might be a 
local or regional securities firm.) Because these customers are ac-
tive traders rather than long-term investors, they allow J-1 to con-
trol their securities in order to facilitate rapid resale and to ensure 
that secured margin credit can be extended to them by /-1 from 
time to time. /-1 has many other customers (C-5 to C-5,000), each 
of whom claims securities of a much smaller value (in no case ex-
ceeding $500,000). 
/-1 does not physically possess, nor is it the registered owner 
of, any of the securities it controls for its customers. Rather, / -1 
maintains a securities account with (i.e., is itself a customer of) 
another securities firm intermediary, /-2. (J-2 might be a national 
securities firm or a larger regional securities firm.) /-2 also does 
not possess, and is not the registered owner of, any of the securities 
it controls for /-1 (or for any of J-2's other customers) . Instead,/-
2 maintains a securities account with yet another intermediary, 1-3 . 
(/-3 might be a clearing corporation depository or a national secur-
ities firm.) On the books of the various securities issuers, /-3 is the 
registered owner of, and (in the case of certificated securities) is in 
physical possession of, all securities that / -3 controls for its cus-
tomers. (Alternatively, if I-3 is a national securities :firm, posses-
sion and registered ownership of the securites might be lodged with 
another intermediary, 1-4, which is a clearing corporation 
depository.) 
In order to finance its operations, 1-1 obtains a loan from a 
bank lender, L. Collateral for this loan consists of securities issued 
by A Co. J-1 "pledges" these A Co. securities to L by causing 1-2 
to debit I -1 's securities account and credit L 's securities account on 
J-2's books. 
Needing additional credit, J .. l obtains another secured loan, 
this time from J -2, and pledges securities issued by B Co., by in-
structing J -2 to debit I-l's securities account and to cr~dit a special 
pledge account in /-1 's name on the books of 1-2. 
/ -1 becomes insolvent. C-1 (whose claims otherwise would 
not be satisfied) claims the A Co. securities and the B Co. securi-
ties that are pledged to L and J-2, respectively . L and J-2, of 
course, also claim these securiti.es as secured creditors. The 
shortfalls in A Co. and B Co. securities (and the other shortfalls 
mentioned below) may have resulted f:;om I -1 's m.isbehavior or 
inadvertance. 
C-2 and C-3 each claim securitl<:s issued by C Co. The C Co. 
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securities credited to / -1 in its account with /-2 are of a quantity 
that is sufficient to satisfy either C-2's claim or C-3's claim, but the 
quantity is insufficient to satisfy both of their claims. 
C-4 claims securities issued by D Co: 1- l controls D Co. se-
curities in its account with J-2 in the exact quantity necessary to 
satisfy fully C-4's claim. 
/-l's other customers (C-5 to C-5000) claim securities of is-
sues not claimed by C-1, C-2, C-3, or C-4. However, these cus-
tomer claims reflect a similar pattem. In some cases / -1 controls 
sufficient securities to cover customer claims to securities of the 
issue involved. In other cases there is a shortfall. 
The following diagram illustrates the relationships involved in Exam-
ple 1. 
[SJ 
(Se.curities AccowltS] 
Customers 
[Securities ,<1.ccounts] 
I I 
Customers [1DJ ICTII 
I [Securities Accounts] 
I I I I I I 
II I [ill] 1~1 !@Ji [~I c-s -sooo_j I j' C-2 lj 
I 
Note that L, !-2 and each of 1-1 's customers have claims to securities 
as a result of transactions with the same party, J-1. But their claims 
are based on entries on the books of two different intermediaries- J -2 
and J-1. 1-3 has a relationship with I-2 , but has no relationship with 
I-1 or L. 1-2 has a relationship with J.-1. and L, but has no relation-
ship with any of 1-1 's customers. Note also that in these arrange-
ments the securities involved are controlled by the intermediaries in a 
" fungible bulk. " 4 
4 An intermediary (such as J-1) may control ~.ecurities by maintaining an account with 
another, upstream, intermediary (such as 1-2). Or, an intermediary (such as I -3) may have 
physical possession of securities held in "stre-=t name." "Street name" generally refers to the 
practice of securities intem1ed iaries \Vho hold fungible bulks of securities in their own names, 
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Example 1 raises several obvious questions. For example, why 
have various parties chosen to receive interests in securities through 
intermediaries who continue to control the securities (through other 
intermediaries), rather than taking physical delivery of certificates in-
dorsed or registered to them? Part I of this article addresses these 
questions by introducing some important transactional patterns in the 
securities markets and the roles of securities intermediaries. It also 
addresses the risks inherent in such a market structure and the vari-
ous legal approaches that serve to reduce or manage those risks. 
How will C-2 and C-3 share in the insufficient quantity of C Co. 
securities? Given that shortfall, will C-4 be permitted full satisfaction 
because J-1 controls a sufficient quantity of D Co. securities to satisfy 
C-4's claim? The same questions can be asked about the similar con-
flicting claims of 1-1 's other customers. These and related questions 
are addressed in Parts H and III, which consider how current law 
deals with conflicting property claims-which I call " same-tier" 
claims-of claimants (such as C-1, C-2, C-3, and C-4) who claim 
through accounts with a common intermediary (such as 1-1 ). Part H 
examines the existing statutory framework for transfer and pledge of 
interests in securities as well as relevant priority rules . Par t HI con-
siders the treatment of claims to securities when an interm ed iary be-
comes insolvent. 
Who is senior as w the A Co. securities claimed by C -1 and L 
and the B Co. securi ties claimed by C- 1 and J -2? \Vill the ansvver 
depend on who obtained a property interest t1rst- in-time? Did L , .!-2 
or C- 1 achieve the status of a bona fide purchaser and thereby cut off 
claims that arose earlier-in-time? P art IV exp:lores th ese competing 
claims to securities by transferees who claim thro ugh accounts with 
different intermediaries- -which I call " different--tier" cl2.im.s. 
Part V develops the central thesis of this artic1e··--thai a property 
1aw construct for resolving priorities among clai:mants to fungible 
bulks of securities is a fundamentally flawed approach. T he proper ty 
interest received by a purchaser on the books of its securities in terme·· 
diary bears little resemblance to the property interest resulting from a 
physical deliv·ery of a certificated security or rc:gistrai:icm on the books 
of an issuer. The interest of an ownership claimant through an int;:;I-
n l "d·:::;>r·u l.S 'oe"t ~'harac-t,.-l.?e ,. l "'S "' l-qu·n r.llr n f T-i o"'i1 t" C'lfJ !=l i · - c: ·t th A -i ··--r"·-. ·" 1;_ . .! U _1 .-:>. >~ > · .,1 .- >~ '-'. Q. V ·'-' -· - JA L ·.!:> J ,C) ·..<.(:> '-·-d.!..JC >H\ .• .i! V.~c _, . r ·· -- · " · , d · · · · ' · · · memary. · ne ··property mvoive IS tl1<::: clm.ma:n t s Jnterest 111 1ts 
\:;r that of their norDi;1ees~ evt.::n t hot~gh the secuiiti r=;.) rnGty 1>::; hen~ .fici~. l1y tY.;>i:V~:~1 by th .:lr c·us-
tornet s. See E. G-ut tman, 1''1Icxicn1 Securities 1"'·~ansfc rs l r.;~: r! . l (.3d e;.L 1987); l\~L S ~1gu;n l 
.A.fter The Trade: )Je.sJer A .. nd Clec.ring Bank. Op-erations in f/to:1e_·;,- l\i3.:rX::t ;1f!d (Joventnte n1: 
Securities 15,1--5 5 ( 1983) [}:er;=inB-fter Stigu1n, Trade). 
1 
l 
l 
I, 
' l 
j 
I 
~ 
j 
i 
.j 
' 
1 
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account with its intermediary, not the fungible bulk of securities that 
may or may not underlie that account. If the intermediary remains 
financially viable, the claimant obtains the indirect benefits of owner-
ship of the securities . If the intermediary fails, the claimant has a 
priority claim, shared ratably with other similarly situated claimants 
and measured by a fungible bulk of securities that may or may not be 
sufficient to satisfy those claims. Nevertheless, in many important re-
spects the existing legal regime dealing with transfer, pledge, and pri-
orities among claimants to interests in securities- principally U.C.C. 
Article 8-is grounded on a distorted perception. It contemplates 
that claimants are owners of discrete property in the possession or 
control of bailee-agents. This distorteJ characterization promotes un-
necessary costs, uncertainty, and arbitrary and fortuitous results. Ex-
isting law has resulted in confusion and misunderstanding among 
scholars, practitioners, and courts alike. 
Earlier and ongoing law reforms have not embraced the more 
accurate conceptualization of transfers of securities controlled by in-
termediaries suggested here. The revisions to Article 8 that resulted 
in the 1978 Official Text of the U.C.C. served primarily to provide a 
statutor; framework for the transfer and pledge of uncertificated se-
curities . 5 T his etfort was worthwhile, but in the larger context of se-
curities market operations the potential for a certificateless society 
may turn out to be merely a detail. 6 Market participants recognize 
5 See U.C.C. app. l at 934 (1989) (Reporter's Introductory Comment) [hereinafter Re-
·porter's Com.:r1ent) ("What the revision is intended to accomplish is to .3'~ t forth a ·:x>herent 
g i'oup of icl.\e:S for th.~ issuers, buyers, seliers and other persons dealing with uncertificated 
securi tics, w the S<.li'T1t e:nen t that present A rticle 8 deals wi th th.::se matt ers with respect to 
certifk:ated secmities . " ). For descriptions of the background and development of t1le 1977 
ame;1dments to che U. C. C., wh ich resulted in the 1978 Oiflcial Text, see Aronstein, Haydock 
& Scot:, Artic.l e 3ls Re3dy, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 889, 890-93 (1980); Coogan, Security Interests in 
Investment Se:.:urit.ies Under Revised Article 3 of th ·~ Uniform Commercial Cede, 92 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1013, 101 7-2.2 (1979). B<:eause the 1987 Official Te;~t of the U.C.C., which added Article 
2A, and the 1989 O:'ficiHl Te:(t, which added Article 4A, made no changes w Article 3, the 
version of Article 8 in bo th tbe l 978 and 1989 Official Texts hereinafter ·:vill sometimes be 
ref~iTr~d to as the 1978 A_rticie 8. T he identical ver.;ions of Article 8 in the ! 962, 196& ancJ 
1972 Official ', exts he:.einafter wiJJ be referred to as the pre-1978 Article 3. A version of the 
.! 978 Article R has beer; ccnacted by 37 states a;; of September, 1990. [3'!.>-He Correlation T ables] 
U. C. C~ . _-R-~ ~;. St r \·. (C~1~i aghnn) . 
6 Even bcfc r~ t~1e 1973 {'\.rt ~c1e 3 was prornulgatcd th e "papenvor~\. crunc}l., that inspired 
~ he t -:Yi ~ i cD of .. \ rtic1e 8 1!:'3.~ subst..antia.lly resolved by the development and vtidespre~d use of a 
r:.ent :-<.·d deT-~os lt o1· ")- :,-y·sr.:::.:-rt aDd enhunc.::d methods of c!eariug and settling St;Ci1.rit1es trad~s. s~e 
<:=on·_~. rnj tt·~-: ;,)n .s ~:c\.:k c (: ~r.i fL: J..t-es, Section of Corporation, Rauking /Jr.. .BusiDt-3S La\:5!, ;\111eliCC!! 
l'.c\..r Associ,;t\''"· uf ':1-~r: Committee on Stock Cer1ificat';;S 'lt 3 -(.J, J ( 19 75) [hereinafier 
AE/\ R t po t tl ; /\rur-~5tein) ·fi aydcck 8r.. Scott; supra note 5, at 890-91; }-\re-nstein . J.\ ·Cectific ~Ht·· 
lt-3:. A.rt.ich :3~ W~ C~'41 [~bve it Both Ways, 31 Bus. Law. 727, 728-30, 732-Jj (1976) [ll..:reinaf-
tc:r :2-~.Jt ;~ \V~"- YS] . T"1.~.! e '!:: 6enc~. :::::. .ry ~ ~ papenvork crunch " in i:he securities rnar:(.:!ts ch..! r-ing th.e 1at~ 
l9&CJ:; ",.'::lS t i "':: : f:~_ p\:<us for thf:: .A.B.t\ project that ev~:n tuaB:.: :n~sulted i!l 9rOrf~ld3ntion 
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not only that deliveries of negotiable paper reflecting each market 
transaction are intolerable, but also that routine market transactions 
must occur without changes in registered ownership on the books of 
securities issuers or their transfer agents. In Example 1, where fungi-
ble bulks are involved, it is of no real consequence whether J-3 is in 
possession of certificated securities or is, instead, the registered owner 
of uncertificated securities. Although the role of intermediaries is 
central to market structure and operation, the 1978 Article 8 offered 
no new conceptual framework to take account of transfers on the 
books of an intermediary. It remains wedded to a property law con-
struct even when fungible bulks are concerned. The same can be said 
of the proposed federal regulations that would (when and if issued) 
cover transfer and pledge of book-entry Treasury securities (the Pro-
posed TRADES Regulations). 7 
Part V of this article offers an alternative to a property law con-
struct. It suggests a new model for dealing with transfer and pledge 
of interests in fungible bulks of securities controlled by intermediaries. 
A new model would focus on the relationships of claimants to in-
termediaries rather than property law constructs such as identifica-
tion and tracing of property, first-in-time-first-in-right, and bona fide 
purchase. A new model is illustrated by a proposed priority rule for 
resolving different-tier claims: "upper-tier priority." Claimants 
against a securities intermediary could look only to that intermediary 
for satisfaction (subject, of course, to sharing rules applicable to same-
tier claimants). Lower-tier claimants (such as C-1) generally would 
have no senior claims to securities or other rights as against upper-tier 
intermediaries (such as 1-2) or transferees (such as L) who claim 
of the 1978 Article 8. See, e.g., Aronstein, Both Ways, supra, at 727. A considerable volume 
of commentary was addressed to prospects for a "certificateless society" during the 1970's. 
See, e.g., id.; Aronstein, The Decline and Fall of the Stock Certificate in America, 1 Comp. L. 
& Sec. Reg. 273 (1978); Guttman, Toward the Uncertificated Security: A Congressional Lead 
for States to Follow, 37 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 717, 719 (!980); Mulhern, First Steps Toward a 
Certificateless Society Under Existing Law: One Practitioner's Experience, 26 Bus. Law. fil7 
(1971); Smith, A Piece of Paper Revisited, 26 Bus. Law. 1769 (1971); Smith, A Piece of Paper, 
25 Bus. Law. 923 (1970) [hereinafter Smith, Piece]; Steadman, The Lender in the Certificate-
less Society, 26 Bus. Law. 623 (1971); Werner, The Certificateless Society: Why and When?, 
26 Bus. Law. 605 (1971). 
7 On March 14, 1986, the Department of Treasury published proposed new rules, called 
the Treasury/Reserve Automated Debt Entry System (TR.A..DES), to deal with transfers and 
pledges of Treasury securities within the commercial book-entry system. 51 Fed. Reg. 8846, 
885't-57 (1986) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 357) (proposed March 14, 1986) [hereinafter 
March Proposed TRADES Regulations]. After consideration of numerous comments, a sub-
stantially revised version of proposed TRADES Regulations was published on November 28, 
1986. 51 Fed. Reg. 43,027 (1936) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 357) (proposed November 
25, 1986) [hereinafter Proposed T RADES Regulations]. See generally infra text at notes !55-
57. Final regulations have net be•::n issued. 
·l 
' 
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through accounts with such upper-tier intermediaries. The merits of 
this upper-tier priority rule are supported by economic analysis and 
by analogous priority rules under the U.C.C. An upper-tier priority 
rule would neither pit the rich against the poor nor the large and 
sophisticated against the small and unsophisticated. Pursuant to the 
Securities Investor Protection Act (SIP A), nonfinancial institution 
customers of insolvent securities broker-dealers generally are pro-
tected against losses up to $500,000 per customer by the Securities 
Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC). 8 
Consideration of this priority rule suggests a new way of thinking 
about what it means to become a purchaser of securities through an 
intermediary. Even if upper-tier priority is rejected as unsound, the 
fact remains that modem securities markets have moved so far be-
yond the movement of pieces of negotiable paper that the property 
law construct is inadequate and unworkable. Whatever rules might 
emerge, there is a need to push the legal regime "beyond negotiabil-
ity" and, perhaps, "beyond property."9 
Legal scholars of commercial and property law have paid rela-
tively scant attention to the important subject of transfer and pledge 
of securities in modern securities markets. Even those w no have fo-
cused their attention on securities market operations have rarely 
delved into the matters of transfer and pledge. 10 This article seeks to 
inspire greater scholarly attention to these matters. 
Actual litigation concerning the priority contests considered here 
has not, and probably will not, often occur. Does this mean that these 
defects in the property law construct of existing law are merely of 
academic and theoretical interest? My answer is "no"-with one 
8 See generally Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (SIPA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa-
78lll (1988); infra notes 163-67 and ao.:ompanying text. The $500,000 cap includes claims for 
cash not exceeding $100,000. 15 U.S.C. § 78fff-3(a)(l) (1988). Moreover, many securities 
firms have obtained private insurance affording additional protection to customers, typically in 
the amount of $2,500,0C0. SeeR. Teweks & E. Bradley, The Stock Market 319 (5th ed. 1987). 
This article generally is concerned with the rights and claims of market pa!"ticipants who are 
not eligible for , or whose claims exceed, such protection rather than smaller, probably less 
sophisticated investors. 
9 Observers have long recognized the flaws of market dependency on delivering and 
processing paper securities certificates. &-x supra note 6. For a fascinating description of the 
tortuous rouie of securities certificates, '\Yhich was routine before development and widespread 
use of the s...»curities depository system, see Smith, Piece, supra note 6. The legal regime does 
not yet comtemplate the fuil implications of a system dependent on intermediary control of 
fungible bulks. 
10 One exception is Egon Gumnan. See Guttman, supra note 4. However, as wi th any 
broad treatment that is intended to can VQ";s the state of the law, Guttman's treatise does not 
always accommodate extensive theoretical explorations more compatible with articles in schol-
arly joumals. 
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possible caveat mentioned below. Ex ante, the applicable legal treat-
ment casts a continuous shadow over how market participants (in-
cluding extenders of secured credit that is vital to the market) 
approach and structure their transactions and relationships. More-
over, government regulators of securities intermediaries and bank 
lenders must take loss allocation rules into account in order to assess 
the exposure and prudence of those regulated entities. Some evidence 
of the significance of these issues is provided by the serious study and 
consideration they are receiving from lawmakers, regulators and 
within the securities industry.11 Perhaps this article will assist and 
influence those who are positioned to change the law. 
The problem is not only that current law can lead to a "wrong" 
result. The nub of why the issues addressed here actually matter is 
the prevailing uncertainty of outcome under current law. This uncer-
tainty derives largely from the inherently poor fit between a property 
law construct and the nature of fungible bulks of securities controlled 
by intermediaries in today's marketplace. The limited case law and 
commentary indicate that there are wide areas of disagreement, even 
as to results that ought to be clear enough under current law. More-
over, it will be shown that any future changes in commercial law 
probably will fail to enhance certainty and predictibility if they cling 
to the existing property law construct. 
The caveat mentioned above is this: Is the existing uncertainty 
significant enough to warrant serious attention? Few would argue 
11 The Propos.<~ TPJ\DES Regulations under consideration by the Department of Treas-
ury have been mentioned. See supra note 7. In addition, at the request of D<tvid Ruder, then 
Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), a spc"Cial Advisory Committee 
(on which I serve) of the American Bar Association Section of Business Law is studying these 
issues, among others. That committee is in the process of finalizing a report that will ma.ke 
recommendations conceming many of the issues discussed in this article. Sr.:e .Advisory Con> 
mittee on Settlement of Market Transactions, Section of Business Law, American Bar A.ssocia· 
tion, Investment Se.curities Under U.C.C. Article 8: Sekcted Issues Cmceming Scope, 
Transfer, Security Interests and Priorities (Draft of Aug. 24, 1990) [hereinafter ABA Draft 
Report]. 
The Market Reform Act of 199{), signed by the President en Ocwber 16, 199C, fS!v,::; the 
SEC the power, upon its mal<.ing c-ertain findings, to issue preemptive federal regulations con-
cerning transfer and piedge of interests in securitie-s, including priority rule-s affecting th.ird 
parties. See Market F.eform Act of l99D, Pub. L. No. 101-432 (Oct. 16, 19?1()) (a!D•onding 
§ 17a(a)(2) of the Securitie-3 E;;change i\.ct of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78q-l). That act also directs 
the SEC to form a federal advisory committee to make recornmendarions. Jd. The Gmup of 
Thirty, an international private sector group concemed wiih financial mukets, has rna;:k r1i ne 
1mponant recommendations for irn proving se-.:urities clearance and settlernent in the ')\l!Jf1crs 
securiti-es markets. Group of Thirty, Report, Clearance and S·~tdc:ment Systems in tne 
\ Vorld's Securitie,; IV{arkcts {1989) [hereinafter, G-30 Report]. l rnpler.nenting t:h~ f\XCnl·un~n ­
dations will put further strain on the various private 1a·w legal fe.gi~Ti '.:-:; . pro{)ably necessi t-c1ting 
v~:Jrious changes in la•rv dealing -with 'transt~:;r and pledge. See Group of Thir ty TJ. S. \V o'fk ing 
(}roup H.eport on Coxnpressing the Sett.1eint":nt Pcricd 9--Il (1989). 
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with the general proposition that certainty and predictibility in com-
mercial and property law are desirable. Yet few would think that 
even great uncertainty as to a trivial matter would warrant the time 
and attention necessary for a fix. This article embraces the apparent 
consensus that the existing state of the law concerning transfer and 
pledge is indeed a serious problem warranting serious attention. 12 
The value of securities traded and financed and the potential for chain 
reaction "system risk" affecting a large number of financial institu-
tions is enormous. Although the routine procedures for settlement of 
securities trades and secured financing of securities market partici-
pants may function well enough in normal conditions, recent market 
events- the October 1987 "market break" and the bankruptcy filing 
by the parent corporation of Drexel, Burnham, Lambert, Inc.-have 
illustrated the potentially severe consequences of prevailing uncertain-
ties in the legal regime. 13 
Finally, the thesis of this article may have broader implications 
for loss allocation in contexts unrelated :to the securities markets. 
Loss allocation based on a property law construct seems to make 
sense in an environment where claimants can feasibly determine that 
they will receive and continue to maintain their bargained-for prop-
erty interests. In other environments, such as transfers of interests in 
fungible bulks of securities controlled by intermediaries, those deter-
minations cannot be made. Allocating loss based on doctrines such as 
tracing, first-in-time and bona fide purchase makes little sense in these 
contexts. 14 This discussion may offer insights ±or other areas of com-
12 See, e.g., ABA Draft Report, supra note II (recommendations conceming secmiiy inter-
ests in "securities accounts;" treatment of security interests in securities and repos in bank-
ruptcy; "same-tier" sharing among ownership claimants, secured creditors, and repo parties; 
warranties made by securities intermediaries; choice of law issues; priorities among "di.fferem 
tier" claimants (suggesting "serious consideration" b<! g1ven to the upper tier priority proposal 
made in this article); and foreign t:ustodians for clearing COI}XJrations) . 
13 In b0th instanc..-o.s bank lenders were reluctant to extend cn:dit necessary to pmvide vitzl 
liquidity because of uncertainty as to perfection and priority of securi ty imcfl~s ts in collateral. 
See Division of Market Regulation, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commissi on, The Octobe( 
1987 Market Breaic 10-57 (1988); The Issues Surrounding the Col lapse of Drexel Burnham 
Lambert: Hearings Before the Senate Committee on I3an.king, H ou3.ing and Urban Affairs, 
101st Cong .• 2nd Sess. <}9-50 (1990) (statement of Ric;1ard C. Breeden , Chainnan, U.S. Securi-
ties a.1d Exchange Commission). 
14 For a general discussion of principles of property law imbedded .i.n ch.: U. C. C .• set: Do-
lan, The U .C.C. F ramework: Conveyancing Principles and ?ro~r~y ! ntcr;:.c>ts, 39 B. U.L. Rc:v. 
g 11 (1979). Dolan identifies three "conveyancing rules": (i) ,;security or prooerty, " Of the 
"shelter principle," v,.·hereby a transferee receives a11 of its transi"c-(or's ~nterest , and the close 
relative of ushelter," nemo dat quod non habet, whereby a t nl.nsf;:: r .:e can.n. ot t ~·c~r.1 sfer a greater 
interest than it has; (ii) '4 good faith purchase, " \Vhercby a transferor can traasfer rnore than it 
h~s; and (iii) the Twyne rule, \~/hereby a tr::z_nsfere~ r~~i'.Je-s less thaH irs t : an.sferor has . Id . at 
gJ ) -819. 
1 
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mercial law that are ill-suited for loss allocation through a property 
law constnlct. 15 
I. SECURITIES CONTROLLED BY !NTERfv'fEDIARIES 
A. The Roles of Intermediaries in Securities .ftrfarkets 
In order to participate in the securities markets, investors must 
use market professionals. The most familiar role of a securities inter-
medial)' is that of the broker who, through a seat on an exchange or 
as a participant in an "over-the-counter" (OTC) market, buys and 
sells securities on behalf of its clients as well as for its own account. 
Moreover, many investors in the securities markets normally allow 
intermediaries to maintain continued control of their securities. The 
convenience and enhanced liquidity are obvious for active traders 16 
who maintain accounts with an intermediary who controls the securi-
ties. However, this intermediary control phenomenon reflects more 
than mere convenience for active investors; it is an essential element 
of their oar ticipation in the market. Consideration of clearimz and . ' ~ 
settlement of securities trades illustrates why this is so. 
1. Clearing and Settlement 
"Cle2.ring and settlement" comprise the process that occurs after 
securities tradef, (agreements to sell and buy) are made. 17 "Cleming" 
is the process whereby the trades are compared, matched, and con-
t1rmed. 18 "SetHement" is the process \vhereby parties to trades fulfill - -
15 See. e.g., Rog~rs, The Indevanc.e of Negotiable Instruments Concepts in the Lav; of the 
Check-Ba:sed Payment Syskm, 65 Tex. L. Rev. 929 (1987) (arguing that property law concepts 
in negotiability dcr.:trine a.-e inappropriate for the check collection systf:m) [hereinafta Rogers, 
Inelevauc~] ; see also Rogers, N egotiability, Property, and Identity, 12 Cardozo L. Rev 471 
(1990) [hereins.fier B_ogers, l~egotiab iEty] ; Rogers, T b.e I\.-1yth of Negotiability, 31 B.C.L. Rev. 
265 (! 990) [.hereinP.fter Rogers, f,IJ yth]. Consideration now being given to the prospe-~ts for 
den1at~!"ializatior.;, ".f1;:ough ele~tronic data interchange, of letters of crcd;t, dccun'lt=;n.ts of title, 
and documentary data also may be inf~xmed by the discussion here. See 2 U. S. f'...Dun.cil on 
lnkmatior18.l Banking, Inc. New~, hn. ! 990, at 1, col. 1 (establishment of wor:.:ing groups by 
the International Ch::nnbt-;; of Con·nnerce tc"~ addr-ess these 1:natters !n connection ~Nith the revi-
sion of Intemati(Jrl?J Chamber of Commerce Publication No. 4{)0, "Uniform Customs and 
Practice for l)ocnrnenta:-y ,Credits"). 
16 Because th~ iH terrnedic.:ry controls the se:euritie-s, the customer wn ask the int-~rrnediary 
to seH the se, .. ::u 'rir.y wlth.Jut the rH:ed to deJ1ver to the intermediary a certiftcate and a signature 
guaranty in -f;,)!T C. for i' gc-c}d delivery." s~ ;\_BA.. P""eport, supra note 6, eJ 27-30; se~ also 
(Jut)~n,an, s~1pn-1 note 4, 8J 3-31 to 8-34 (discussing market practices concerning ·~~G-Od d-~liv­
ery. "). T hs cc;rrvenicn::e ;:--l}~~o is 1mycctant to rnany less active investors, includin.:; i~n_dividual 
in ve-:?,tors. 
17 See :~crv~;rr..lly l () ffic2 of ~f:?:;hno!ogy l\ssessment, Study of tnttmatio:na1 Clearing .8nd 
S-.:::t"(ernent 3-4 ( 19:39) (here·;_ naft.~r err~~- .Study}; Stigurn, Trade, supra note -4, ::;.t 121 ~22. 
(.,1 
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their obligations thereunder19-generally a "delivery"20 of the securi-
ties by the seller and payment of the agreed price by the buyer. 21 Two 
principal systems of clearing and settlement in the United States se-
curities markets today illustrate the process. 22 
a. The DTC-NSCC System 
Most of the trades in corporate equity and debt securities made 
on the major United States securities exchanges and OTC markets are 
cleared and settled, directly or indirectly, in a system involving the 
combined services of two registered clearing agencies, The Depository 
Trust Company (DTC)23 and the National Securities Clearing Corpo·· 
ration (NSCC).24 The system is NSCC's Continuous Net Settlement 
19 OTA Study, supra note 17; Stigum, Trade, supra note 4. 
20 In securities industry parlance " delivery" refers to the completion of a transferor's obli-
gation with respect to transfer of an interest in securities, but does not necessarily mean an 
actual physical delivery. For example, transfers of book-entry (uncertificated) securities, trans-
fers on the books of securities depositories, and credits to accounts of securities intermediary 
customers are referred to as deliveries. 
21 More precisely, it is the process whereby the actual parties to trades made on exchanges 
and in over the counter (OTC) markets deliver and pay each other. Brokers usually act as 
agents for undisclosed principals and thereby lA->come obligated on trades to buy or sell, as the 
case may be. See Guttman, supra note 4, at 8-17, n.67 (citing Restatement (Second) of Agency 
§ 321 ( 1953)). Thus, clearing and settlement on the wholesale level deais with delivery and 
payment as among the participating securities intermediaries. 
22 Unless otherwise noted, the following discussion of the precess of clearing and settle-
ment is based on Stigum, Trade, supra note 4, at 77-145, 245-57; R. Te>veles & E. Bradk;, 
supra note 8, at 174-79. While the discussion is adequate for present, t.-ssentially contexmaJ. 
purposes, it is oversimplified in many resp,.,<>cts and much detail is omitted. 
23 DTC, a New York limited purpose trust company, is the. worl d 's largest securities de .. 
pository. Th.:: D epository Trust Co., Annual Report i939 at 11, 35 (1990) [hereinafter DTC 
1989 R-eport]. It was formed in 1973 as a successor to the business of the New York Sh'A:k 
Exchange's Central Certificate Service, which was created to respond to the paperwork cn.mch 
of the late 1960s. I d. at 6. DTC is owned by its securiries finn and bank participants. I d . at 
11. At year-end 1989, DTC maintained securities accounts for &'Jt'i participams (408 broker-
dealers, 189 banks, and 9 clearing agencies). Id. at 3. "1ndirect panicipan ts," securities in-
termediaries that are cone-3p--'mdents of (i.e., customers of) DTC partisipan:s, to talled mot·;:: 
than 4,000 cluring \989. Id. at 29 . (I f, in Ell.ample 1,1-3 were DTC, then l -2 would be a direct 
participant and /-! would be an indirect participant.) During 1939 74 million DTC bcx:k-
entry transfers of securities with a total value of $9.2 irillion ··Nere made. Id . at iO. At year-
end 1989 there were deposit;;<! with DTC eligible securi ties valued at $4.02 trillion, consisting 
of 116.5 billion equity shares, corporate debt (principal J.<:wunt) of $1,017.8 billion, and m•l-
ni·;;ipal debt (principal amount) of $750.9 tiliion. Id . at 3. These depo~ited secur-ities ccnst.i-
tute abom 72% of all shares of companies represented in the Dow Jones Industrial Average, 
nbout 65 % of all shares of New York Stock ExchRnge-listecl cornpanies, abom 43% of Gll 
shares of 1'-~TA .. SDi\.Q- and !;.nv2rican Stock Exchange-listed cornp:.njQ, and about 85S'f of th ;'; 
priDcipal amount of all outstanding municipal bonds. Id. at 9. 
24 ?·~SCC ~.~ias formed in 1977 to provide posttrade c1e.2ra-nc;-: .::-tud ~.e·nJ.er:u~·~n: servic;;s F1r 
trades on the Ne'.'Y .. l ork Stock Exchange (N~{SE) and the A .. rnerica.n S1ock _f.x.ch .~tnge (.t~f~.rJ E~X) 
and ?'-lationzl ;\ssc-ciation of Securi ties D~alers (I'LO;o.§[)) l)~~f'C r.na r\et; l ... ·TSCC is owntd jo!nr1y 
by the t·r:r'SE, ,&,_J\.fEX, and 1'\IP~SI''. R. "l;lloido"\Vl l\n Overvi ,~~' of th~c; R :J.le of Ihe I'=I8.;.1,Jn~d 
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(CNS) system.25 Only trades in securhies eligible for deposit with 
DTC can be cleared and settled in the CNS system, and on the settle-
ment date26 all of the securities to be delivered must be on deposit 
with DTC. 27 Prior to the settlement d~te the trades among all of the 
participants are compared (matched) and netted with respect to each 
securities issue, with each participant ultimately becoming obligated 
to transfer or entitled to receive only a net quantity of securities that 
takes into account all of that participant's trades in that security is-
sue. 28 Also prior to the settlement date, NSCC becomes obligated to 
transfer and entitled to receive these netted amounts of securities to or 
from each participant. On the payments side, all amounts to be paid 
and received by each broker-dealer participant also are netted, and 
NSCC becomes obligated to pay and entitled to receive payment to or 
from each participant. 29 Each participant becomes obligated to pay to 
Securities Clearing Corporation in Equities T rading, 1-2, 8 (1990) (unpublished manus.:ript) 
[hereinafter Woldow, Overview]. During 1983 there were more than 1800 direct and indirect 
participants in the NSCC clearing system. National Securities Clearing Corporation, 1988 
Annual Report 5 (1989) [hereinafter NSCC 1988 Report]. In 1987 NSCC processed a daily 
average of about 480,000 transactions, in 1988, about 375,000 transactions, and in 1989, about 
430,00D transactions, including equities, municipal bonds, and mutual fund transactions. Na-
tional Securities Clearing Corporation, 1989 Annual Report 1 (1990) [hereinafter NSCC 1989 
Report]. About 95% of all equities trades in the NYSE, AMEX, and NASD markets are 
cleared and settled through NSCC. Woldow, Overview, supra, at 7. Both DTC and NSCC 
are clearing agencies registered under § 17 A of the Securities and EAchange Act of 1934. 15 
ll.S.C. § 78q-1(o) (1988); Exchange Act Rdease No. 20,221,48 Fed. Reg. 45, 167 (October 3, 
1933) (ordering registration of DTC, NSCC, and several other entities as full clearing 
agencies). 
25 For a general description of the CNS (and other) clearing and settlement systems oper-
ated by NSCC, see Woldmv, Overview, supra note 24, at 9-16. 
26 In the corporate equity and bond markets trades are settle{! on the fifth business day 
following the trade date by the broker-dealer intermediaries involved in the trade ("street-side 
settlement"). By the settlement date, customers of DTC participants a.lso are required to pay 
their intamedia.ries for securities being purchased ("customer-side S.'!ttlement"). These pay-
ments from customers to their DTC participant intermediaries take place outsid.~ the DTC-
NSCC process. ;vJost hrge, active institutional investors have th<: privilege of "delivery versus 
payrnent"--that is, they are not obliged to pay the intermediary who is to control the ;;ecurities 
fo r them until the securities bave been "delivered" to the intermediary. DTC's Institutional 
Deli';e:ry (or ID) System e:aectiveiy connects the street-side and customer-side settlements for 
part icip9.ting institutional investors. Se-e infra note 33. Changes and enhancem-ents of the CNS 
clearaiJce and ~ttlement sy3tem and the ID System wiH !;..; required if the United States mar-
ktts cu·e to mt'el the .! 992 target for compliance with two of the G-30 recommendations: Set-
dement on the third (instead of the fifth) business day foliowing the trade date and money 
>ettiement ·Nith s..:Jme-day (insiead of next-day) funds. See G-30 Rep{:;rt, supr:.1 note 1 1, at 13-
t:5 . 
7. 7 \V'o1dow, {Jverviev;~ supra note 24, at 14. 
1 8 ~rh!s is the ccncept of' 'multilateral netting." See Stigurn, 'Tradt, supra no::~ 4 .. at 246-47. 
? r1o.r to ne tti ng, the p.rC42-~ss of ucomparisonn takes place. Buyers' and ~eUers ' track: con11rr~a­
cions 8.T·~ compared in o;·der to det•xt ~uid modify or eliminate tramactions where a buyer's and 
::.-eDe.(s records t~o !)Ot £'-~tee. I bis process is higtly :auton1atC:;;d. 
29 :3;;cause X"'iSC~C is df::\::rDed ~ o corne bet1;veen cJl p&r'tiQ to t 1ad -:~-s fo.r purp0SQ of netted 
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or entitled to receive from NSCC only a single sum on account of all 
of its trades for all issues to be settled on that date. 30 In sum, on each 
settlement date, each NSCC participant pays to or receives one sum 
of money from NSCC and each NSCC participant transfers to or re-
ceives from NSCC, by book entry on the books of DTC, 31 a single 
quantity of each security issue involved. 32 
Most large institutional investors employ a DTC participant cus-
todian bank. 33 Most of these investors allow their custodian banks to 
leave their securities in the custodian banks' accounts with DTC, reg-
istered in the name of DTC's nominee, 34 although in theory the inves-
securities deliveries and netted payment obligations, in effect there is a novation of the trade 
obligations for clearance and settlement purposes. 
30 This is the concept of "multi-issue" netting. See Stigum, Trade, supra r10te 4, at 247. 
31 In its role as a securities depository, DTC effects transfers of securities among its partici-
pants by debits and credits to their securities accounts on the settlement date. NSCC is a DTC 
participant. On the settlement date, participants who are net transferors of securities of a 
given issue transfer securities to NSCC on DTC's books and participants who are net transfer-
ees of such securities receive transfers from NSCC on DTC's books. 
32 This methcd of settlement involves obvious credit risks for the pax'ticipants since 
NSCC's ability to deliver securities and make payments depends on its receipt of securi ties and 
payments from participants. The novation netting, however, reduces the aggregate amount of 
each participant's obligations. In the case of a payment default arising from a participant 
insolvency, NSCC maintains a fund of participant deposits designed to ensure that settlement 
will ta.l(e place even in the face of such a default. See Stigum, Trade, supra note 4, at 253; 
Woldow, Overview, supra note 24, at 19-20. In the event the fund were to be insufficient, 
participants share the risk as they are subject to additional pro rata assessments to make up 
any shortfall. ld.; NSCC 1989 Report, supra note 24, at 19. In the case of rou'-ine failures to 
deiiver securities, in the CNS delivery obligations are continually defened w the next settle-
ment date (by netcing with deliveries to l:>e made on that settlement date) and "rnarh-d to 
mark.:t" sv as to adjust for price changes. See Guttman, supra nore 4, at 8-1 9; Stigum, Trade, 
supni note 4, at 252. In theory, however, the potential for "systemic risk " exists if a la.rge 
default were to result in defaults by other participants. See, e.g., Board of Go'itmors of the 
Federal Reserve System, Controlling Risk in the Payments Syst-em, Report of the Task Fore~ 
on Controlling Payments System Risk to the Payments System Policy Committee of the Fed-
eral Reserve System 9 (1988) [hereinafter Payments Task Force Repon]. 
33 D T C's 1i1Stitutional Delivery (ID) System involves the r~lationship between an institu-
tional investor and iL' custocliM bank and broker. The ID System connects the investor to the 
automated communications process for clearing and comparing trades. For descriptions of the 
ID System, &."e generally DTC 1989 Report, supra note 23, at 30-31; Stigum, T rade, supra note 
4, at 254-55. R ules of t h~ NYSE, A M EX, and NASD now require institutional in vestors to 
settle trades through an institutional delivery system (such as the ID System) through a regis-
ten~d cle.aring agency (such as D'.i'C). See AMEX R ule 423 {rev. eel. 1982); l' lASD Unif. Pmc. 
Code, § 64 (rev. ed. 1988); l'TYSE Rule 387 (rev. ed. 1988). 
34 S..x DTC 1939 Report, supra note 23, at 30. Securitie:; deposited wi th DTC nonnaily 
are r.~giste:rerl in the nfl.rn.; of its nominee, Cede a c:o. (a psD:nership controlled b~,· :o·rc ~ the 
sole function of '?.:hid! is to maintain registered ownershi p of securities deposited with DTC). 
DTC coJl.::<~ r.s 0 . .nc\ distributes to its pa rticipants amounts paid by issuet s a:, divi d c .<~ci:;, pri:r.ciral 
and l:nterest. :CYTC ~dso p.rov1dc..') info-rTnation on ~cart1cipant J;:nc.fic1ni fYWn~rsh ip (CJ iS$Gcrs 
vvho (/Jil d:>:!ll cornm ~1nicate ctire!:dy ~vi th the part icipants concen~i:n.~ rnJ.tt .::rs su·.:h r;.s vr;tin,5 
rights . ~The p;rrt~c.ip;~r:t.S 1 in tur7;, corn:r11Un.i.cat~ with t~1cir o·wn cus!ome;s. 1d. at 22- /..~. \VeJ~ .-; 
the :~·~c:.!tit"ies not :1 pD.rt c f 2. fnngit.11 ~ b~1lk , much of the b-~~ \!fit o( the ~ r~te r-mech :1 ~~;, C()Xlttol 
l 
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tors could request their DTC member-intermediary to withdraw and j 
hold them or request that certificates be issued in the investors' own l 
names. 35 Thus, these market participants normally have no direct re- l 
lationship with the issuers of securities of which they claim beneficial 
l 
ownership. DTC participants expect DTC's nominee to become the 
registered owner of securities, and non-participant investors, in turn, 
look to the DTC members or other intermediaries. 
Eliminating or reducing reliance on securities certificates and 
moving toward a world of uncertificated securities36 would be useful 
and could reduce costs. 37 But the role of the depository system in 
clearing and settling securities trades has achieved more than merely 
reducing the physical movement of securities certificates among the 
market participants. Even if uncertificated securities became the 
norm, that probably would have no fundamental impact on the most 
important characteristics of securities market operations. DTC's 
nominee would continue to be the registered owner of the uncertifi -
cated securities (although freed from the costs of maintaining physical 
control of certificates), and the propensity of market players to claim 
through inte:rmedifl:ries would not be abated. 38 
phenomenon would evaporate. For example, the benefits of netting in the DTC-NSCC clear-
ing and settlement process depends on the inherent fungibi lity of S....""Curities on deposi t with 
DTC. s~ supra notes 25-32 and accompanying text. 
35 See Stigum, Trade, supra note~,, at 255 ("When a custody bank takes delivery of securi-
ties for a [sic] institutional -;;ustomer, the normal procedure and the one DTC prefers is that 
the custody bank leave those securities in DTC's vault."). Not only would routine withdrawal 
of c<!rtificat<-.:s r-csuit in additional costs, but it would make no sense for many active traders. 
Because th~ securities ultimately must be in DTC's control for purposes of cleari.ng :c.nd settle-
ment, continual withdrawals would result in a.'l intolerabl-e loss of liquidity. 
36 See supr2. not~ 5. 
37 The principai ;;<wings from eliminating certificates would relate to DTC's costs of physi-
c.al storage, retriev~.l, depz•sit and witbdrawal of se;-tificates for participants' custome:-s. The 
deposit and withdrawal D:;'erations would remain necessary with uncerti:fic.at~ &:curities in 
order to confer registered status on those beneficial owners who desire it. See infra note 82 
(registrHtion of tran~.fer of ,_mc.;;rtificated securities under 1978 Article 8). As between DTC 
and seeurities issuers, lwwever, eliminating cenificates would ailow many of these operations 
be achieved ·~lectronic~lly. Even without actually eliminating paper certificates, the succ-~sful 
devdopme7lt ~JY DTC of the "book entry only" (BEO) system for securiti.~ issuance and trans-
fer has resul ted in substantial ~-avings for securities issuers. BEO securiti es invol•;e only one 
"global" cer-tificate p;':r i.,:me to be held by DTC. Neither BEO certificates nor regiotered own-
ership ar.~ zwailabie to investors. DTC 1989 Report, supra note 23, at 28. Ahout r.\.)'fo of ail 
nm::icipal debt issutd Juring 1989 invoived BEO securities. Id. Additional cost reductions 
have be-er! :1r..:hi-:::vr::d through DTC~s Fast A.uto:mated Securities Transfer {Fi·\.ST) Systern, in 
~;;hi~ti '··r.:c.i:::-.nc;: c~rtific~:rt>:~s!' an: 1eft ,;vith is:~ueJ.-s' transfer ~tgents) >:;vith daily adjustments in 
boJ~ne-es! thereby further n::<lucin.g the nlovem~nt of physical certiTic:;rtes. See !d. s·,t 17. 
38 Int:;n'ie·;v ~v·i.{!l :?..ichard 1"\fess.on, General Couns..el, '"'fhe Depository ·rrYst Cornpany .. in 
tt·ft \V ~~ cr:<. City (July 6, 1938). 
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b. Government Securities-Fedwire and the 
"Clearing Bank" System 
321 
United States Treasury securities are virtually all uncertificated 
(book-entry)/9 yet the market reflects the same propensity for inter-
mediary contro1.40 Book-entry Treasury securities are subject to a 
"tiered" system of ownership and transfer established by Treasury 
Department regulations.41 Only a "depository institution'' (D I) can 
39 As of December 31, 1985, 97% of the outstanding principal amount of marketable 
United States Treasury securities were in book-entry form. See Regulations Governing Book-
Entry T reasury Bonds, Notes, and Bills, Summary of Department of T re:3.Sury, 51 Fed. Reg. 
8846 (proposed March 14, 1986) (To be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 357) [hereinafter March 
TRADES Summary]. Since 1978 Treasury bills have been issued only in book-entry form, and 
since July l, 1986 all Treasury securities have been issued only in book-entry form. Id. Securi-
ties issued by various Federal agencies with full or partial guaranties by the United States 
government also are issued in book-entry form. See infra note 126 (citing relevant regulations 
applicable to such agency securities). The following discussion generally applies to such 
agency book-entry securities as well as to book-entry Treasury securities. ()ne important type 
of Federal agency security, "mortgage-backed pass-through" securitie-3 guaranteed by the 
Government National Mortgage Association (usually called "Ginnie Maes"), is >J o t issued in 
book-entry form, and clearing and settlement for Ginnie Maes continues to involve physical 
deliveries and registration and reissuance in the name of bend1ciai owners. See generally 
Stigum, Trade, supra note 4, at 151-68, 263-78. A new system for Ginnie !'viae clearing and 
settlem•.:nt is emerging. In that system Participants Trust Company {PTC), :; New York lim-
ited purpose trust company, functions as a securities depository and M:BS Clr.aring Corpora-
tion (MBSCC) perform:; trade recording, comparison, and netting servic<.-s . ::.ec: generally Self 
Regulatory Organizations; Participants Trust Company; O rder Granting Regist ration as a 
Clearing Agency and Statement of Reasons, Exchange Act Release No. 26,671, 54 Fed. R eg. 
13,266 (March 3 1, 1989) (PTS System) [hereinafter PTS System]; Self Reguiatory Organiza-
tions, MBS Clearing Corporation, G rder G ranting Registration as a Ck.aring Agency and 
Statement of Reasons, Exchange Act Release No. 24,(\46, 52 Fed . Reg. 4218 (Feb. 10, 1987) 
[hereinafter MBSCC System]. Clearing and settlement in the .?TC -ivl8SCC ~.y~:tem will be 
similar to the DTC-NSCC system in many respects. See PTS Syst.:m . jllpn>; MBSCC Syst~:m, 
supra. 
40 For a description of the market for United State;; Treasur:; securit:es, see Gen;;ral A'> 
count ing Office, U .S. Treasury Securities, The Marker~ Struc ture, Risks, and Regulation 
(1986) [hereinafter GAO Report]. See abo Association of R':s:~rve Ci ty Banker:> , RepDrt of the 
Working Group of the Association of Reserve City Bankers on .8cc Y.-Entry Daylight Over-
drafts (1986) [hereinafter Reserve City Ban!<ers Report] . Tile lJ niled Sta r.es government secur-
ities market is unquestionably the larges t and most important c.:.:eurit ies mar".: -~t !n th e worid . 
4 ' See 3 i C.F.R. §§ 306.11 5-306. 122; 350.2-3 50.6 (1990). ·n~: Departmti}t ofTceasury h2s 
described the system as follows: 
Assume that an individual ("Individual Investor") has iav:::s ~ ':d in :1 Trcasur _y 
5-year nok through a local govemment securiiies d,caier (""Loc~l I>:c.ler" ). Lccal 
Dt~3.1er 'NiH be maintaining one or more Tre3sury 5-;,.ear r~ otc.!; cf th~ ;;a!ne issue 
through another book-entry custC'..dia:n such as a lt;..rg:':r ;svv~r-.:unent secu;itits 
dea1.er c··l'Iat1ona1 I)caler"). National Dealer \lJQU}d, most hke.i y, n..~ m.aE~ -:~in1ng 
the 5-year notes thcough a bank ("Clearing 8 1l.nk"). Cbuir:g Bank wc.uld o-:: 
:;:-.:1aintaining th-'= 5-year note-s directly in an accoun~ f!t a :f-::d-.:i·B1 R~~:~ e;--v .: .Bank . 
Each of thr:: boo~< entry custc-dians will record on ii s t}(t:J !r.s ;_.; ~~c :Jri t i es J:Tl::Li :tn sined 
[or th;~ 3Ccount of the book-ent ry custodian b .. -;low it ~n the chJi:J, r1rJd lc-cai d.::aler 
·,;y11l record c.n. it:> bcl{)ks the intere.q of Individu ~d in~/t~te r. 
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attain a status equivalent to that of a registered owner on the books of 
a Federal Reserve Bank.42 Thus, an active trader of book-entry 
Treasury securities, that is not itself a DI, can only obtain an interest 
in securities through an account with an intermediary (either a DI or 
another downstream intermediary).43 Just as direct participation in 
DTC is limited to its financial institution members, only Dis have 
access to securities accounts on the books of the Fed.44 
It follows that clearing and settlement in the book-entry Treas-
ury securities market45 necessarily involves the participation of Dis. 
Most trades are cleared and settled for the principal government se-
curities dealers and brokers by only three banks, known in this con-
text as "clearing banks."46 Instead of settling on a netted basis on a 
day following the trade date, book-entry Treasury securities are trans-
ferred against payment on a real-time, continual basis throughout 
each business day. These practices are made possible by the Fedwire 
system.47 A participating DI can transfer securities electronically on 
Fedwire to another DI and simultaneously receive payment from the 
March TRADES Summary, supra note 39, at 8846. 
4 2 Treasury regulations applicable to book-entry Treasury securities, as written, contem-
plate that only a "member bank" (defined as a member of a Federal Reserve Bank) can main-
tain a book-entry securities account with a Federal Reserve Bank. See 31 C.F.R. 
§§ 306.115(g), 306.1l7(a) (1 990). However, those privileges have been extended by the various 
Federal Reserve Banks to all depository institutions. Telephone interview with Stephen Smith, 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York (October 11, 1989); see 12 U.S.C. § 46l(b)(l)(A) (1988) 
(defining "depository institution" essentially as an entity eligible to apply for federal deposit 
insurance) . 
-+3 Transfer and pledge of interests in bcok-entry Treasury securities under the Book-Entry 
Treasury Regulations is discussed infra text at notes 125-54. Investors who do not require the 
fle xibiiity of intermediary con trol, such as individuals that desire to hold sxurities for long 
p-eriods, now have the option of establishing a b<x>k-entry security account directly with the 
D epartment of Treasury. See 31 C.F.R. §§ 357.20- 357.32 (1990) (regulations dealing with 
the Treasury Direct system). 
4-i The various Federal Re-seiVe Banks are referred to as the Fed. 
4 5 The market for T reasury securities is an OTC market. See generally GAO Report, 
supra note 40, at 18-32. 
4 6 Prior to the combinaticn of The Bank of New York and Irving T rust Company , there 
were four "clear ing banks": Manufacturers Hanover Trust Company, The Bank of New York, 
lrving Trust Company, and Secmity Pacific National Bank. Stigum, Trade, supra note 4, at 
i22.-24. One clearing banker estimated that the top three clearing banks clear ~curi ties trades 
of rnor·~ chan §300 billion r,:.er day on average. ld. at 124-25. 
"n Fo.:\wire is a computerized comm,Jnications system operatoj by the Federal Reserve Sys-
te-.T! for t.hc trnn.s ier of funds and bcok-entry Treasury and federal agency secmities among 
perticipating Dis. See Federal R :.-serve System Regulation J, 12 C.F.R. §§ 210.25-210.38 
( \ 9S'0) (wire trans fers of funds); Federal Reserve Bank of New York Operating Circulars Nos. 
Zl (:BcxJk -Entcy Se<:ui~bes) (re;·. 1977); 2 i A (On-Line Transactions in B<Jok-Entry :3-<.--curities 
(rev. _t 938) . Crth.~r .F ed:.:~ ral R~servc Banks have operating circulars t hat are subs tantially the 
3.':1ril·~ ~lS Op{:ra~ing Citculars 21 and 2 iA. For a descrirrtion of the Fed wire 5/~H i:m see Stigum. 
·Tr t::\ ~~ .::) Sl1YJfa ;·~ otc .;,~~ a t l 0.5 -2D. 
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transferee DI.48 
The Fedwire system involves enormous extensions of intra-day 
credit, in the form of overdrafts, by the clearing banks to the brokers 
and dealers. When a dealer's clearing bank receives securities against 
payment the dealer often does not have enough in its account with the 
clearing bank to pay the clearing bank, thereby creating an overdraft 
in the dealer's account. During the day the Fed, in turn, must extend 
overdraft credit to the clearing banks. 49 A clearing bank looks to se-
curities received and allocated to the dealer's "clearing account"50 as 
collateral for this daylight overdraft credit. Before the end of the day, 
the dealers expect to receive funds, mostly from instructing the clear-
ing bank to transfer securities over Fedwire against payment, so as to 
4 8 Fedwire permits a participating DI to transfer securities to another participating DI 
against payment. Federal Reserve Bank of New York Operating Circular 21A, para. 7. 
Although these transfers are final, it necessarily follows that the recipient simply could reverse 
the transaction by sending the securities back to the transferor against payment. Fedwire also 
accommodates so-called "free transfers," not made against payment, as well as "funds only" 
transfers not involving securities. See Stigum, Trade, supra note 4, at 105-08. 
49 The dollar amounts involved are staggering. In 1988 the average daily peak overdrafts 
(based on two week averages) with the Fed attributable to receipt of book-entry securities 
against payment, for all Dis, were almost $60 billion. Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System, Recommendations of the Payments System Policy Committee 18, 35 (1989) 
[hereinafter Policy Committee Recommendations]. Presumably, most of these overdrafts were 
incurred by the most active clearing banks. See Reserve City Bankers Report, supra note 40, 
at 20-21 (estimating that more than 75% of average daily book-entry overdrafts were attribu-
table to the five largest clearing banks). Officials in the Federal Reserve System have expressed 
much concern about the amount of these (as well as non-book-entry securities related) daylight 
overdrafts. See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Modifications to the Pay-
ments System Risk Reduction Program; Book-entry Securities Transfers, Docket No. R-0669, 
55 Fed. Reg. 22,087 (May 31, 1990) (adopting proposal that DI's funds and book-entry over-
drafts be combined for purposes of compliance with net debit cap, adopting modified proposal 
for collateralization of certain overdrafts, and adopting procedures for collateralization); see 
also Payments Task Force Report, supra note 32; Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System, A Strategic Plan for Managing Risk in the Payments System, Report of the Large-
Dollar Payments System Advisory Group to the Payments System Policy Committee of the 
Federal Reserve System ( 1988). In part because of the Fed's concerns about daylight over-
drafts, the Government Securities Clearing Corporation (GSCC), a subsidiary of NSCC, has 
developed a system to intre<luce the benefits of multilateral netting among principal govern-
ment securities market participa11ts. See Stigum, Trade, supra note 4, at 257-62. Such a net-
ting scheme could substantially reduce transfers of book-entry securities over Fedwire and, 
consequently, reduce overdrafts. In 1988 GSCC began operation of automated comparisons of 
government securities trades and in 1989 it began implementation of a netting scheme. See 
Self-Regulatory Organizations; Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes By The Government 
Securities Clearing Corporation Regarding Its Proposed Netting System, Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 34-27,006, 54 Fed. Reg. 29,798 (July 14, 1989); NSCC 1989 Report, supra note 24, at 
10. 
5° Clearing banks normally obtain a security interest in !ill securities in a dealer-customer's 
"clearing account"- i.e., securitie3 ilOt allocated to an account maintained with the clearing 
ban'.c for fully paid-for securities of the dealer's customers. See Stigum, Trade, supra note 4, at 
177-79. 
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cover their overdrafts. Many of these transfers against payment in- · 
volve so-called repurchase agreements (repos). 51 
2. The Selection of Intermediaries by Market Participants 
The propensity of investors to allmv interrnediaries to control ·j 
their securities is apparent from the volume of DTC and NSCC cus- , 
tody and clearing activity. And, in the government securities market l 
D I control is a necessity. Evidence of market behavior and anecdotal ! 
perceptions of professionals in the securities industry suggest that ·1 
market participants32 generally exercise extreme care in the selection 
of the intermediaries who are to control their securities. Given their 
awa.reness of potentially disastrous consequences of securities inter-
medial)' insolvency and misbehavior, to be addressed shortly, market 
participants tend to choose safe intermediaries where the risks of in-
soivency and misbehavior are perceived to be essentially nil. 
The largest institutional i ~westors, including insurance compa-
nies, pension funds, and investment companies (such as mutual funds) 
normally select large, "blue chip" con1mercial banks as their "custo-
dians."53 Some other active investors, however, a11mv securities firms 
to control their securities. 54 The high level of success with which 
-----------------------------
51 Ro:JXlS 'l.!e a.n important means for dea]e:rs ~c ob£ain overnight financing necessary to 
r::1bance daylight onrdrafts. S<-e Stigum, T'<e Rcr{) And Re·1erse Niarkets 25-26, 57 ( 1989) 
[bereina.fh:r, Sti~um, Repo]. In a repo, a seller of a .security (a funds borrower) transfers the 
;;,_:{: 'Jrity ~c. '' r)ny;ot (a hnds lender) under an arrang.:mem whereby the securities seller agrees 
to r.~p t;.rcb <l::''': ch t: 'Aocurity on a spec!lled catc (often the ne;\t day) at a sp..."'Cified price, and the 
:S:ecnrici~ b uyer z.~ rees to resell tile seeuriry back to th<: seller. From the perspective of the 
bttye:. 1h.-: trJ.Psacti:Jn is "3. reverse repurchas-:: agreem:.::nt (rev~rs-~ repo). Repos serve the func-
ti:) !·~ o.t" S(.'"Cu ~· ;xi ·}O fTO'';~r' ings :1..nd loans, (.~_\though they £~r.: dtnotnina'Ced as sales and resales. The 
c ~; c r.:t;rr;.lc~ .:; f ft ~: ~ransac.ti -J11 ar~ sue!: that ·.vh~r2 th~ :·>: :11er (funds bo1Tower) pays the repur-
chB-!sc Drlc~ ·!·:!pays the 1oan\ \:he buye~ (funds 1end~ ·t) ·r(~c:.:=:ives a profit {a return on the 
rncr.~y 1o::tn~1) . l :t :H 5~6 . 'Th~ legal characttrizl.r tion c [ rcrr:)S for various purposes is not 
•:::lt.a:c. s~ lni.1:d note 1'.22 . 
-'2 I t s·;-_t:Juld t~t ~r;1?has1z :..~:1 a ;_~ain that t:·:ls d isc:.E;~ l or:: \~Or:':S not :c;icompass srnaller investors 
~.-.,.· ft o c..r..:; fnlly CC' I/e:erl by SJPC and pri-vate insur2.nc~. s~;e supra note 8. 
:53 s.,c: Sthu m. T ,:r" r.!e , supra note,,, <! t :Bl (T'd )ost majoi jJ'Jnfo~io manr-.g;;:rs use a big (top 
25) ban k ::.::; a cus to·:l"y bank, a.nd t1:.e g·::nf!ra1 -vi e t;~i is that the Fed i.s the d-e facto guarantor of 
G .. ny z;uch ';;snk. 11 ) . Srno.Ut r i:nstltGtio na.! i.(Y/ t:stors cften i_lSt s rn.all~r custodians. I d. at 220-21. 
~fh ~ 11S~ of :.:: 11Stodi::~ :-1 b~~n.ks by -~;-;. s ti t :.rtiv ·~~ta1 i :: v~~~t,') r.:; is not a r-.ecern phenornenon. See ABA 
R .. ;.": P"'-"'.·l-:. s::::p :;:- r.~ net.:~ S, :rt 32. L-·~~~a J r~::s t dcr-t n ;J.s c.1 ~1 i : J '/ .~~; t rn cn. t companies registered under the 
~i.":.~Y~~s tn_i C!"l t c::;tnp;i:ny 1\ct of l j.:~ .[; essent1a11y n~a~(e mair~t::1·w.nce of their securities through an 
i;.1 J~~)'~·n_ . .].:;·n t -;;;:;.r\\ cu::; tc-d i2tn t h<: 0~1 ~y pr~cticr:d :\\;:er; -; ~t i ·r·~. Ste ! .5 ·u.s. C. § 30a-1 7(f) (1988); 
i "I ~:~ . I----. 2~ .. § "2 7:).17 f-l -27G. 1--? r./.~ ( 19~.8) . ?'Ac· ~·-::f}Y~r J b~:: •..:a G~~ tnstit:Jt io:!ai investors now use the 
· ;)~[(~ I I~: Sy :ste ~---r:. , th-: '-i~) ,:: cJ b~.nk (:t;.:;;·~od! £~rl s r.h~:rt co:r ~ -~ ~·ol ·;e.cui·it.i:;s throu,gh I )TC cssentia11y 
-~J l-1,) ~'-.:>~~ ~1 i:~:_, rr:n :iE ::.;~d. ~-:-;:: S1: pl' :J T>'~--~ r: .. 
5 ·'· :K. ~·:GV-'1 :-':Ig-::abie .·;;~")~ .:n .. ~ -: ... s ·;.J~ thi :: b ·• c.·~: -~: t · -dec.l ~:rs :.;~_t ~-' e j.- J"o· .. - i ;:i~d s.orr1e insight concerning 
~l r; Y-. :E: ~ .. ---::-:s !)"l~ t :-n'".•ir:taiT: c~ ~- s ~ or r-, ~::::· ;Jcc :~)1:;··.-c~~ ~n e :·~r~,~- :·ss r_;£" cnr,~b ined ~ r~ su.rance wverage provided 
:::· :~:;r?C <ii'L~ 9 ~"i --,,a te in~~-EJ ? ei~.;. :Jnc .r~gic:Hl i R; rn r,~;~o.:-~· .. ::d ~:h;.: t -~.3 of s. recent date on]y four ( 4) 
[~{ i Ts -:::: •_'l.i_)i<".:t:'" ··. t_r· 2.C -'~ (:,l_J.n-~. s -::: :~ •.:t·t:_l ;xJ .i. ~ '/'.--l!.c : i :·:~; =:>:_; : ·J] ~~i ::tc-d :. l.O ·,~~1illi on p ;! f r::nsto a1~r SIPC and 
1990] BEYOND NEGOTIABILITY 325 
large investors have selected securities intermediaries is indicated by 
the minimal losses experienced by investors not protected by SIPC 
when securities intermediaries have failed. 55 The conciusion is ines-
, capable that either intermediaries selected by important securities 
market participants generally have not failed or misbehaved to the 
investors' detriment, or such failures have not resulted in serious 
shortfalls in customer securities. Significant losses incurred by claim-
ants against several failed government securities dealers in recent 
years provide striking exceptions to this pattern. 56 It also appears 
that many active investors tend to select only one custodian bank or 
securities firm to act as a principal securities intermediary. 57 
B. Risks Posed by Securities Intermediaries 
When an intermediary becomes insolvent and the securities that 
it controls are insufficient to satisfy all of the claims of its customers 
and creditors, priority disputes among claimants to the available se-
curities may ensue. 58 The applicable legal regime must sort out these 
private insurance coverage, one (1) of which exceeded $25 million in value. Another regional 
firm reported that as of a recent date .8% of its customer accounts exceeded in value its com-
bined SIPC and private insurance coverage, but the aggregate value of those accounts repre-
sented 52% of the aggregate of all of its customer accounts. The largest such account was 
valued at $88,412,000. A larger, national firm reported that , on a recent date, it maintained 
1,569 customer accounts with cash balances in excess of the applicable 5100,000 SIPC cover-
age for cash claims and 5,071 accounts with securities values in excess of the applicable 
:5500,000 SIPC coverage for securities claims. There were 400 of these accounts that exceeded 
in valu ..: both the $100,000 cash claim coverage and the $500,000 securities claim coverage, 
and 56 of those 400 exceeded in value the $ !0 million in private insurance carried by that firm. 
:55 During the p.::riod from 1971 through 1989, only 299 (less than .2%) of the more than 
250,000 claims made in SIPC proceedings exceeded the protection provided by SIP A. Securi-
ties Investor Protection Corporation, Annual Report 1989 7 [hereinafter SIPC 1989 Report]. 
The aggregate unsatisfied portion of these claims through 1988 was § 19.1 million. ld. Thus, 
the mean of unsatisfied portions of claims for these years W 3.S approximately $64,000. When 
compared to the size and volume of the securities mar.kets, the relatively small mean losses 
indicate thal the large, active investors generally have selected secmities intermediaries that 
have not failed. Experience with failed commercial banks has been even more striking. Sub-
stantial shortfalls of customer securities controlled by failed banks have been virtually nonexis-
tent. Tdephone interviews with C<1rro!l R. Shifflett, Assistant General Counsel, Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (May 15 and June 29, 1989). 
56 See infra notes 65-67 and accompanying text. 
57 Telephone interview wi th Thomas F. Coolica n, Assistant General Counsel, Metropoli-
tan Life Insurance Company {July 6, 1939); Telephone Intervie w with Thomas L Mahon, Jr., 
Assis[;mt T reasurer. New York Life Insurance Company (June 28, 1989). The reaso n for this 
oe;u vior doubtl-ess arises from the fact that an active investor's secmities trades are, in effect, 
cleared and settled by its in termediary. See Si:igu;n, Trade, supra note 4, ar 219. 
52 Pai~C II I, infra, considers ho>.v an inll.dequate pie is divided when such events occur. The 
reasons why an intermediary might bc"Corne insolvent, and the rC'-?,sons why the se.;uri ties avail-
able to an insolve:1t intenned iary might be insufficien~ to satisfy the claims of its customers 
who have paid fo; the se::UJities, are imponant areas of inqui ry , but a deta il<xi exploration of 
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claims and distribute the assets of the insolvent firm (or the asset 
value) to some or all of the competing claimants. More significant, 
even when an intermediary has not failed, those who claim through 
that intermediary (and who are not fully covered by SIPC or private 
insurance), those who employ that intermediary to execute trades, 
and secured creditors of and other transferees from that intermediary, 
all must consider, ex ante, what the effects of the intermediary failure 
would be. Although actual intermediary insolvencies and actual pri-
ority contests may be relatively rare, applicable distributional rules 
figure into an enormous variety and quantity of securities market 
transactions. These credit risks borne by customers and creditors of 
securities intermediaries are addressed and affected by a variety of ap-
proaches under existing federal and state law. 
The regulatory approach makes it less likely that intermediaries 
will become insolvent. Financial institutions that serve as securities 
intermediaries, whether banks or securities firms, are subject to broad 
regulation and supervision. 59 The regulatory approach also seeks to 
ensure that an intermediary will control sufficient securities to cover 
claims of its customers that have paid for them. Then, even if the 
intermediary were to become insolvent, customers' claims to securi-
ties would be satisfied.60 rne "segregation" and other "customer pro-
tection" rules applicable to registered broker-dealers are examples.6 1 
those matters is beyond the scope of this article. Fraud, mistake, back office operational 
problems, a.nd general market conditions may be involved. 
59 Capital requirements, restrictions on powers, requirements of prudency, audits, financial 
reporting, and supervisory examinations are examples. See generally, e.g., Guttman, supra 
note 4, at 19-11 to -20 (reporting and net capital requirements for broker-de.'\lers); A. Pollard, 
J. Passaic, K. Ellis & J. Daly, Banking Law in the United States 57-104 (1988) (bank regula-
tors' enforcement powers), 191-266 (national bank powers and lending limits, r.:::strictions on 
bank transactions with affiliates, reserve and capital requirements). 
60 See infra Part III (discussing insolvency proce.edings of sccuritiQ; intermediaries). 
6i As a general matter, a broker-dealer is required to maintain poss...."'Ssion or control of its 
customers ' fully-paid and excess margin securities. Ser. SEC Rule 15c3-3(b )( 1 ), 17 C.F.R. 
§ 240.15c3-3(b)(1) (!990) (broker or dealer must promptly obtain and maintain possession or 
•::ontrol of fully-paid customer securities and customer excess margin securit ies); § 240.15c3-
3( c) (specifying control of securities to include securi ties (i) deposited in a clearing r;.or;.JOration, 
(ii) in a broker's or dealer's acrount with another broker or dealer, (i ii) in the precess of trans-
fer by an issuer or transfer agent, (iv) in the custody of c.~n a.in foreign d.<:positories, cle.aring 
ag·::ncies or custodian banl<s, (v) in the custoDy or control oi'::. b:m:,, (vi) in tnu·,sit or in cus-
tody of a subsidiary of the broker-dealer, ;md (vii) in other control locat ions 2.;Jp;·oved by the 
SEC) (in the case of locations mentioned in (ii) and (v), tl1e s.;curitie:; must be n'':...int<1.ined fr~ 
of any charges, liens, or other daims of the other broker or dv.:<l>:r 'Jf the b<nk or persons 
claiming through any of them). This normally means th~ t ':he C'is tom ,::r ;.:-:uri ties 1m~ main-
ta.i:nW in a "s.:gregated" account maintained ·with the bro~<. .:: r or dealer or ban".L Broker-i..iea]e:rs 
are ;;1J1o~·ed some fl~xibility as to timing ::ind1 at an y poin t in hn1e, a. bro~er-deu.l'::r th.at docs not 
have possession or controi of sufficient securities n,~vertheb;s m:cty he .in (x> n-:p !iance . .See, .:.g., 
SEC P'"nie 15c3-3(b)(2), 15c3-3{d), 17 C.F.i~-- § 2 .. 1-Q.1 5c3 ~ 3(b)(2) (19:;0) C \ttrrr:~ : <•r:l.ry lazs" jn 
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Banks also are required to maintain possession or control of their cus-
tomers' securities. 62 Not surprisingly, the regulatory approach is not 
foolproof, as both banks and securities firms sometimes fail63 and 
shortfalls in customer securities are the norm in securities firm insol-
obtaining possession or control of securities are permitted if they result from "normal business 
operations" and the "broker or dealer takes timely steps in good faith to establish prompt 
physical possession or control"); § 15c3-3(d) (1990) (determination of possession or coatrol of 
securities made at close of business day for next preceding business day and time periods speci-
fied for moving securities from certain noncontrol locations to qualifying control locations). 
Customers retain the "absolute right ... to receive in the course of normal business operations 
following demand . . . the physical delivery of certificates." SEC Rule 15c3-3(b )(1), 17 C.F.R. 
§ 240.15c3-3(1) (1 990). Broker-dealers also are required to maintain a special reserve account 
with a bank for the exclusive benefit of customers. SEC Rule 15c3-3(e), 17 C.P.R. § 240.15c3-
3(e) (1990); see also 15 U.S.C. § 8(b) (1988); SEC Rule 8c-l, 17 C.F.R. § 240.8c-1 (1990) 
(broker-dealers prohibited from hypothecating customer securities so as to (i) commingle se-
curities with other customer securities (in absence of customer's consent), (ii) commingle cus-
tomer secmities with noncustomer securities, a11d (iii) ~ure amounts in excess of aggregate 
indebtedness of all customers as to customer securities); SEC Rule 17a-13, 17 C.F.R. 
§ 24D.l7a-13 (199D) (broker-dealers required to ma..~e quarterly counts and verifications of all 
securities they control and to compare the results with their records). 
62 For exan1ple, national bank.s holding assets while acting in a fiduciary capacity in the 
exercise of trust powers must segregate those a&..<:ets from the general assets of the bank. 12 
U.S.C. § 92a (1988); see i2 C.F.R. §§ 9.1-9.22 (1990). When conducted by a national bank's 
trust department, bank safekeeping and custody services are subject to the same rules that 
apply to fiduciary activities even though no investment discretion is involved. See Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency, Handbook For National Trust Examiners, Precedents and Opin-
ions, 5 Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 59,225, No. 9.2020 (1988). Although national banks 
that do not have trust powers may undertake safekeeping and custody arrangements thai do 
not involve discretion, those activities are not subject to the same restrictions on control and 
segregation that apply in the case of trust depa..--tments. But all national banks that fail to 
exercise proper control over customer securities are subject to enforcement proceedings by the 
Comptrolier of the Curren:..:y. So~ 12 U.S. C. § 92a(k) (1938) (proceeding to revoke tmst pow-
ers on account of unlawful or unsound exercise of powers),§ 1818(b) (1988) (proceeding for 
cease and desist order <>gainst national bank engaging in unsafe or unsound banking practices); 
sc-.:: also Comptroller of the Currency, News Releas<e No. 84-75 (November 21, 1984) (an-
nouncing consent order against First National Bank of Maryland relating to len.ding of cus-
tomer securities kept in safz:keeping). 
63 From 1971, when SIPA was enacted, through 1989, 212 SIPA proceedings have been 
commenced. SIPC 19:39 Report, supra note 55, at 6. Prior to SIPA, however, swckbroker 
insoivencies ha.d b-een commonplace during some p-eriods. See, e.g., id. at 32 (During the "dif-
ficult years of 1968-70 ... [h]undreds of broker-dealers were merged, acquired or simply went 
out of bu.'aness. Some were unable to meet their obligations to customers and went bankrupt. 
Public confidP.ncc in our securities markets was in jeopardy."). In 1988, 200 banks insured by 
the FDIC faik-d. Q,;,,;;rai Accounting Office, Finailcial Audit, Federal Deposit Insurance Cor-
ponnion's 1936 and 1987 Financial State:nents 6 ( 1989). In 1987, 184 failed; in 1986, 138 
failed; in 1985, 11 o L:1iled; iu 1934, 78 fHilt:d; z..nd in 1983, 48 f~iled. Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporaiion, 1987 Annual R::por1 12 (1988). This art.icle does not cAarnine whether "im-
proved" methods of regulation &"'ld supervision in the United States would r·esult in substan-
tially fe';"ver inso1v~;ncies of financial institutions or )llhethe:r any regulatory prvcess having that 
result would be wif-e. Certainly thHt matter is rr.-eeiving much attention, hoV.' ·~ver. See, e.g., 
Fin.?.nci::U I nstitu~ _!ons Stefor-nJ, t1eco-:.;ery·, and Enforc~rnent i\ct of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-73, 
103 StB.t 1:3 3 (J 
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vencies. 64 But the most serious shortfalls have occurred in cases of 
failed government securities dealers that were not subject to regula-
tion. 65 Largely as a result of these losses, the Government Securities 
Act of 1986 was passed. 66 That Act requires the Secretary of the 
Treasury to adopt rules for customer protection, " including but not 
limited to, capital adequacy standards" and rules for "the acceptance 
of custody and use of customers' securities."67 
Experience with failed unregulated government securities dealers 
suggests that the regulatory approach may exert a more powerful in-
fluence than careful selection of intermediaries by investors. But 
these aberrations probably can be explained without undermining the 
basic assumption that market participants generally are successful in 
their selections of intermediaries. 68 
64 In the 206 proceedings commenced under SIP A through year-end 1988, all but eight 
required advances by SIPC to cover customer securities shortfalls. Telephone interview with 
J. H. Moelter, Vice President-Operations, Securities Investor Protection Corporation (October 
18, ! 989). Bank insolvencies, however, have resulted in a low incidence of shortfalls in cus-
tomer property held in custody or trust. See supra note 55. It is possible that the differing 
experiences result, in part, from the fact that securities firms are more likely to be involved in 
active trading for their own accounts. Or, because bank custodians normally are sel~ted to 
control securities for reasons of safety, it may be that banks with substantial custody accounts 
simply have not often failed. 
65 See GAO Report, supra note 40, app. VIII, at 143-51 (summarizing pertinent facts con-
cerning failures of Drysdale Government Securities, Inc. (1982), Comark (1982), LDmbard-
Wa!l, Inc. (1982), Lion Capital Group (1984), E.S.M. Government Securities, Inc. (1985), 
Beviil, Bresler, and Schulman Asset Management Corp. (1985)). T he SEC estimated that from 
1982 to 1986 "investors lost about $900 million before recoveries from reduced income taxes, 
insurance claims, and civil suits, if any," resulting from these failures and that more than $300 
million of these losses resulted from the failme of E. S.M. Government Securities, Inc. alone. 
Id., at 13-14 & n. 6. 
66 Pub. L. No. 99-571, 15 U.S.C. 78a {1988). 
67 15 U.S.C. § 78d-S(b)(1)(a) (1988). The Treasury regulations adopted under the Act re~ 
quire government s.~urities brokers a.<'1d dealers (including DI's not qualifying for exemption) 
that are not registered under the Securities and Excha.11ge Act of 1934, as amended, to comply 
with SEC Ru ie 15c3-3, with certain exceptions. 17 C.F. R. § 403.1 (1990); see supra note 61 
(discussing SEC Rule 15c3-3). Requirements similar to SEC Rule 15c3-1, deal.ing with nd 
capital, also were adopted for those government securities brokers and dealers. See 17 C.F.R. 
§ 402.2- 402.2d (19C:D); SEC Rule 15c3-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-l (1990). 
6 8 See supra notes 52-57 and accompanying text (assumptions wnceming market behav-
ior). The biggest losers in these government securities dealer insolvencies were investors (such 
as school districts, municip3.lities, and thrift institutions} with cash to invest for short terms 
who -entered into repo transactions. Ivlany were victims of outright fraud who apparently be-
iieved (foolishly, p-erhaps, as it turned out) that their securities "collateral" was segregated and 
held for them by a third party custodian. For an -enlightening treatment of one such c(.e;;~J,or 
failure, see Failure of Bevill, Bresier & Schuiman, A New Jersey Government S~mities 
Dealer: He<t.ring Before the Subcommittee on Commerce, Consumer, and i•!Ionetary Aff;;.irs of 
the House Com.!Ttittee on Government Operations, 99th Cong., lst Sess. (1985). Heightem:d 
""'nsitivity to intermediary risk, combine-d with regulatory controls, may prev.::nt such huge 
los..<:e> in the future. Purstk'\Ilt to regulations issued under the Govem.ment Sccuritie> /\ct, 
s.-ec~lrities flrtns and b2..t_J3cs who do not deliver r~po ucollateral" to their repo pBrticipants ar;_: 
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The insurance approach to c!.lstomer risk is exemplified by th:: 
protection provided by SIPC, pursuant to SIP A , and private ins' . .:tr-
ance covering customer interests. 69 This approach provides pro tee-· 
tion to investors whose claims are within the coverage limits and who, 
by hypothesis, may lack the sophistication and resources necessary w 
evaluate any particular intermediary. These ixrvestors thereby may 
take advantage of the convenience of an intennediary account without 
substantial risk. 70 
The property law opproach-application of property 1aw rules 
that protect purchasers against earlier and subsequent competing in-
terests in the event of an intermediary insolvency-also may provide 
investor and creditor protection. Although these rules can provide 
security and comfort to a transferee of a property interest, reliance on 
traditional property la'iv concepts for investor and secured cred itor 
protection in the event of an intermediary insolvency is problematic . 
Existing property law rules either are not easily a aptable to t}v; i:nter·-
mediary control-fungible bulk context or can result in little protection 
when applied. 71 In many respects property law concepts provide 2.n 
awkward and unsatisfactory approach to codifying rJ1es for clai~·!Fo to 
• • ll tl b • }' • • f'. 'bl ' " 7~ "'/\ r secuntlcs contro. e., y mtermeusx1es m ,untp ;: omK ... ~vlo.reove:I, 
property law rules ultimately must be applied in deference to disni1:m · 
tional rules applicable in an insolvency proceeding, where they may <_•r 
may not be honored. 73 
A risk allvcadon apptoach contenrplates legal rules tb~tt dis~ 
tribute assets to daimants based o:n objective classifications of t1:.;:; 
claimants' status and relationship to the fai1ed :dn:-n. In. contra.st w t bi; 
·a .. • ·1 , ... • 1 , ~ . 1' property 1.aw approac.Q., a ns~~ a.!10C8.i::on apprvac.n WGi.W1 noi: Ot~ 
17round"'d o·n ,rlp-t»nm· i--y, t i()f!S ..-,r r ' ;<' ;''I"Pt'·p o· T')""' '"'"'"" !·nr_,., .C.<O'C' 1'n ,..,,,r;. -:,--.-,_ 
0 "-' · . ~J.v . .._,_, J._'t .... ~ -~"...1. '\.-1 ,...., •.._._t ~~~ .!..'.!....., . .,... ....,_. 1 . \ ,!-•'-'!. \..j , :.. -........~-~ ..... :}J..) . 1./(.-.. ·. t -,... \.·t 
lar assets. An exarnple of this approach is the distributional n.1ie ::1.1--"'· 
plicable to securities 1in:n lnsolvtncie;; undei SJI'.,\. 7 -'· 
--------------·----- - -------.. ----- ---·---·-·--------- .. --- -- ----
required elther to retain corr~rol of ;-,;i-~'.J ~;.coHat~;rar, o ~ to pfov1de sp~:-c:i.R (; d1Y..:L.: 3;jre:3 :Jf :e1·~~,~ in 
risks to their repo participr .. n t3 . 17 C.F.R . § ~03 . 5(d){ i;( ';) C 9SU). 
69 See supra note 3; infra no i:es l ~)9-75 and a ·:;c:;)rnp;:\ r..~._:i ::-! 6 t-:~xt. 
70 The regulatory Hpproach ::.nd the insurance approach 8.Je rd!:!k::i lf th.;: n~{'.1:::r:'O:J "f '' !> 
proach were ab:2..rH.iorH:!d, r.}_t.~ in ~~-ur :~ . .;.!CC aprrr\.x~~.~b rntgl1t be ;}rohJb1i..ivciy co~;tly i.f.i a ·y~ -~,r~: __ : • ;-~~ t~1 
rnore intermediary ii.!50jY:~nci,;3 and gr:.: !.!Ci :~ };o!1frJ.L; ir.:. c:~s t{Jrn:~t s~~::uriti~ . r-\hh ct~. :;h .Sr~:=~ :·_~ 
has confinned lin~ of crc.:: b!, r;;a.~.n~ ·::n2J~c::; of ;. h"=~ SI ?C f·~n£-~ rri.rna riJ:' d .::_~::~n:J.~ on ~ .. :. :: es:~:·,.., _:;'":: ~ 
of SIPC's rnernbers. SIPA. :~ .. ~{d), !..5 ·u.s. c. § '73d.d(: ( i 933); SIP·=--:: ts·g9 Ft .  cp~'YJ:T. , ~,~-~.r·-~ ~ ' J"~.c -i:: 
55, at 32. 
71 See gGn~raUy infra _?;:;;-r~~ f f , IL:_. TV. 
72 Se-e ge·nera!ly infr:.~. -~\ni.s :u, TV . 
7 3 s~~ gen~ralJy infra P~t IJI. 
" customer p.roJ>~.r{)' '~ re;~c.rd.L:.:ss of ,.Y b ~ :d~ f:r ~~ oo~:., 3or .... ~.~-: . :~'{ z; ..t1 rJ/ t::.:; :::.':'"(.:·~:,-}·• if·s 
actlli'illy inclur}.~d in Hcusto n~ ::: t ;...-.~ cq:. t: : ... t }. :, S,;r-~ >1.f;~~ ;·l;_Yct:~J 169-·7 5 a.nd 
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The remainder of this article is largely devoted to the property 
law and risk allocation approaches, but the discussion necessarily pro-
ceeds in the constant shadow of the other approaches. It is not a 
criticism to note that the regulatory approach is not a panacea. In-
deed, that approach, in tandem with the insurance approach, proba-
bly is the most important means of investor protection. But, even in 
the best of worlds, it is likely that intermediary insolvencies and 
shortfalls of securities will occur. And, especially, when failures and 
shortfalls are hypothesized ex ante, the system of allocating loss and 
resolving priority contests must be taken into account. Morever, reg-
ulators must have some sense of the potential outcomes in order to 
determine what constitutes prudent behavior for regulated entities 
and how exposure can be minimized. 
II. TRANSFER AND PLEDGE UNDER THE U .C.C. AND THE 
BOOK-ENTRY TREASURY REGULATIONS 
This part introduces the implications of property law-primarily 
U.C.C. Articles 8 and 9 and, for book-entry Treasury securities, the 
Book-Entry Treasury Regulations-for intermediary risk. It ad-
dresses the creation and characteristics of the property interest (if 
any) received (in Example 1) by C-1, C-2, C-3, C-4, and J-l's other 
customers--claimants on the same tier who share a common interme-
diary. It also addresses the creation and perfection of the security 
interests received by /-2 and L as secured lenders to J -1.75 The dis-
cussion exposes difficulties in applying the existing property law con-
struct to fungible bulks of securities controlled by interrnediaries. Be 
warned: the literature has not synthesized fungible bulk securities 
claims under current law. As a result, the descriptive component of 
the discussion can be tedious. Indeed, that is part of the story's 
message. 
line between the property law and risk allocation approaches is not dear. Under SIP A the 
assertion of or entitlt:ment to a property claim may be necessary in order to determine that a 
claimant has "customer" status. Moreover, the application of property law rules to any prior-
ity contest necessarily has the result of allocating losses (and risk) to t:1e subordina•ed parties. 
The differences lie, perhaps, only in the degree to which property law rules play a role in the 
risk allocation process. 
75 Part IV contains a more detailed discussion of different-tier claims, such as the priority 
contests between C-1 and L, and C-1 and J -2. TI1e distributional rules that operate in insol-
vency proceedings are considered in Part HL 
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A . Articles 8 and 9 
1. Creation of Property Interest: Purchase, Transfer and Delivery 
Section 8-313( 1 f 6 specifies the exclusive means by which an in-
terest in a security can be transferred to a purchaser77 and the time 
that a transfer occurs. 78 Under the facts of Example 1, transfers to 
the customers of 1-1 could have been effected only by confirmation 
and book entry (or other identification) under 1978 section 8-
313( l)(d)(iii).79 'With one caveat, 80 it seems a safe assumption that, in 
Example 1, transfers of property interests were effected. 
The pre-1978 Article 8 does not address the means by which a 
property in terest in securities is transferred to purchasers, such as J-
1 's customers, who acquire interests through an intermediary, such as 
1-1, when the intermediary controls securities in a fungible bulkY 
Instead, pre-1978 section 8-313(1) specifies the necessary elements, 
and time of effectiveness, of a delivery. 82 Transfers such as those 
76 U.C.C. § 8-313, marked to reflect additions and deletions from the pre-1978 version, is 
quoted in full in Appendix I to this article. A brief drafting history of § 8-313 is set forth in 
Appendix II to this article. Readers who have a particular interest in the details of how to 
read § 8-3 J 3 may find it useful co re,ad Appendix II at this point. 
77 See id. § 1-201(32) (defining "purchase" to include "taking by sale, discount, negotia-
tion, mortgage, pledge, lien, issue or re-issue, gift or any other vohmtary transaction creating 
an interest in property"); § 1-201(33) (defining " purchaser" as "a perso:r. '.vho takes by 
purchase"). 
78 U .C.C. § 8-313(1 ) . "The word 'only' in the first sentence is intended to provide that the 
methods of transfer listed are exclusive and that compliance with one of them is essential to a 
valid t ransfer." l d., comment 1. 
7 9 !d. § 8-313( l)(d)(iii) {transfer occurs "at the time a financial intermediary" [here, 1- 1) 
sends a confirmat ion to t:1e purchaser "and also by book entry or otherwise idc;n tiftes as be-
longi ng to th<: purchaser . . . a q uantity of securities thclt e>Jnstitute or are part of :'1 fun gible 
bulk of ser;uritics shown on !he account of the linancial intermediary [!-1] on the books of 
&nother financ ial intermedi~r; [here, 1-2)"); see also id . § 8-3 13( l)(d)(ii) (transfer, by conrlnna-
tion and bcDk '"ntry, of in terest in f,..:ngible bulk of certifica ted securities in financial inte:rrT!cd.i-
ary's possession or uncertific-a ted so~uriti es registered in name of financia1 interrncd iary). 
80 See infra notes 104-110 and acwmpanying tex t (discussing effect of absenc:;: or insuffi -
ciency of securities controlled by intennedia.ry at time of putative transfer). 
8 1 The " fungible bulk" concept i.s discussed in more detail infm notes 92-95 and accompa-
nying text. 
82 Pre- 1978 § 8-313(1); see U.C.C § 1-201(1 4) ("'Delivery' with respect to ... certificated 
securi ties me:.<ns vobntarj tnnsfer of possession."). Pre-i978 § l-201(14) d ZA-":3 not inciude the 
word " ceni11c3.cc-d ." Moving from a deliver; -based w a transfer-based struct ure also faci li-
taied. ,~moth,:;;· icnportam feature of the 1978 Ar.-ticle 8--the treatmen1 of uncerti l'ica~ed s.xuri-
ties in a fashion that is largely parallel to the treatment aiforded certiikated secu rities. See 
U .C .(:. § 3- l02(1 }{b) (derlni!1g ·~unc..e:rtifica!ed s-=cu rity, ' ' in part! as ··a share~ pnrtjcip:.Hio n , or 
other ~nterf:-S~ iTt ·p:r:)p-crly or :111 .enterprise of th.:: iss1Jer or 2-n obligation of the ~ss ue.r ~vhich is (1) 
not repre..s·::Ltt<l by 8.n ins.:rurncnt D.nd the tntnsfel~ of ;;vhich ;t s rr:gist::-:reL~ upc~n hoo:<s I71ain-
tained for th9.t pur-po:: -~ Dy o r on behalf of the issuer,) . 1_! ncertiti c:?.ted se.curiti·:-s ~11.1y t-c tr~ns·· 
f:~-rr<:d fJy .c •::~~. s::-r:1.t·iun. of the transfer on th~ 1:--Do!<s ofth-:: issuer. Id . § 8- 313( 1)n~;). 1-;~egis tr::u:ion 
of t r~nsfer ~ :; inici.at d by Ih t: 3t TK1ing of an "instn..!cticn" by an ··apprcpri rl Z;:: q.:en;on" (foe 
cnr.re11t ·ce ~-t~t ;; :-ed o~·'DC::f lf the ;:-:e-:-..:l_~. rity is no·r 3ubje-:;t to rr.:gis(ert d p1tcls e) L•J thr~ is·~ue r. Id. 
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made to J-1's customers, mainstays of the stockbrokerage business for 
many years, do not constitute deliveries under pre-1978 section 8-
313( 1 ), but it is clear that a property interest can be transferred none-
theless under the common law. 83 
The principal operative rule in the 1978 Article 8 that deals with 
the purchase of securities is found in section 8-301 (1 ): "Upon transfer 
of a security to a purchaser (Section 8-313), the purchaser acquires 
the rights in the security which his transferor had or had actual au-
thority to convey .... " 84 Pre-1978 section 8-301(1) is to the same 
effect except it states the effect of a delivery of a security rather than 
the effect of a transfer Y5 It follows that under the pre-1978 section 8-
301 (1) a delivery is a sufficient condition for transfer of an interest in a 
security to a purchaser, but a delivery is not a necessary condition for 
such a transfer of a property interest to occur. 86 But even this basic 
point has sometimes been missed. 87 Both versions of section 8-301(1) 
state the familiar "shelter principle"-a purchaser receives what its 
transferor had-and by implication the common law maxim nemo dat 
quod non habet--one cannot give what one does not have. 88 
§ 8-308. For a description of the process of registration of transfer, see Reporter's Comment, 
supra note 5, at 936; Guttman, supra note 4, at 5-9 to 5-14. 
33 See infra notes 97-100 and accompanying text (discussing operation of "proportionate 
property interest" rule of§ 8-313(2) (second sentence)); Appendix II, infra, notes 12-14. Be-
cause U.C.C. § 8-313(1) specifies the exclusive means of transfer, provisions were added that 
accommodate expressly these nondelivery transfers effected by confirmation and book entry. 
See U.C.C. § 8-313(1)(d)(ii), (d)(iii). In addition, references to a "broker" (defined in both 
versions of § 8-303) in pre-1978 § 8-313 were changed to the broader category of "financial 
intermediary" (defined in U.C.C. § 8-313(4) to include banks, clearing corporations, and other 
appropriate entities in addition to brokers). 
84 U.C.C. § 8-301(1). U.C.C. § 8-301(2) provides important gloss: "A transferee of a lim-
ited interest acquires rights only to the extent of the interest transferred. The creation or 
release of a security interest in a security is the transfer of a limited interest .... " 
85 Pre-1978 § 8-301(1). 
36 ld.; see supra note 83. 
87 See, e.g., Cohen v. Army Moral Support Fund (In re Bevill, Bresler & Schulman Asset 
Management Corp.), 67 Bankr. 557, 603, 615 (D.N.J. 1986) ("Under [pre-1978] Article 8 .. . , 
the transfer of ownership of securities to a purchaser is governed by the concept of 'delivery.' 
. . . [I]f the three requirements for achieving delivery/transfer under ... [pre-1978 § 8-
3i3(1)(c) or U.C.C. § 8-313(l)(d)(i)] are not satisfied, then a purchaser acquires no interest in 
the securities."); Memorandum of Law of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York as Amicus 
Curiae, County of Dauphin v. Bradford Trust Co., No. 85 Civ. 2220 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) [herein-
after Bradford Trust Memo], reprinted in Ringsmuth, Federal Reserve Book-Entry System, 
and tl1e Role of the Federal Reserve, in Repurchase and Reverse Repurchase Agreements II 0-
11 (PU 1985) (A. Levin and H. Novikoff, co-chairmen) ("If the delivery did not meet the 
requirements of N.Y. [pre-1978] U.C.C. § 8-313(l)(c), it appears that the purchaser did not 
2cquire any rights in the security. Thus, if the broker became insolvent, the purchaser could 
no t enforce a claim to the securities against the broker's estate."). 
38 See U.C. C. § 8-301 comment 1; pre-1978 § 8-301 comment 3. Because pre-1978 section 
8-301(1) deals only with delivery, it dQ,..~ not speak directly to the applicability of "shelter" or 
nemo da! in the context of non-delivery transfers such as those made to 1-! 's customers. 
1 
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2. Priorities and Sharing on the Same Tier: First-in-Time, Bona 
Fide Purchase, and Proportionate Property Interest 
The conclusion that J-l's customers are purchasers who have re-
ceived transfers of property interests in securities does not, alone, sug-
gest a re-301ution of the priority contests raised by Example 1- such as 
the contest between C-2 and C-3, each of whom has a claim to a quan-
tity of C Co. securities (controlled by J-1) that is insufficient to satisfy 
both claims. Application of the nemo dat principle to the C-2 and C-
3 claims, however, would result in priority for the customer who re-
ceived its transfer first-in-time. 89 
Both versions of Article 8 contain the familiar exception to the 
baseline rule of nemo dat: "A bona fide purchaser in addition to ac-
quiring the rights of a purchaser (Section 8-301) also acquires his in-
terest in the security free of any adverse claim. "90 But only certain 
transferees can achieve bona fide purchaser status. 91 In particular, 
transferees (such as J-l's customers) of an interest in a fungible bulk 
of securities through an intermediary (such as /-1) cannot become 
bona fide purchasers. 92 Although that general statement may not be 
89 If C-2's interest arose first and nemo dat were applied, 1-1 could not later transfer to C-3 
an interest in the C Co. securities that had already been transferred to C-2. 
90 U.C.C. § 8-302(3); see, e. g., Satterfield v. Haymond, No. C-84J'M6\V (D. Uwh Oct. 31, 
1985) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file); Matthysse v. Securities Processing Servs., Inc., ¥A F . 
Supp. 10CI9, 1020-23 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). Pre-1978 § 8-301(2) is to the same effect. "Adverse 
claim" is defined identically in U.C.C. § 8-302(2) and pre-·1973 § 8-301(1) to include " a claim 
thai a transfer was or would be wrongful or that a particular adverse person is the owner of or 
h.as an interest in the security." As to what constitutes notice of an adverse claim, see U .C.C. 
§ 8-304; Matthysse, at 1020-23; Satterfield No. C-84-0646W (D.Utah). 
9 1 U.C.C. § 8-302(1) provides: 
(1) A "bona fide purchaser" is a purcha...--er for value in gcoo faith and with-
out notice of any adverse claim: 
(a) who takes delivery of a certificated security in bearer fo rm or in regis-
tered form, issued or indorsed to him or in blank; 
(b) to whom the transfer, pledge or release of an uncertificmc.xl security is 
registered on the books of the issuer; or 
(c) to whom a security is transferreD under the provisions of p~ragraph 
(c), ( d)(i), or (g) of Section 8-313(! ). 
Pre-!978 § 8-302(1) is substantially the same as U.C.C. § 8-302(1)(a). Subparagraph (l)(b) 
•,vas added in the 1978 official text so as to accommodate uncertificated se-curities anc! subpara-
graph (l )(c) was added for clarity only, the same result foliowing from both versions of§ 8-
313(2) (first 5entence). See U.C.C., app. 1, § 3-302, Reasons for 1977 Ch<mge, m 9E4 (i989) . 
92 Sec U. C.C. §§ 8-302( 1 )(c), 8-313( 1 )( d)(ii)-(iii), 8-313(2) (firs! seutence); pre-197.3 § 3-
3 i 3(2); infm notes 218-232 and accompanying te;;; t (rebuttin~ .arguments ::>.ncl auti1o!ities to the 
con trary) . TJ:e Official Comment to U.C.C. § 8-313 explains: 
}f bona fide purchaser status were given to those whose ~.;urities art: "11 -:ld as part 
of a fungible bulk, there would be a possibility of inconsistent claims b~tween cwo 
or mor.: bona fide purchasers, since if the bulk should prove to b-e sraall.:::: than was 
expected, the claim of one or both must b-e compromised. 
\d. § 8-313 comment 4; see also Haydock, When Is a Bro!·:er ::; Baik;: ci! Js an Inter~-:st in 
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controversial, the circumstances that remove securities from a fungi-
ble bulk by specific identification have proven to be highly controver-
sial and often misunderstood. 93 When the intermediary involved is a 
clearing corporation94 (such as DTC), book entry transferees of inter-
ests in fungible bulks on the clearing corporation's books can achieve 
bona fide purchaser status. 95 
Because / -l's customers could not have become bona fide pur-
chasers, it would seem to follow from the foregoing that the priority 
contest between C-2 and C-3 would be resolved on the basis of first-in-
time. 96 But Article 8 provides a different answer: The purchaser of 
an interest in a fungible bulk of securities pursuant to 1978 section 8-
313(l )(d)(ii) or (iii) "is the owner of a proportionate property interest 
in the fungible bulk. " 97 The same result obtains under the pre-1978 
Article 8. 98 This means that all purchasers claiming an interest in a 
Securities a General Intangible?, 35 Ark. L. Rev. 10, 18 (1981) (U.C.C. § 8-313(2) "makes 
sense, since it avoids giving one bona fide purchaser priority over another"). This reasoning 
misses the mark. There is nothing odd about the transfer of securities to a series of bona fide 
purchasers; the last-in-time would cut off the rights of earlier purchasers. See Guttman, supra 
note 4, at 8-4 n.l7. What the comment and Haydock probably intended to recognize is that 
such transfers of interests in fungible bulks do not fit the paradigm of delivery of a discrete 
negotiable instrument and the corresponding policy that transferees who share a common in-
termediary ought to share according to the "proportionate property interest" rule. See infra 
text accompanying notes 97-100. 
93 See infra notes 218-232 and accompanying text (discussing requisites of identification of 
a specific security within the meaning ofU.C.C. § 8-313(1)(d)(i) and pre-1 973 § 8-313(J )(c)). 
94 See U.C.C. § 8-102(3) (defining "clearing corporation"). 
95 Id. §§ 8-302(1), 8-313(1)(g), (2) (first sentence), 8-320; pre-1 978 §§ 8-313(2) (first sen-
tence), 8-320; see Satterfield v. Haymond, No. C-8"r0646W (D.Utah Oct. 31, 1985) (LEXIS, 
Genfed library, Dist. file); supra notes 23-38 and accompanying text (discussing role of DTC 
and NSCC); infra notes 339-44 and accompanying text (discussing rationale for bona fide pur-
chaser status of clearing corporation transferee). U.C.C., § 8-313(l)(g) refers to "entries to the 
account of the purchaser or a person designated by him" (the italici zed words havin g been 
added to the pre-1978 paragraph (l )(e)). Read literaliy, the "designated by him" language 
would seem to say that a purchaser who is a customer of an intermediary-participa.11t in a 
clearing corporation can receive a transfer under paragraph ( 1 )(g) and, thereby, become a bona 
fide purchaser. The "designated by him" reference apparently was derived from paragraph 
(l)(a) (where it appears in both the 1978 and pre-1978 versions rn:ordy to incorporate a general 
agency principle), perhaps in the (misguided) in terest of consistency. That literal read ing of 
paragraph (l)(g) would mean that many routine transfe rees of interests in fu ngible bulks in the 
s.xurities markets become bona fide purchasers-~ertainly not the im en d<:d r·~s u lt under para-
graph ( l )(g). See Katzman , Security Interests in Federal Agency Boo: -E nt ry Secu ri ti•:s: Do-
ing It With Mirrors, ' !·2 Bus. Law. 157, 176 (1986) (transferee on bco\s oF cieari;:g corpora tion 
can become bona fide purchaser, but t ransfer .~.e' s custorner cannot; 1:h.: ' "d.::3_i. gnctted by h1rnl! 
l:.mguage ·s;1as not discussed); supra not~ 92. 
96 See supra nme 89 and accompanying te:a . 
97 U.C.C. § 8-313(2) (second sentence). 
9 8 Pre-1978 § 8-313(2) (scccnd sent ::nce) is to £he same df::r..:t as th e 19-!G v;::rs;c•n 
.:~lthough pre-1 978 .L\.rtlcle S contained no express provis·ions deal ing ·;.;vi. t11 ho~rv SiJCll t rcu1sf.::rs 
are effected, transfer of a proportioEnte property interes t 1Y1 a f'.! ::-!gi bJ,:.: bu :~z LJ ]~ l '.s Ci.lsto rr.~. <.::.- s 
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fungible bulk of a particular issue of securities controlled by I -1 have a 
proportionate property interest shared ratably with all other transfer-
ees of that issue. 99 Applying this formulation to the C Co. securities 
in Example 1, C-2 and C-3 would share the available C Co. securities 
proportionately according to the number of units to which each is 
entitled. 100 
If the facts of Example 1 are varied slightly, application of the 
proportionate property interest formulation becomes much more diffi-
cult. Assume that only a portion of the C Co. securities controlled by 
/-1 is in 1-l 's account with /-2, another portion is in /-l's account 
with another intermediary (J-2A), and yet another portion comprises 
a fungible bulk of street name securities in I -1 's physical possession. 
Will the treatment of the claims of C-2 and C-3 now depend on which 
one or more of these three fungibie bulks have been identified by /-1 
as subject to their respective claims and the quantity of C Co. securi-
ties in each relevant fungible bulk? If so, and if /- 1 has failed to iden-
tify any particular fungible bulk to the claims of C-2 and C-3, is the 
result that no transfer to C-2 or C-3 has occurred? The property con-
struct embodied in the language of section 8-3 13(1 )( d)(ii) and (iii) and 
8-313(2) would seem to suggest an affirmative answer to each of these 
questions. 101 But the answer to each question ordinarily ought to be 
would occur outside of Article 8 as a matter of contract and common law. See Appendix II, 
infra, notes 12-!4 and accompanying text. 
99 See U.C.C. § l-201(1 7) ("'Fungible' with respect to ... s...~mities means . .. securities of 
which any unit is, by na.ture or usage of trad e, the equivalent of any other like unit."); see also 
id. § 8- 107(1) ("[A] person obligated to transfer securities may transfer any certificated secur-
ity of the specified issue ... or ... an equivalent uncertificated secmity .. . . ") (emphasis 
added). The second s,:;nt.ence of § 8-313(2) has rarely been interpreted by the courts. How-
ever, one ccurt may have applied the sharing principle as among all customers with resp...'>Ct to 
all types of securities controlled by the intermediary, although the facts are not clearly re-
flected by r.he reported opini,)n. United States v. Doyle, 486 F. Supp. 1214 (D. Minn. 1980). 
lCXJ Under this analysis, C-4 (the only claimant to a sufficient quantity of D Co. securities) 
would be fully satisfied. Whether C-1 's claims to A Co. aPd B Co. securities would be sati.sfied 
depends on the resolution of the d ifferent-tier priority contests with 1-2 and L, discussed infra 
Part IV. It has been suggesteJ , incorrect ly in my view, that the p roportionate property interest 
rule applies as among claimants on different tiers. See infra notes 243-46 and accompanying 
text (arguing tha t the: proponicnate property interest rule is inapplicable except l.'.S among 
claimants that shs.:re a <::ommon inkrmx\iary). lt also ha.s been suggested that the purpose of 
the proponional prr,\)f.'::-ty interes t rule is to provide a distributional rule to be applied in c2ses 
of in tcrrr:ecEnry ir:so]venc; _. but that suggestion is questionable as wel l. See infra notes 1 82 ~ 3n 
:1nd accon1panying ·tex"t. '"To :.he ~z t.ent othenvise [tpplicable, state property la~' i5 controlling 
in ar"i in tc:rr~-~d;. t~ry's 1nscdvency proceeding. It is !fl~~e, ho·wcvcr, that the rule ·wo1Jld serve that 
func tion ln fact . s,~t inJ"rg n ote 2t)J and accor:-1panyin.g {.e .:~t. 
; o 1 A tm nsfet p•m 1s2.nt co eicher TJ . C. C. § 3-313( l )( d)(ii) or § 8-3!3( ]){d)( iii) requi res that 
\;a fir: :~i·t cial ~ n '.crrnet:!ihry . .. td enti~T.Y] as b,::long-ing to ·~ he p1..1rc.baser .. . a quantity of sccar-1-
tie-s t h::: ~ r:onsti ~~) (e or :1 r~ pal-~ o~"' d ./t;ngibi€ bulk .. . H LT .C'.C . § 8-31 3(I)(d), (d)(ii) (:;rnph?.sis 
add:::d). Tile pm;x:n1.iGnate property interest rule c•f § 8-31 3(2) appLies to sec~Jnties chat a re 
H}:'- ;tr t o f n ~(unJib!-! .0 !11 ~~ -!' l(L § S-3l3(2) ( ~::rnph~~sis ~.dded) . 
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"no," although no authorities appear to have addressed these issues 
squarely. In practice, securities firms do not identify the claims of 
customers) who have paid for securities, to any particular fungible 
bulk. 102 Following the interpretation that is consistent with prac-
tice-that the "fungible bulk," for these purposes, is comprised of all 
of the securities of a given issue that are controlled by 1-1 and identi-
fied as belonging to customers who have paid for them-seems appro-
priate. Where a different practice prevails, however, it is arguable 
that a different result would be fitting. 103 
In sum, transfers of interests in a fungible bulk of securities made 
pursuant to an intermediary's confirmation and book entry subject the 
transferee's interest to the proportional property interest nlle. The 
proportionate property interest formulation is the baseline rule pro-
vided by Article 8 concerning the priorities among claimants to secur-
ities controlled by a common intermediar-;, i.e., claimants on the same 
tier. 
3. Transfer of Nonexistent or Insufficient Quantity of Securities 
The foregoing discussion implicitly assumed that at the time J-1 
originally effected transfers to C-2 and C-3 there were sufficient C Co. 
securities controlled by I-1 so as to satisfy both claims. Now assume 
that 1-1 took all steps necessary to effect transfers to C-2 and C-3 
except that at the relevant times 1-1 itself did not control any C Co. 
securities. Under Article 8, it is likely that no effective transfer oc-
curred.104 That result is not surprising, given the traditional property 
law concept of nemo dat. 
Next, assurne that, at the time of the transfer to C-2, J.-1 con-
trolled sufficient C Co. securities to cover C-2's clairn, but at the sub-
sequent time of the putative transfer to C-3 , J-1 controlled a quantity 
that was insufficient to satisfy both claims. Th.e shortfall of C Co. 
securities might have resulted from mistake, an unexpected develop-
ment, or even fraud. 105 In that situation, it is theoretically possible 
102 Interview with Jonathan Kallman, SEC Division of Market Regulation (June 23 , 1989). 
Nor are securities 1'irms requi red tc do so. See sup.-a note 61. 
103 For example, banks norrnally maintain records reflecting a fungible bu1 ~, of securities for 
t1ust depart1nent custozne:rs that is ~~p::J..r:;lte from fungible bulks rr:ainta!n~ for other 
cu.storners. 
104 U.C.C. § 8-31 3{l)(d){ii) and (d)(iii) a:fer to the tramf-~r of ''a '-1'-i~<n ticy of "''").Jtities that 
constitute or are part of B. fungible bulk' ~ of s~c;curities tl:tdt cxe in the intertzv~diary 's poss.~ssion, 
or (if uncertificated) rcgist~red i;1 its nam.:, or shovin on i t.s accot.w:t \f-t'i th a!l{:theT int.~rmefl i::.ry . 
u.c.c. § 8-313(J)(d)(ii), (d)(iii) . 
105 J-1 rnight not have T·~ceived the c; r;o. securities to b-::: ~rs·:-!3fe1T~~:~.i as c~ r•~3uh of a failed 
trs.d~. Or, I- 1 ITiig.ht have b\;corn~ insolvent after th~ put~r.ive tra11s!f-;rce's payrnent to .f-1 but 
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that a transfer to C-3 would occur, 106 resulting in application of the 
proportionate property interest formulation as between C-2 and C-3. 
Yet, it also is possible that C-3 would not receive a transfer of any 
property interest whatsoever under Article 8. 107 
While far from shocking under a property law construct, the 
treatment of a put::~.tive transferee, such as C-3, as an unsecured credi-
tor, intuitively seems questionableo 108 C-2, a preexisting customer, 
and C-3 have common interests, have behaved similarly, have taken 
the same risks, and are victims of the failure of J-1, their common 
intermediary.109 Moreover, the fact that C-2 and C-3 are both victims 
of a shortfall and C-4 is made whole is largely fortuitous. As a practi-
cal matter, none of J -l 's customers would be able to ascertain, either 
at the time of a putative transfer or thereafter, that I -1 actually con-
trolled a fungible bulk sufficient to satisfy their claims. 110 J-1 's cus-
before the securities had bl>...en transferred to J-1. Or, a lender to /-1 might have failed to 
release the securities held as collateral or might even have disposed of them. 
106 To reach this result it would be necessary to find some book entries or other actions by/-
1 that would satisfy the identification requirement. See U.C.C. § 8-313(1)(d)(ii)-(iii). 
107 A court might refux to award C-J, the putative transferee, with a property right in 
securities already on hand, to the detriment of C-2, if it appeared that /-1 did not intend to 
dilute C-2's interest by identifying C-3 's putative interest to the same fungible bulk. However, 
that approach could yield bizarre results. The entire transfer to C-3 could be nullified even 
though the C Co. securities on hand were only one unit short. A similar result (i .e., no trans-
fer) could occur even if 1-1 subsequently acquired securities in order to cover the shortfa ll, 
since U.C.C. § 8-313(d) dcx.'"S not expressly contemplate the intermediary's acquisition of the 
securities ajier the other steps n.:..-cessary for transfer have occurred. But a reasonable reading 
should accommodate the conclusion that a transfer would occur. Cf. Aronstein, Haydock & 
Scott, supra note 5, at 911-912 (arguing that the ·'at the time" language of U.C.C. § 8-313(1) 
should not be read to preclude subsequent satisfaction of additional requirements of U.C.C. 
§ 8-321 for attachment and perfection of a security interest). Moreover, the customer protec-
tion rules applicable to registered trok<:Or-dealers e:t.pressly contemplate that compliance is not 
inconsistent with temporary shortfalls in customer securities. See supra note 61. 
108 Stated otherwise, in the event of an intermediary insolvency, perhaps putative transfer-
ees who have paid cash to the intermediary should be treated the same as customers who have 
actually received tramfers of securities. P resumably, the putative transferee would have paid 
for the secmities and would 1::;~ entitled, at a minimum, to a claim for the money paid or a 
damage claim. If no payment had been made, then the "no transfer" result would not be so 
harsh. 
109 The argument that C-2 and C-3 should re-.;~ive similar treatment is developed below in 
the discussion of risk sharing distributional rules applicable to customers in intermediary insol-
vency proceedings. See generaliy infra .Part IH . 
J 10 If a t ransferee of a,l interest in a fungible bulk of securi ties looks to the books of its 
intermediary for evidence of a transfer, ti!ost: books normally would show interests of m any 
ether t ransfe ree:> of interests i.n the sarn . ; fungible bulk. Only a continuing " audit" of the books 
of the intermediary and the securiti;;; i11 the intermediar;'s possession and those credited to its 
account with ether intennedimies wouid provide assurance that the fungible bulk contains 
s t1fficien t securities to coveT :he in terests of all oi the intem1ediary's customers. This would 
involve a dekrminaticn of ti:le aggreg,~tt claims against the fungible buik as well as the aggre-
gate volume of r.;:.--curities inciuded in the hngib!e bulk. When the fungibl e bulk inciudes secur-
ities in accounts of the tra:nsf-::re.::'s iGtermcdiary with other !ntermediaries, the same analysis of 
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tomers must rely on both the ultimate financial strength and integrity 
of their intermediary and regulatory controls designed to prevent or 
discourage such shortfalls. 
4. Transfer of Security Interests (Pledges) 
The preceding discussion assumed that I-l's customers were pur-
chasers of ownership interests in securities. The exclusive methods of 
transfer specified in section 8-3 13(1) also apply to the "[t]ransfer of a 
limited interest (including a security interest)" 111 in a security. If the 
transfer is made "[p]ursuant to agreement by a transferor who has 
rights in the security to a transferee who has given value, (it] is a 
perfected security interest." 112 Although a security interest can be 
transferred pursuant to any subparagraph of section 8-313(1 ), certain 
subparagraphs of section 8-313(1) specify the time of transfer only for 
security interests. 113 Returning to Example 1, L presumably was a 
the aggregate volume and aggregate claims would be required as to the other intermediaries. 
Such investigations are not compatible with most securities transactions. The status of the 
various accounts would b-e constantly changing in any event. See Aronstein, Haydock & Scott, 
supra note 5, at 910, n.lOl: 
As a practical matter, one who purchases through ... an intermediary dc·es 
not investigate any further. H e assumes that the intermediary holds a valid and 
unencumbered interest and relies on the intermediary's integrity and financial 
strength. The kind of inquiry ... which goes behind the intermediary's confirrna-
tion, would rarely, if ever, be undertaken. 
James Rogers is critical of tracing rules generally. 
The commingled fund tracing rules are perhaps the most daborate and detailed 
attempt a.-1ywhere in our legal system to retain the normative consequences of 
mine versus rhine even though the objects of the:.:.e property concepts have irre-
tric:vably lost their identifiable thingness. As we l1ave s.xn, the r~csults are not 
impressive. 
Rogers, ;-.[egotiability, supra note 15, at 501. 
lll U.C.C. § 8-313(1); see id. § 8-301(2) (quoted supra note 34). A security inrerest in a 
s.xurity is enforceable only if it has been transferred to the secured party (or its designee) 
pursuant to U.C.C. § 3-313(1). U.C.C. § 8-321(1); FDIC v. W. Hugh Nieyer & Assocs., Inc., 
864 F.2d 371, 374 (5th Cir. 1989); In ;-e Domestic Fuel Corp., 70 Bankr. 455, 460 (Bank:r. 
S.D. N . Y. 1987). Consistent with commonly used securities industry parlance, "security int er-
~t" and ~ ~pledge" .~l!e used interchangeably in this article, whether o:r not the s..;-.:u.rity interest 
is a possessory om~. See U.C.C. § 1-108 (r,~gistraciqn of pledge of' uncerti:fica ted security); id ., 
app. 1, § 8-108, ~lZC?.sons for 1977 Change, at 953 ('1pledgt ... refl ects com·cnon ter m·inolcgy"). 
1 1:2 :1c1. § g-32 1(2). 'The fjJing of an f\.rticle 9 Hnanclng statem·ent is not rcqtdred. 1d. § 3-
32 1(3)(a); In rz I:-~(rf:nest]c Fuel ·Corp., 70 Bankr. at 464. 
113 TJ.C.C. J 8-313(1)01) (time of Vlritten notice, after deb't o r h:~r; si g-ned a ~ecuri.ty agre~· 
rn.ent -:::1 ::sc;i;)iJtS co .l.~ ;lt t:r~tl, .ziven to d -ebtor's financi ~1J. int..::rrnediar; c·: th i:cd ·par ty in ·po-sse:~sicn 
of, or ·;:v bo is n; :{ist.::red O'Wiler or pledge~ of, security); (if d -: ;btor ~1 as 5 ~ Tn ~~d a lAi ri tt:n 
e~gre-ernerrt de-scribing the collateral, tlme ths.t _n -.:: ';'~' value i~ gi i/ ~rt by s~~s t:! rr:d pany); 
secured p~~·ny is fl::.tancial interme61ary tD 1:'/h.orn s:::cu rl ty h.:~s aL:- .~az-;)'" r.r-2~n 
tir:J. ;:-; d.:.:btor si .:~ns secu rity :~grecrn.tnt describin g coL r~H:raJ &.nd s.::c1}.fed party gives v.:d ue). 
T'ra.l";Sfe r pursuant to U. C. C. § 8-313( 1 ;(i) pruvides only t .:·rn~:-s rary fJ-erfb:>~ i on that -is c.:-:;;; .. :n -
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transferee of its perfected security interest pursuant to section 8-
313(1 )(d)(iii) by virtue of both confirmation and book entry made by 
/-2 upon J-l's instructions. 114 1-2, on the other hand, received a 
transfer and a perfected security interest when it gave value and J-1 
signed a security agreement describing the collateral, pursuant to sec-
tion 8-313(1)(j).115 
The treatment of all aspects of creation and perfection of security 
interests in the 1978 Article 8 and the corresponding removal of those 
matters from Article 9 have been strongly criticized.116 The resulting 
unification within 1978 Article 8, however, has produced some dis-
tinct improvements. The confusion as to whether provisions of Arti-
cle 8 or Article 9 control the perfection of security interests in 
securities has been removed. 117 Other changes in substance also have 
solely under paragraph (i) of Section 8-313(1) becomes unperfected after 21 days unless, within 
that time, the requirements for transfer under any other provision of Section 8-313( I) are 
satisfied."); s...oe also U.C.C. §§ 8-108, 8-3 13( l){b), 8-321 (perfection of security interest in un-
certificated security by registration of pledge); Reporter's Comment, supra note 5, at 936-37 
(discussing registration of pledge); Guttman, supra note 4, at 5-56 to 5-60 (discussing registra-
tion of pledge); supra note 82 (discussing registration of transfer). 
114 See U.C.C. § 8-313(i)(d)(iii). 
I 15 See id. § 8-313( 1 ){j); supra note 113. 
J 16 See Coogan, supra note 5, at 1052-69; Rasor, A Critical Look at Secured Transactions 
Under Revised Article 8, 14 Fla. St. L. Rev. 859, 868-72 (1987). Both authors appear to have 
been substantialiy influenced by nostalgic concerns about abandoning Article 9's generally suc-
cessful approach of de.iiing with security interests in personal property in one place. See Coo-
gan, supra note 5, at 1052-53; Rasor, supra, at 868-69. Aronstein, Haydock and Scott 
responded to Coogan's article by explaining persuasively that many of Coogan's problems with 
the 1978 Articie 8 also exist under the pre-1978 versions of Articles 8 and 9 and that others are 
not serious. See Aronstein, Haydock & Scott, supra note 5, passim. For discussions and com-
ps.:.r:isons of secured transactions covering securities under the pre-1978 Articles 8 and 9 and 
the !978 .0.rticle 8, see Aronstein, Security i nterests in Securities : How Code Rev1sion Reflects 
}efodern Security-Hoiding Practices, 10 U.C.C. L.J . 289 (1978) [hereinafter Security Interests] 
and Haydcck, supra note 92. 
1 17 Fer example, when a third party bailee is in possession of securities collateral, under pre-
1978 § 9-305 a secured party can :;.,~hieve perfection "from the time the bailee receives notifica-
tion of tbe secured party's interest." Pre-1978 § 9-305 (second sentence). But pre-1978 § 8-
313(J)(d) can be construed to mandate that the perfection requires an acknowledgment by the 
third party bailee. Sec Security Interests, supra note 116, at 296 ("It is surely not a strained 
constmction to conclude that the creation of a security interest in a security is the 'purchase of 
a limited interest' therein, and, therefore, governed by the provisions of (pre-1978) Part 3 of 
Astiele 8."); H aydock, supra note 92, at 15-16; see also Winnett v. Inverness Counsel, Inc., 
>ic. 77 C. Y. 3810 (S. D . 1\i. Y. Aug. 14, 1979) (holding that third pa.rty bailee must agree to hold 
ior notifying secured jXucy and mere notice is imm'ficient fo r perfection, but not -.:iting pre-
1978 § 8-313(1)(d)), aff" 'd, 614 F.2;J 1?.93 (2d Cir. 1979). Commentators generally tak e the 
vie'N, h1wever, that pre- l 973 § 9-J05 O'Jgh< to c<Jntrol over any con trary provision of pre-1978 
A c-ti cle 8 unless a n ,;\rticle 8 tr:crsfer<~ e is a subsequent bona fide pm-chaser. See U.C.C. 9-309; 
pr(~-1973 § 9-309; G uttman . supra note 4, at 5-55; H aydock, supra note 92, at 16-17; :;ee alr.o 
H n.le v. :Kont;;lr atos (in re X ontaratos), 10 B::mh. 956, 970 (Bankr. D. Me. 1981) (when third 
p;;:;·son in po:;.;;cssion is senior secured pa<-ty, notice under pre-1978 § 9-305 must come from 
the debtor); Not.::, Nocice ? roblem3 in th'= Dout k:-P looge Situa tion, 55 Fordham L. Rev. 809, 
1 
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made perfection less cumbersome. For example, under the pre-1978 
Articles 8 and 9, L 's security interest could not be perfected merely by 
the transfer of A Co. securities to L's account on /-2's books. 118 
Arguably, section 8-313(1)(d) provides a means for perfecting a 
security interest even when the intermediary that effects the transfer 
by book entry and confirmation is, itself, the debtor. 119 Under this 
817-37 (1987) (disagreeing with result and analysis in Kontaratos, but not questioning the ap-
plicability of pre-1978 § 9-305 perfection by notification of security interests in securities). 
When securities are controlled by intermediaries in fungible bulk, U.C.C. § 8-313(1)(h) makes 
it clear that transfer (and perfection) can be achieved by the debtor's notice to the debtor's 
intermediary. U.C.C. § 8-313(l)(h). 
118 Because I-3, not /-2, is in possession of the A Co. securities, /-2 is not the proper party to 
receive notification under pre-1978 § 9-305 or to make an acknowledgment pursuant to pre-
1978 § 8-313(1)(d). L would be forced to deal with 1-3, or to insist on a physical delivery to 
either I-2 or L, in order to achieve perfection. Arguably, I-2's security interest is perfected 
under the pre-1978 versions. Because I-3 holds the B Co. securities on behalf of 1-2, its cus-
tomer, I-3's awareness of I-2's interest would seem to satisfy the notice requirement of pre-
1978 § 9-305, even though 1-3 does not know about 1-l 's interest on the books of I-2. 
119 U.C.C. § 8-321(1) - (2) makes it clear that (subject to the requirements of agreement, 
debtor's rights in the collateral, and value) transfer of a security interest in a security under 
any paragraph of section 8-313( I) is sufficient for the attachment and perfection of a security 
interest. See U.C.C. § 8-301(2) (quoted supra note 84); supra notes lll-13 and accompanying 
text. U.C.C. § 8-313(1)(d) makes no distinction between transfers of entire interests (owner-
ship) and limited interests (such as security interests), unless that distinction can be read into 
the phrase "identifies as belonging to the purchaser." U.C.C. § 8-313(1)(d) (emphasis added). 
A financial intermediary who is a debtor-transferor, then, would act in two capacities-as 
debtor-transferor of a security interest and as the secured party-transferee's financial interme-
diary. Cf. U.C.C. § 8-313 comment 2 (broker can be a "financial intermediary" and also act in 
capacity of pledgee from customer). This conclusion, however, is not free of doubt. First, a 
"financial intermediary" is defined as a "(p]erson ... [who] maintains security accounts for its 
customers and is acting in that capacity"). U.C.C. § 8-313(4) (emphasis added). It is not clear 
that the intermediary's secured creditor would be a "customer" for this purpose. Second, it is 
a longstanding tenet of the common law that a debtor cannot serve as an agent or bailee of a 
secured party for purposes of delivery and possession of collateral so as to create and perfect a 
pledge. See 1 G. Gilmore, Security Interests In Personal Property § 14.2 (1965) . This princi-
ple has been left intact by the U.C.C. See U.C.C. § 9-305, comment 2 ("(I]t is of cour&: clear, 
however, that the debtor or a person controiled by him cannot qualify as ... an agent for the 
secured party."); StarrY. Bruce Farley Corp. (In re Bruce Farley Corp.), 612 F .2d 1197, 1200 
(9th Cir. 1980) ("The debtor cannot qualify as an agent for the secured party for the purpose 
of perfection."); Huffman v. Wikle (In reStaff Mortgage & Inv. OJrp.), 550 F .2d 1228, 1230 
(9th Cir. 1977) (U.C.C. drafters did not intend that debtor could be agent for purposes of 
J:->erfection and possession); St>..e also Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Van Ky1en 
(In re Van Kylen), 98 Bank.r. 455,460-461 (Ban...1a. W.D. Wis. !939) (where a debtor retained 
investment discretion and the right to withdraw securities from its account wit.h a securities 
firm int-ermediary, the intermediary was !Wt an agent of the secured party "designated by him" 
within the meaning of U.C.C. § S-313(i)(a), and notice to the intermediary of the ;,.;x;urity 
interest was ineffective to effect a transfer and perfect a security interest, but the comi fai led to 
consider U.C.C. § 8-31J(l)(h)(i), pursuas:t to which a transfer by notice given to ?. debtor's 
financial intemlediary can tee effective to perfect a S<~eurity interest); FDIC v. Mount P!e<J..<>~.mt 
Professional Bldg. (In re Mt. Pleasail.t Bank & Trust Co.), 426 N .W.2d 12.6, 132-133 (lowa 
1988) (notifie<!tion to debtor's intermediary (a bank) of security interest in securities controlkd 
by that intermedia.ry was suf:Gcient to perfect a security interest under pre-1978 § 9-305). 
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analysis, if C-3 (in Example 1) were a secured lender to J-1, (rather 
than an ownership claimant), the foregoing discussion of transfer and 
priorities between C-2 and C-3 would remain applicable and the pro-
portionate property interest formulation would apply as between 
these two claimants. 120 Recognition of such a transfer could provide 
some comfort to a secured creditor or a repo transferee121 because the 
transfer would be both effective and perfected regardless of whether it 
was characterized as an outright sale or a secured transaction. 122 
120 U.C.C. § 8-313(2) (second sentence) continues to refer to the "ownership" of a pur-
chaser. But, given the goal of unifying both security interest and nonsecurity interest transfers 
in U.C.C. § 8-313(1), the second sentence of subsection (2) could be read to apply also to same-
tier security interests and ownership interests alike (e.g., where the debtor is itself the interme-
diary effecting a transfer, or where a secured party transferee gives a notice, under U.C.C. § 8-
313(1)(h)(i), to an intermediary whose customer is the debtor). See supra notes 110-113. It 
could be argued, however, that the priorities should be determined according to the time of 
perfection. See U.C.C. § 8-321(3) (with certain exceptions, a "security interest in a security is 
subject to Article 9"); § 9-312(5Xa) (priority for first to perfect when perfection is not by 
filing). That approach could involve difficult tracing problems and would seem to be wholly at 
odds with the proportionate property interest concept. See supra notes 97-100 and accompa-
nying text. 
12 I See supra note 51 and accompanying text. Many lenders to securities firms extend se-
cured credit without taking delivery of the collateral-so-called "A-P" ("agreement to 
pledge") loans-while relying on "temporary perfection." See U.C.C. §§ 8-313(l)(i), 8-321(2) 
(21-day temporary perfection); pre-1978 § 9-304{4) (same); Interview with James Clark, Vice 
President, Citibank, N.A. (June 22, 1989). Unless specific securities in the debtor's possession 
have been identified within the meaning of U.C.C. § 8-313(1)(d)(i) or pre-1978 § 8-313(1)(c), 
such a secured lender cannot achieve bona fide purchaser status. See supra notes 92-93. Such 
secured creditors as well as transferees in "hold in custody" or "dealer safekeeping" repo 
transactions, where the securities are not transferred through a third party, necessarily bear 
the risks that the transferor-intermediary will fail and that there will be insufficient securities 
available to satisfy their claims. See Stigum, Repo, supra note 51, at 191-204 (discussing dealer 
safekeeping repos and less risky alternatives); supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing "proportionate property interest" rule); infra, Part III (discussing secured claims and 
customer claims in insolvency proceedings). The transferee also is exposed to the risk that its 
interest will not continue in proceeds of the collateral upon a disposition unless the proceeds 
are "identifiable." U.C.C. § 9-306(2); see, e.g., Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Farmers Bank, 
358 F. Supp. 317 (E. D. Mo. 1973) (application of "lowest intermediate balance rule" in deter-
mination of whether cash proceeds commingled in a bank account were "identifiable"). See 
generally B. Clark, The Law of Secured Transactions Under the Uniform Commercial Code 
§ i0.3, at 10-20 to 10-24 (1980 & Supp. 1990); R. Henson, Secured Transactions under the 
Uniform Commercial Code§ 6, at 204-05 {1979); Note, Standards and Sanctions for the Use 
of Cash Collateral Under the Bankruptcy Code, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 341, 347 n.41 (1984) ("[T]he 
major limitation with respect to a security interest in proceeds is the ability of the secured 
party to trace the proceeds."). Arguably, the standard for identification of proceffis should not 
be more strict than that applicable to the original transfer. See U.C.C. § 8-31 3(1)(d)(ii), § 8-
313(1)(d}(iii). 
122 The law is not clear as to whether a repo is an outright sale with an agreem.ent to repur-
chase (as it is denominated) or a secured transaction. Compare Cohen v. Army Moral Support 
Fund (In re Bevill, Bresler & Schulmai1 Asset Management Corp.), 67 Bankr. 557, 596-98 
(D.N.J. 1986) (repo and reverse repo agreements were contracts for the sale and resale back to 
the original seller of securities) with Union Planters Nat') Bank v. United States, 426 F.2d ! 1 S, 
118 (6th Cir. 1970) (repo transactions were secured loans for Federal income tax purposes) 
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New York has amended its version of section 8-3 13 to make it clear 
that a secured party can be a transferee under section 8-313( 1 )(d) even 
though the financial intermediary also is the debtor. 123 Any concerns 
about misleading appearances, even if justified in other contexts, ap-
pear to have little relevance when the debtor that remains in control 
of the collateral is a professional securities intermediary. 124 A prop-
erty law construct that denies the effectiveness and perfection of such 
a security interest, while giving effect to similar transfers of ownership 
interests, could only be grounded on an historical anomaly or a failure 
to appreciate the sui generis characteristics of the intermediary con-
trol phenomenon within the securities markets. 
B. The Book Entry Treasury Regulations 
For the most part, the foregoing discussion of transfer and pledge 
under Articles 8 and 9 also applies to the transfer and pledge of book-
entry Treasury securities. 125 But these transfers and pledges, gov-
and Westchester County Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Lege!, Braswell Gov't Sec. Corp. (In re Lege!, 
Braswell Gov't Sec. Corp.), 648 F.2d 321, 324 n.5 (5th Cir. 1981) (repo is a short term collater-
alized loan even though it is in the form of a sale) . See also Focht and H ar beck, Repurchase 
Agreements in Stockbrokerage Bankruptcies, 11 A .L.I. -A.B.A. Course Mat'ls J. 7, 10-12 (Oct. 
1986) (repos should be characterized as secured transactions for bankruptcy purposes); Note, 
The Need for a Uniform Classification of Repurcha-;e Agreements: Reconciling Investor Pro-
tection with Economic Reality, 36 Am. U.L. Rev. 669, 678-81 (1987) (characterization of 
repos by the courts has bt!en inconsistent); Note, Lifting the Cloud of Uncertainty Over the 
Repo Market: Characterization of Repos as Separate Purchases &"1d Sales of Securities, 37 
Vand. L. Rev. 401, 415 (1984) (" [N]either courts nor federal regulatory bodies have given 
repos a clear legal characterization"). 
123 Se-.e N.Y. U.C.C. Law§ 8-313(1)(d) (McY.,inney's 1990) (which includes the following 
italicized nonunifonn language: "identifies as belonging to, or subject to a limited interest in 
favor of, the purchaser") (emphasis added); § 8-313(4) (which includes the following italicized 
nonuniform language in the definiti0n of "financial intermediary": "and is either a·::ting in that 
capacity or acting as tr-ansferor of a security or an interest in a securir:y, iiTespective (in either 
crue) of whether such person is also acti11g in any other capacity.") (emphasis added). 
124 Given the difficulties of a."'lyone ascertaining the current status of securities controlled by 
an interr.nedia.r; in a fungible bulk of s.e<;urities and the various claims that exist with respect '~O 
-:~uch secu1iti~s, it js hard to see how a.nyon~ could b~ rnislcd by 3ppearances. S.t.'"C supra note 
!09. Fjsks of fraud or debtor-c;editor colJ,Jsion may he m•:.re real. c ·. i'viooney, The M ystery 
'!nd iV!yth of "Ostensible Ownership" and Arti.:;le 9 Filing: A C.ritique of Propo:>als w E"tend 
:F).!ing Reqnir ·~ rnents to uase0, 39 A la. L RcY . 1)83, 7:)2-5 3 (1 938) (prevention of fmucl ~md 
co11usio-n a.:l to ti:rnin,g r.u1d v~racity of s.u:ured tr3..'!1Sactions 1s an )rn ~)Oii ?-n t fun(: t.~ on of th:e 
_i\ !-tic1e 9 -iiling rules). But ~:b.ere ~vould not seern to be a greater like!!h·:;cd for fra~Jd in the 
in'termedia:ry-sccurc.-..,..1 party conte;~t than in the _\ntf.:r-rnc-cH:-1ry · ·O'Wn t:.r~~h ip cnstc.rn.er con~ex r. 
125 'T11~: rn9-.r.ke t structur~ and opsr2.rion of th~ ti ~~r~d ;:_; ~/:~ [<: rn i~)r Ceo~< ·t:.:nt r_y govcr·nr.e.-e,1t 
securi ties V,'i!.S d¢Scribed above. See supra note:-3 39-:51 a:nd acc8rnpanying t.::xt. Th..:: .n"!cverncr:. t 
t07}t~ __ ej 1 Dcre~l:3ing the efficiency of ~: r2.dinr; i.n gove·cnment s--~u :r!ti~; .. :Jy >.::l·irn.inatiriJ th.e ne.ees-
::"'-HY of cz:rt iJi r ... 1te del1 .... ·eri-::s 1 bega:n rr1ore than iifty ye~-:..r .s ago. A .. t first, pro~lislon ~v a s 1nade for 
tl:(! transfer of securiti'!S betw~n Federal Res.~r-v c banks by telegraph . 'These transt .. ets, c-JlJcd 
~~-c-pr: ~,.. requ i~·ed the approval of the 'Treasury )~ Co1nmissioner of t he Public :Debt. See 
Sti.gu1n , 'Trade, supr?l note 4~ at 83 -84. Tb~y elirn in~~t~d the n e:c.cssit~)" of t~anspcrrting secu:dtie:s 
1990) BEYOND NEGOTIABILITY 343 
emed by the Book-Entry Treasury Regulations, 126 also present some 
special problems that underscore the deficiencies of a pro~rty law 
construct in a legal regime for fungible bulks of securities. 
1. The "Bearer Definitive" Fiction on the Top Tier: Transfer and 
Pledge on the Fed's Books 
Pursuant to the Book-Entry Treasury Regulations, transfers and 
pledges of interests in book-entry Treasury securities among Dis are 
subject to a Federal rule that does not, on its face, appear to involve 
state law.127 But this appearance can be deceptive. According to par-
agraph (a) of section 306.118, transfers reflected by entries in the 
Fed's books (such as by Fedwire) are deemed to have the effect of 
physical deliveries and receipts "in bearer form of definitive Treasury 
securities." 128 The transferee or pledgee is deemed to be a "holder," 
and, in the case of a pledge, the pledgee's security interest is "per-
fected. " 129 Paragraph (a) provides a Federal rule that preempts state 
over long distances. For a brief description of the history of the Treasury security book-entry 
system, see id. Although the current book-entry system had its origin in the late 1960's, the 
full implementation of the book-entry system was accelerated in the early 1970's because of a 
crisis created by the possible loss of theft insurance coverage by securities dealers (resulting 
from several large thefts of securities). See id. at 86-88. Tne portion of the current book-entry 
T reasury Regulations dealing with the transfer and pledge of book-entry securities was last 
amended in 1972. 37 Fed. Reg. 8671 (1972). 
126 31 C.F.R. §§ 3(){).115- 3(){).122 (1990) [hereinafter Book-Entry Treasury Regulations). 
The Book-Entry T reasury Regularions cover book--entry Treasury bonds, notes, certificates of 
indebtedness, and bills issued under the Second Libeny Bond Act, as amended. 31 C.F.R. 
§ JM.1 J 5(d) (defining "Book-entry Treasury security"). Substantially similar (for present pur-
poses) regulations dealing with book-entry Treasury bil!s are found at 31 C.F.R. §§ 350.2 -
350. 6 (1 990). See 31 C.F.R . § 3.50 .1 (1990) (defining "Treasury bill"). Various Federal agen-
cies also have adopted substa.;1tia.ily similar regulations. See l C.F. R. §§ 462.1-462.8 (1990) 
(Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation); 7 C.F.R. § 190 1.5(){) (1990) (Farmers Home 
Administration); 12 C.F.R. §§ J,OO.] - 4(h5.8 ( i990) (The Export-Import Bank); 12 C.F.R. 
§§ 506a.l - 506a.9 (1 990) (Federal Home Lean Bank Board); 12 C.F.R. §§ 61:5. 554 50 -
6 15.5494 (1990) (Farm Credit Admi nistration); 1:?. C..F.R. §§ 81 1.1 - 8 11.7 (1990) (Federal 
Financing :sank); 24 C.F.R. §§ 81.41- 31.49 ( 19S',.O) (.Federal National Mortgage Asso•.;imion); 
31 C.F.R . §§ 3 54.1 - 354.9 (1990) (Student Loan ?-Aar\ering Associa~ion); 39 C.F.R. §§ 76 1.1 . 
761.8) (1 990) (United States Postal Service). For simplicity, the foll owing disc,Jssion focuses 
only on th,; Ek10k-Entry Treasury R egulations, but the discussion generally crp plics to transi":r 
and p1cdg·~ in the od1er book··entrj sy'3tt:ms. See generally Guttn1an 1 supr~ note 4. at 5-55 to 5-
75 ; Ringstnuth, supn1 note 37, at 51 ; Crespi, Securit)· Interests in Bcok-Ent:ry Government 
S.::curltjes : The u·ns~ t dcd Sta tus of C1e.aring ~ ge:nt Liens Under 1\.rticl...: 8; _:O ·u .C.C. L .J . 159 
(1 987); }(~i~ :Z.J fi~.nl . su pra note 95 . In v ie t.~· of the size and imrr.)rtOJlCC o f th;:: go\'CT!1D1Cnt ~~ccuri ­
ties rn!Jrl~ ~t, .surprisingly li J. tlt hP.s b~n ~.v ritten dealing ':Vith th;; .L~gal .::tspccts pf tr::E1sfr~r a.nd 
pled;5e of bc"o X--cntry 'Trec..sury securitie3 . 
127 31 ·C.F. TC 2 30.0. 11 8(a) (199D). ~Parag:;:aph {tt) a~ so ~!pp]L::-.::; -~o tr s.n3fers ;-~.nd ~Jh~d;$eS tc-
h:v~t:n D!s c,.nd eithc~ the Fed or the ·~Jnit e-.:.1 St.ate:s govf.:r~·lfn c nt . .Id. 
~~ 2S I d. 
129 IC: . 
., 
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law, 130 although it leaves much to resolution under state law. For 
example, the regulations do not specify the effect of a "delivery" or of 
becoming a "holder," and do not explain the effect of a security inter. 
est being "perfected." 131 To understand these effects, which are not 
altogether straightforward, resort must be taken to applicable state 
law.132 
As among Dis with book·entry securities accounts at the Fed, 
the "bearer definitive" fiction seeks to replicate the delivery of physi· 
cal securities as well as the effects of a delivery. At the top tier, this 
fiction has worked fairly well because all participating transferors and 
transferees have accounts with the same intermediary (the Fed). 133 
Every transfer involves simultaneous and corresponding entries in the 
accounts of the transferee and the transferor. Transfers on the books 
of a clearing corporation provide the best state law analogue for trans· 
fers and pledges on the books of the Fed. 134 
130 Transfers and pledges are "effected and perfected, notwithstanding any provision of law 
to the contrary." 31 C.F.R. § 306.118(a) (1990). 
131 Id. 
132 "Delivery" has long been a means of transfer and negotiation of negotiable instruments, 
including securities. See U.C.C. § 1-201(20) (defining "holder" as one "in possession of ... an 
instrument or ... [certificated] investment security ... issued ... to bearer"); § 3-202(1) 
("negotiation" of an instrument occurs only when an instrument is transferred "in such form 
that the transferee becomes a holder"); § 3-302(1) ("holder" status is a requirement for ob-
taining "holder in due course" status); § 8-313( 1 )(a) (transfer of a security occurs at the time a 
purchaser "acquires possession of a [certificated] security"); § 8-302(1Xa) ("delivery" of a cer-
tificated security is a requirement for obtaining "bona fide purchaser" status); pre-1978 § 8-
301(1) (purchaser acquires rights "upon delivery of a security"); pre-1978 § 8-302 ("delivery" 
of a security is a requirement for obtaining "bona fide purchaser" status). At the time the 
Treasury Regulations were first adopted U.C.C. Article 9 had been widely enacted. As used in 
paragraph (a), "security interests" and the concept of "perfection" presumably were borrowed 
from Article 9. See U.C.C. §§ 1-201(37), 9-303. 
133 Although the entries actually are made on the books of various reserve banks, for pres-
ent purposes the book-entry system functions essentially as an integrated single intermediary. 
13" Transferees on the books of clearing corporations, like DI transferees on the books of 
the Fed, also can achieve bona fide purchaser status. See Katzman, supra note 95, at 160-61, 
178-79. Indeed, paragraph (a) was "explicitly modeled after .. . § 8-320." Id. at 161 (citing 
Hoey & Rassn ick, Automation of Government Securities Operations, 17 Jurimetrics J. 176, 
18 1 ( i 976)); Memorandum of Law for the United States Treasury Department and the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York, Wichita Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Comark, 610 F. Supp. 406 
(S.D.N.Y. 1985), modified, 610 F. Supp. at 418 [hereinafter Comark Memo], reprinted in 
Ringsmuth, supra note 87 at 76 n.9 . For present purposes, the role of the Fed, as the issuer's 
(federal government's) fiscal agent, also is somewhat analogous to that of an issuer or transfe r 
agent who maintains records of registered ownership of securities, except that only Dis may 
maimain accounts with the Fed in the book-entry system. See 31 C.F.R. § 3(){). 1 !6 (1990) 
("Each Rese1ve Bank is hereby authorized, in accordance with the provisions of this subpart, 
to: (a) Issue book-entry Treasurj securities by means of entries on its records .... "). 
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2. The "Bearer Definitive" Fiction on the Lower Tiers: Transfer 
and Pledge Under Applicable State Law 
Courts, counsel, and commentators alike have been confounded 
in their attempts to interpret and apply the Book-Entry Treasury 
Regulations. Most of the difficulties have arisen in the context of 
transfers affecting at least one claimant that does not have (or is not 
claiming through) a book-entry securities account with the Fed. 135 
Such "lower-tier" transactions, not involving transfers on the books 
of the Fed, are governed by paragraph (b) of section 306.118 of the 
Book-Entry Treasury Regulations. 136 
The first sentence of paragraph (b) stipulates that the effective-
ness of a transfer or pledge and the perfection of a pledge turn on 
compliance with what "applicable law" would require "if the securi-
ties were maintained ... in bearer definitive form." 137 The second 
sentence then instructs that the securities are to "be deemed to be 
maintained in bearer definitive form." 13 8 The reference to "applicable 
law" in the first sentence means that state law controls. 139 
This "bearer definitive" fiction was intended to permit transfer 
and pledge under the law then applicable to securities-the pre-1978 
Articles 8 and 9. 140 Otherwise, paperless book-entry Treasury securi-
ties would have been characterized as "general intangibles," 141 with 
13 5 To put the discussion in the context of Example 1, imagine that /-3 is a DI clearing 
bank, I-2 is a non-DI primary government securities dealer, and I-1 is a regional securities 
firm. A non-DI dealer (such as I-2) normally finds it necessary to give a security interest to its 
clearing bank (/-3) covering securities "in" its clearing account on the books of its clearing 
bank (/-3) in order to secure daylight overdrafts and overnight ioans. See supra note 50. In 
that case the clearing bank (I-3) is both the intermediary on whose books the interest of its 
customer (I-2) is reflected and a transferee of a security interest in the securities. Th~ same 
point applies to the security interest given by I-1 to /-2 in Example 1. In addition, a customer 
(such as 1-1) of a dealer (such as /-2) may desire to sell (pursuant to a repo arrangement or 
otherwise) or pledge to a third party (such as L) securities "in" its account on the dealer's 
books (l-2's books, in Example !). 
136 3i C.F.R. § 306.118(b) (1990). 
i3 7 Id. The scope of paragraph (b) is limited to book-entry Treasury securities that are 
"maintained by a Reserve bank." Id. (emphasis added). Presumably "maintained" means 
that the securities involved in lower-tier transfers under paragraph (b) must actually, in fact, 
be "in" the account of a DI on the books of the Fed. That interpretation is consisrent with the 
approach under Article 8. Se-.:: supra note 104. 
138 31 C.F.R. § 306.118(b) (1990). 
139 See, e.g., Cohen v. Army Mora! Support Fund (In re Bevil!, Bresler & Schulm::!n Ass-et 
l'vh11agernent Corp.), 67 Banlu. 557, 616-17 (D.N. J. 1986); Cres;-;i. supra not~ 126. at 170-71; 
K atzman, supra note 95, at 1 67; Co mark Memo, supra note !34, at 8. 
140 See }b:y & Rassnick, supra note 134, at 13 1; K atzman, supra note 95, at 167 , 183. 
14 1 S-~e U.C.C. § 9-106; pre-i978 § 9-lO,.'i (defining "general iP.tangible" as " any personal 
property (including th ings in action) other than go:J<ls, accoun ts ~ cha ttel p3.per, documents, 
instruments, .and money"); Heinicke Instrum ents Co. v. Republic Corp., 543 F.2d 700 , 702 
(9th Cir. 1976) (purchaser's ir.terest in stock prior to iss•1ance of scock certificate wa.s a general 
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transfers governed by the common law of assignment and perfection 
of security interests achieved by filing under Article 9. 142 At first 
blush, book-entry Treasury securities would seem to be uncertificated 
securities under the 1978 Article 8. But the Fed does not undertake 
the role of an issuer, as contemplated by the 1978 Article 8, and un-
certificated security treatment clearly would conflict with the "bearer 
definitive" fiction. 143 Thus, whatever version of Article 8 applies, the 
"bearer definitive" fiction dictates that book-entry Treasury securities 
are deemed to be certificated securities (to use 1978 Article 8 
terminology).144 
intangible). Because paperless securities are not "securities" under pre-1978 § 8-102(1)(a), 
they are not included in the Article 9 definition of "instrument." Pre-1978 §§ 8-102(1Xa), 9-
105(1Xi); see Coogan, supra note 5, at 1020 & n.30. 
142 Characterization of book-entry Treasury securities as general intangibles is precisely 
what the Department of Treasury sought to avoid by devising the "bearer definitive" fiction, 
because security interests in general intangibles can be perfected only by filing . U.C.C. § 9-
302(1) (unchanged in the 1978 U .C.C.); see Hoey & Rassn.ick, supra note 134, at 181 ; Katz-
man, supra note 95, at 167, 183; see also Coogan, supra note 5, at 1021-22 & n.32 (suggesting 
that filing might be an appropriate means of perfecting a security interest in uncertificated 
securities in "run of the mill transactions," but ackrlowledging that perfection by entries on the 
books of intermediaries would be desireable "[i)f uncertificated securities become widely 
traded''). Aronstein, Haydock, and Scott effectively countered Coogan's arguments favoring a 
filing mle for uncertificated securities. Aronstein, Haydock & Scott, supra note 5, at 896-98 
(arguing that a filing rule would impair essential attributes of negotiabili ty). 
Although there are disagreements at the margin, most observers agree that Article 9's 
perfection rules and its generally applicable first-to-file-or-perfect rule are useful because infor-
mation is provided to prospective purchasers about the possible existenc~ of conflicting claims 
and because protection is afforded to earlier-in-time secured parties. See U.C.C. §§ 9-301 to -
305, 9-312(5)(a). See generally Baird, Notice Filing and the Problem of Ostensible Ownership, 
12 J. Legal Stud. 53 (1983); Baird & Jackson, Information, Uncertainty, and the Transfer of 
Property, 13 J. Legal Stud. 299 (1984); Carlson, Rationality, Accident 3.nd Priority Under 
Article 9 of the Unifmm Commercial Code, 71 Minn. L. Rev. 207 (1986) [hereinafter Carlson, 
Rationality]; Mooney, supra note 124; Phillips, Flawed Perfection: From Possession to Filing 
Under Article 9 (pts. 1 & 2), 59 B.U.L. Rev. 1 (1979). An Article 9-type filing system for 
interests in fungible bulks of securities, however, would be wholly unworkable (even a.side from 
negotiability concerns) as a means of determining priorities among purchasers. First, to ad-
dress effectively the potential priority contests, it would be necessary that the filing system be 
.::xt,ended to absolute ownership interests, as well as security interests. Second, because th.~ 
securities are fungible, it would be difficult to prepare collateral descriptions that wouid not be 
overbroad. Because securities int.::nnediaries typically make transfers (as collateral and other-
wise) to many transferees, broad filings (e.g., "ull securitie-s") would necessitate subordination 
agn.-ements on a massive scale or exceptions to the first -to-file rule tha t would leave the <;on-
flicting priority issues largely unchanged. Finally, the high volume and velocity of tnmsactions 
c.ould overwhelm (or b-e overwhelmed by) any sort of filing regime heretofore seer; by the 
world. To the extent that perfection by filing served anly to confer priority ag:'!.inst lien c:r~:d i­
tors (and a trustee in bankmptcy), : ather than purchasers, a filing scheme might be feasibl<: . 
i -B See Katzman, supra note 95 , <~t 169, 132-83. 
1¥, See supra notes 137-38 and ac::omp<rnyi:ng text; Crespi, supra not'~ 126, at n.66; K>UZ · 
rrw.n, supra note 95, at 169-70. Arguably this concbsion is 3ubj::oct to son·l '.; cloubt where !:1 ·~ 
.\ 978 Article 8 applies. The deem.OO certificated securi t ies might ])e ''r'.:-de;::m._{l " to b,~ uncer -
tificated securi ti~. 2e<.: U .C. C. § 8-1 02( 1 )(c) ("H a c.~rtigc-:1\~-d so: ·.1riry has t>;en r.::taiw:d by or 
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Because paragraph (b) does not address priorities, otherwise ap-
plicable state law applies to competing interests in securities trans-
ferred or pledged thereunder. And because book-entry Treasury 
securities are inherently a part of a fungible bulk, 145 it follows that the 
Article 8 proportionate property interest formulation applies to a pur-
chaser's interest. 146 Thus, a purchaser of these securities, pursuant to 
a paragraph (b) transfer or pledge, cannot become a bona fide pur-
chaser.147 Nevertheless, it is puzzling that paragraph (b) does refer to 
a "delivery" in the case of a third person acknowledgment contem-
plated by pre-1978 section 8-313(1)(d)}48 One explanation for this 
surrendered to the issuer or its transfer agent for reasons other than registration of transfer, 
other temporary purpose, payment, exchange, or acquisition by the issuer, that security shall 
be treated as an uncertificated security for purposes of this Article."). A better view is that the 
"bearer definitive" fiction controls. See Katzman, supra, at 182-83 (U.C.C. § 8-102( 1Xc) and 
duties of issuer under 1978 Article 8 are "antithetical to the Regulations' bearer certificate 
fiction and to the specific intent to insulate the Reserve Banks from any duty to register or 
acknowledge pledges."). 
145 See Regulations Governing Book-Entry Treasury Bonds, Notes, and Bills, Summary of 
Department of Treasury, 51 Fed. Reg. 43027-41, 43035 (1986) [hereinafter November 
TRADES Summary] (" [B]cok-entry securities of the same issue are fungible and generally not 
subject to tracing."). The "bearer definitive" fiction in paragraph (b) does not state, and does 
not mea11, that each transferee is deemed to have an interest in a discrete, particular, specific 
piece of paper. · 
146 See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text. 
147 See supra note 92. A delivery by identification of either a "specific security" in a bro-
ker's possession under p re-1978 § 8-313(1Xc) or U.C.C. § 8-313(1XdXi), or an acknowledg-
ment concerning an "identified security" in a third person's possession pursuant to pre-1 978 
§ 8-3 13(1)(d), requires aP. identification of a specific security that is incompatible with the 
inclusion of tile security in a fungible bulk. For development of this point see infra notes 218-
32; Appendix II, infra, notes 5-8. Whether applicable law is the pre- i 978 or the 1978 Article 
8, a delivery of book-entry Treasury securities cannot occur under 31 C.F.R. § 306. i l8(b) 
( 1990) because applicable law makes no provision for a delivery of securities included in a 
fungible bulk. A contrary conclusion-that a delivery can occur in the case of a fungible 
bulk- would mca.t1 that the Book-Entry Treasury Regulations made a drastic change in the 
result under applicable state law. But§ J06.118(b) makes no provision for transfer or delivery 
except pursuwt to "applicable law." Where a different result was desired, as in 31 C.F.R. 
§ 306.118(a) ( 1990), the regulations explicitly pro>ide that a delivery occurs a.'1d holder status 
is attainable. See supra nmes 127-29 &id accompanying text. The Department of Treasury 
a..r1d t.he :F:::deral :?._eserve Bank of New York have expressed a different view, how.zver. ~ 
Comarx Memo, supra note 134, reprinted in Ringsmuth, supra note 87, at 92-93 (argui11g tha t 
subs.coounts or segregation of book-entry customer :>ecurities may provide an effectiv;:: identii1-
cation o! a '"specitic" s<xurity under pre-1978 § 8-313(1 Xc) and, therefore, bona fide purchaser 
sbcm.); Bradford Tr-1st ~1.lemo, supra note 87, reprinted i.n Ringsmuth, supra note 87, at 110-
13 (s'=!me argument as to U.C.C. § 8-313(l )(d)(i)). 
l-•s See 31 C.F.R. § JQ.6. 113(b) (1 990) (where s.ecurities are recorded on an intermediary'3 
boo~s, tJ:nt intermediary "shall, for purposes of perfecting a plooge . .. or effecting delive1-y o>-
s:.Jch s~curitit:.> .. . undtr applicable provisio11s of hw, be the bail.::e to which notification of' the 
p100 ~~e of securities rnay be given or the third person in possession from which ac~..no":~1e:dg­
ment of the holding of the securities for th" purch:12..er may be obtained."). The quoted lan-
~liagc obviously ~"i\S deri ·;ed from pre-1978 § 9-30:5 (J:;ex·fection by notification to bililee) 3.i1d 
pre-197 3 § 15-313( l )(d) (ddiv<::y by ackn::rw!edgm.::ni of third person in possession of ideatificd 
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anomaly is that the purpose of specifying an intermediary as the third 
person for purposes of an acknowledgment was to make clear that the 
Fed was not the proper person to make such acknowledgments. 149 It 
is also plausible, even probable, that, in borrowing from the pre-1978 
Article 8, the drafters of the Book-Entry Treasury Regulations simply 
did not focus on the bona fide purchaser issue. 
In sum, the application of paragraph {b) requires, first, that the 
securities involved actually must be " in" a DI's account with the 
Fed.150 Second, one must pretend that the book-entry securities are in 
"bearer definitive form" (although they are not). Third, one must 
look to "applicable law" of a state to determine how transfers and 
pledges of interests in a fungible bulk of bearer definitive securities are 
made effective, how pledges are perfected, and how priorities among 
conflicting claimants are determined. Although this description is ad-
equate for present purposes, a host of other interpretive problems re-
main. It remains necessary to determine what state's law is the 
"applicable law." 151 That determination may depend on the property 
classification given to the securities, and the "bearer definitive" fiction 
may not be decisive for this purposeY2 Determining the location of 
the deemed "bearer definitive" securities, which may tum on who is 
in fictional possession, also may affect the choice of applicable law. 
And the paragraph (b) terminology drawn from pre- 197 8 Articles 8 
and 9 can be troublesome when the 1978 versions apply.153 Finally, 
security). But, if pre-1978 § 8-313(1)\d) is properly construed, no delivery can occur when a 
fungible bulk is involved. s~ ApJ:endix II, infra, notes 11, 41 and accompanying text. 
149 See 31 C.F.R. § 306.11 8(b) {1990) ("A Reserve bank .. . is not a bailee for purposes of 
notification of pledges ... or a third person in pc'lSSeSSion for purposes of acknowle..:J.gment of 
transfers . .. under this subsection."). 
I :SO Ex ant'! determination of this fact normally will be impossible, of course, since the secur-
ities are a part of a fungible bulk and a transferee could not discover the status of th at buL'\;: or 
the existence Oi' absence of competing i.i'l.terests. See supra note 110. Th·~ risk th2t no transfer 
at all will rxcur is inherent. See supra notes 104-10 and accompanying text. 
15 1 The Ikok-En try Trc:~_our; Regulations offer no guidance <l.S to th e choice of law. Each 
of the tw·o ~-~w)ons of i\rtic1es S and 9 is currently in e·ffect in a substant ial nu:rni:x~r !Jf th~  
states. S;~e supra note 5. Th,::re are also various different versions of the U.C.C. A .. r ticl•! 8 that 
ha•ie i:l-e-cn enacted. Signi:1cantiy, the important state of New York has enll.ctcd a version of the 
1973 Article 8 that is di:lferent from the unifonn version ir, a number of res~ts. State Corn: .. 
btion T<.lbl=s U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) NY-6 to f.fY-12 (1986). 
152 s~ Y:..atzrnQn, supra not•:: 95 ~ at 167: 
i:\ court ·easily r;J.ight sep~lrate the t\\-·o issues and consider the ~J.n~r c~rti ftc.ate 
fi ction t •:> appiy ::Jfdy after applicable law is chot>en. In that ca&~, in ord~r co chcv~·e 
the applicable la-.;v, the co•Jrt 7Y O'l ki hav~ t rJ decid~ for !t~lfho\\-· to u·,~~ ~ th~ s:~r; ~.:n-1 ·­
ti~) . ... (}iven thi:; axnbigui ty~ it r:-a nnot be predicte-d with certa] ~j"(; -; vhicb jurisdic--
tion's lav1 \Vi11 appJ.y. 
For ii diSCt1.~..SiDn cf choice of 1a'\-'V in this conteKt'l including the various i~\S n.;.,~ rn;;;ntiorv.:.'rl li:. a~~ 
fullo~;v i:n g text :. soc:. f~:::tzr.nan , supra rtOtt: 95, at 160-35. 
1 :!J For e~';'.B !YJ.ple, ac!lJ1c~yv]edgrnenl by a third f.~tson in pos.?.eJsion , a rneRnf, of {t::hvecy 
1990] BEYOND NEGOTIABILITY 349 
interpretive issues have arisen concerning the relationship between 
transfers under paragraph (a) and those under paragraph (b}. 154 
Several of these problems of interpretation and application in-
spired the Department of Treasury's Proposed TRADES Regula-
tions. 155 Those regulations would scrap the "bearer definitive" fiction 
and reliance on state law in favor of a preemptive federal regime cov-
ering "all of the basic mechanical rules needed for effectively transfer-
ring Treasury book-entry securities and for perfecting security 
interests therein." 156 The Proposed TRADES Regulations would, 
however, strictly maintain a property law construct quite similar to 
the 1978 Article 8. 157 
C. Observations 
The foregoing discussion provokes several important observa-
tions that have not received explicit attention in earlier law reform 
efforts and commentary. Some of these observations have implica-
tions for the world outside of the securities markets. 
Parsing through and applying the existing property law construct 
in the fungible bulk context is an enormously daunting task. 1\iisun-
derstandings and disagreements exist even on some basic principles. 
Some of the difficulties arise from statutory language that might be 
drafted more clearly. Indeed, Appendix II demonstrates that 1978 
section 8-313, when compared with the pre-1978 version, has been 
materially obfuscated where fungible bulks are concerned. 158 But the 
difficulty of interpreting and applying the property lav.r construct re-
flects more than infelicitous drafting. Employing a prope1i y law con-
struct in a context that differs so fundamentally from the environment 
in which property law principles arose and developed is a flawed tech-
nique that is bound to engender disarray. No one would think it wise 
or necessary to legislate that all unsecured creditors have a propor-
under pre-1978 § 8-313(l)(d), is not even a means of transfer under 1978 § 8-3!3( 1) if the third 
person is a financial intermediary acting as such. U.C.C. § 8-313(l )(e). An argument that the 
acknowledgment and notification provisions in paragraph (b) are the exclusiv.:: means of tr&.ilS-
fer and pledge of book-entry Treasury securities wisely has been rejected. Sec Wichita Fed. 
Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Comark, 610 F. Supp. 406, 413-14 (S .D .N.Y. 1985), mGdified , 610 F. 
Supp 406 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). 
154 See, e. g., Comark Memo, supra note 134, at 74-84. 
!55 See supra note 7; March TRADES Summary, supra note 39, at 8847 (discussing defects 
and ambiguities in "bearer definitive fiction" and lack of unifonn.i ty resulti11g from t\vo ve;·-
sions of Article 8). 
156 .March TRADES Summary, supra note 39, at 8847. 
157 Two important priority rules included in the Proposed TR ADES Reg-ulatiop:;-- the 
"gocd faith transferee" rule and the "clearing lien" priority-are dis.cussed infra notes 23 3-4 1 
and ac~m1panying text, in connection with dil.'ferent-iier priority contests. 
158 See Appendix II, infra, notes 39-45 :md accompanying text. 
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tionate property interest in all unencumbered assets of their common 
debtor. Nor would anyone support a law to the effect that bank ac-
count depositors have a property interest in money or other property 
of a bank. Yet the treatment of transfer and pledge of interests in 
fungible bulks of securities varies little from these analogies. 
The common law's baseline concept (nemo dat) results in a rule 
of first-in-time-first-in-right. The proportionate property interest for-
mulation under Article 8 provides an alternative to first-in-time in 
many circumstances, but even that sharing approach is undermined 
by the potential for a "no transfer" result when an intermediary who 
purports to effect a transfer actually controls no securities, or an in-
sufficient quantity, of the issue involved. 159 In order to determine 
whether an effective transfer of an interest in securities in fungible 
bulk has occurred, application of the property law construct depends 
on the actual existence of, and some identification of, the fungible 
bulk of securities involved as well as an identification of any earlier-in-
time claimants. But in today's securities markets fungible bulks can 
be controlled by several tiers of intermediaries who participate in an 
active market, and an intermediary may control more than one fungi-
ble bulk of securities at a given time. Settlements are routinely ef-
fected on a netted basis, and customers of an intermediary have no 
feasible means of ascertaining either the status of the fungible bulks 
against which they claim or the existence of any conflicting claimants. 
It is not surprising, therefore, that application of a prope11y law con-
struct is problematic. 
Indeed, aside from flaws in application, a property construct, 
however devised or modified, is likely to produce .fortuitous, arbitrary, 
and unpredictable results for customers who claim .interests in fungi-
ble bulks of securities controlled by a common intermediary. Simi-
larly situated claimants may receive vr;ry di:Efere:nt treatment. The 
possibili ty of a "no transfer" result, again, is an apt e;w.mph:. Even 
when the pwportionate property interest formulation is ~tpplied , some 
l . . '\... c ... d c 1 . ·-·· , ., ) ·~· 1 ... 1"1 c amw.nts (suc.:1 a.s · - .L an . ...--v , m l:xampw 1 1T\•O::LY s-u tler a s 1o:rt:ta. 1 
d h , ., C' 1) .. ,.. .J, 1 -r·  . . . l .• an or .ers \ SUCfl .as -:.., · may oe n:u y coverea . ms pote.nn ai ror 
h ighly dispara te t reatment of different c.laimams wou1d {;X~is t whether 
· t ·h ~ -.-.r~...,n1~ .-...-.. 1-i .~ pro•1c .........  r 11"\vv ·orinc ; p} ·~ ~- · ·- -r ~ ·fi ·r s: ·l.. .: ...... +i-r l "":. ·J~-. t 1· ~ t. J. Ti~­, 1" - ;; 1-'lJ ..... !v"'. t;• '-· . }' '~l tj . a . i . , l <;;; 't'/1;; .. '-- ·· ' -~> L~ .tH-L L .. •;, , !•:.::-•." .u- ... 1.<';;; 
(..:uch as bona E.de p:1rchase), or the proportion i:lk prope;·ty in terest 
·''·w·-,-..., ,,·J, +.; .. ··rh·ot ·po+e 1+··t "'l •. ·'• ,; ,l ] ., ~-~ .. ' ~ - ..  ~·· , ,_ "j, .. ~ ·l o·'' ·: ... ... , 1 .tC•.1. .·. > .l u~'"" ·'un . 1.,, . . .·l •. o. , e :c;pc.. (. .t.::u.} ~_.h:::C a .• .1c:•>:.:: U 1 u le ·· ·'-'·' · ·t( .1 "'-·t1U ·i"h" 
·:~, -1 o .~ n ~n .,. -1 cry~-~-} T'U_ l• ·ircl--o.["" TI \~,. 1·..,.., r C}'" ; [ .. "~,-.,.~·r'·~ ro1a~· ; oJ ...... ., -;-,.;:t 'n ·:·'t ·:· h 1.+("1 1~ - -~ :-. ,- ~,.. 
\..·'-<> .o l... c.>.Hu · , .J .~c. : .. t · Ldl< • . C:L > .u d. ~ l. .u ~ l .\u 0 ., . tc \..\ ' .U~d u 't-' ' "- 1··" t;o .l .l l."C:.-. -
---·---------~- ---··------···--- --
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cal where fungible bulks are concerned.160 When the benefits that de-
rive from a property law construct are not present, any normative 
justifications for property law doctrine have diminished vitality. 
There are other examples in commercial law that involve poten-
tial conflicting claims to finite resources where it has been useful to 
shrink from a strict property law approach. 16 1 As commercial trans-
actions and markets evolve and are made the subject of study, other 
proposals for non-property law construct approaches may well sur-
face. 162 1vioreover, as the next part explains, for some, but not all, 
claimants in securities firm insolvency proceedings, the property law 
construct was largely abandoned many years ago. 
III. CLAIMS AND D ISTRIBUTIONS I N INTERMEDIARY 
l NSOL VENCY PROCEEDINGS 
lt is only when an intermediary becomes subject to an insolvency 
proceeding that it will be necessary to explore the rights of a trans-
feree of an interest in a fungible bulk of securities controlled by that 
intermediary. So long as the intermediary remains viable, the inter-
mediary's warranty 163 and other obligations 164 should ensure that the 
transferee receives the benefits of the securities that it claims. If the 
intem1ediary becomes unable to honor its obligations, actual enforce-
ment of the transferee's property rights against the intermediary 
outside of an insolvency proceeding is extremely unlikely. 165 T he spe-
160 See, e.g., Berger, An Analysis of the Doctrine That "First in Time is First in Righ t, " 64 
Neb. L. Rev. 349, 357-58 (1985) ("One of the policies of our kgal system is that of encouraging 
certainty, fi nality, or repose with respect w who has a right to a given resource. Such secmiiy 
is required so that JXrsons can order their affairs upon certain assumptions concerning their 
rights and the rights of others.") . 
l6I See, .:: .g., § 9-306(4)(d) (formula for determination and limitation of ciaims to cash pro-
ceeds in insolvency proceedings that overrides otherwise applicable allocation bas..."Cl on tracing 
principies). 
16 2 See, e.g., Schwartz, A Theory of Loan Priorit ies, 18 J . Legal Stud. 209, 260 (1939) (pro-
posing a priority scheme for creditors that , with cer...ain exceptions, wo uld award firs t priority 
to the unse,;urcd lc:n der whose loan was first-in-tirr.e because "something m'.lC.n like [that] pri· 
ori ty m ie wouid emerge ;o.s \he equilibrium crerlit cont ;:-act bet 'Neee initi:--d financ:::rs and 
borrowers"). 
153 For (.~. discu3sion of 'NC.ITB.nty obligations of transferors and bro}~ e l's , sec generally 
G uttman , supra no te -~ , at 6-5 to -28; infra Part V(B). 
164 See, .~ . g . , U.C.C. § 8-31.3(3) (p m chase;-'s ;-ight to demand fron~ financi;:d imermediary a 
securi ty nm subject to not i c.~ of adverse ciaims); SEC Rule \5c3-J(l ), 17 C. F .P.. § 240.15d-J(1) 
( 1990) (cnsro!n-::r 's ;'P.bsolute right . . . to receive . .. physical dcll ver:.c of cen:iftcates '') . 
165 G~ ·,-e n the r1ature) supervision> and regulation of securities irnen·n·::ch3rlt:$, it i ~~ safe to 
;iSSUin~ i:hal t;..::fore a st..oc tlri 'tit;s c!.l ~Jtorntr or se,.:ured credito:c co uld juci iciai.ly ~r'. forc~ .~ its ·:lairns 
to sccur1tl~s t11at th.t: i:nt~ rrned.i a~c.i cou.Id not ho:nor {as opposed to ~n forct:f!') t .rt"t 9/ htii ther::= 1.s a 
di spu~e as 'to tf.q:: r:laim.an t's 1ight3), th e intcrfnedl2.:ly wou}d be subj~::c t ::d to inscd·,'enc y procc·~d -· 
1ngs or repl r;ced by r~gula (ors •;vit h s.nother inten nediary . See ~o:ncra1 .i:~' i\ . Fo1lz!rc!., 1. Passaic, 
:z. :SEis &: .J. }'::J·.t.l ) ' ) s;tftf:J n1Jte 59! at 605-23 (failing and railed bar: ~.: :·; i.n. s ur~·;d. Oy :FI) IC)~ 
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cial nature of the institutions that serve as securities intermediaries166 
distinguishes the transferee's property rights from those of most other 
property owners and secured creditors who not uncommonly assert 
and enforce property rights outside of insolvency proceedings. If the 
intermediary cannot perform, then the transferee often will recover 
only what it is entitled to receive in the intermediary's insolvency 
proceeding. 167 
A. Ownership Claims of Customers: The SIPA and Bankruptcy 
Code Risk-Sharing Distributional Rule 
Returning to Example 1, if state property law (Article 8) were to 
control in J-1 's insolvency proceedings, each of J-1 's customers claim-
ing securities of a given issue would receive the benefit of a propor-
tionate property interest in the fungible bulk of securities of that issue 
controlled by J-1. C-2 and C-3, then, would share pro rata in the 
insufficient quantity of C Co. securities and C-4 would be fully satis-
fied by the sufficient quantity of D Co. securities. 168 
Because J-1 is a securities firm, SIPA and Subchapter HI of 
chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code169 would impose a very different 
distributional result among same-tier claimants. 17° Claims of custom-
Guttma.-1, supra note 4, at 19-49 to -55 (monitoring of broker-dealers by SIPC). Obviously, 
nonjudicial self-help to recover securities would not be feasible when the intermediary controls 
the securities as a part of a fungible bulk. 
166 See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text (discussing regulatory approach to inter-
mediary risk). 
16 7 In some cases the transferee also may have a conversion claim against a third party. See 
infra note 212. Part IV, infra, considers the troublesome different-tier priority conflicts that 
can resuli from intermediary insolvency but are not resolved by distributional rules appiicab!e 
in insolvency proceedings. 
!68 See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text (discussing proportionate property inter-
est rule). 
i69 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988) [hereinafter Bankruptcy Code]; 11 U.S.C. §§ 741 -52 
( 1988) [hereinafter Subchapter III]. 
l 70 SIPA appiies to SIPC members, which consist of all registered brokers or dealers under 
:he Securities and EJtchange Act of 1934 (with certain exceptions not relevant here). SlPA, 
§ 3(a)(2)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 78ccc(a)(2)(A) (1988). The stockbroker liquidation provisions of 
3ubchapter HI apply only to stoc!cbrokers, and a stockbroker cannot be a debtor under any 
o ther chapter. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(48) (1988) (defining "stockbroker"), 103(c), 109(d). When a 
proceeding is commenc...""d under SIP A all pror.-eedings in a case under the Bankruptcy Code 
ue: stayed. 11 U.S.C. § 742. Thus, Subchapter III generally applies only to the limited class of 
:o i:oc'c.brokers that are not members of SIPC. For discussions of securities firm insol vency pm-
<;eedings, see Guttman, supra note 4, at 19-34 to 19-102; Brennan, The R ole of SIPC in Bro-
.:, .~rage Failures: ,<>. Case Study of the Demise of Bell and Beckwith, 13 Se-c. Reg. L.J. 18 
( 1985); Harbeck, Stockbroker Bankruptcy: The Role of the District Court and the Ba.nk-
ruptcy Court Under the Securities Investor Protection Act, 56 Am. Bankr. L..J . ?.77 (1932); 
Note, Investor Protection Under the SIPA: A Reassessment and Recommendations for Fu-
cur;; Change, i 9 Colum. J. L & Soc. Probs. 69 (1985). 
1 
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ers (including large claims in excess of coverage provided by SIPC171 ) 
would be subject to a risk-sharing formula that differs from the A..rti-
cle 8 proportionate property interest formula. Instead of sharing a 
proportionate interest in the fungible bulk of securities of the issue 
claimed, divided among all claimants with claims to that issue, claim-
ants that qualify for "customer" 172 status share ratably, according to 
their respective "net equities," 173 in the entire pool of "customer 
property. " 174 In Example 1, if there is an insufficiency of customer 
property, all of the securities available to /-1 of the issues claimed by 
J-l's customers would be shared by all of J-l's customers (C-1 
through C-5000)--including any customers that have no property in-
terest at all under state law. 175 This sharit"'lg rule represents a clear 
171 When SIP A applies, the investors with smaller claims generally are fully protected by 
SIPC and, in many cases, larger amounts of private insurance. See supra note 8. Each cus-
tomer is entitled to the benefit of advances from the SIPC fund, not exceeding $500,000, which 
can include advances on account of claims for cash not exceeding $100,000. S!I'A, § 9(a), 15 
U.S.C. 781ff-3(a) (1988); see Guttman, supra note 4, at 19-94 to 19-98. 
172 "Customer" is defined in SIPA, in pertinent part, as: 
[a]ny person (including any person with whom the debtor deals as principal or 
agent) who has a claim on account of securities received, acquired, or held by the 
debtor in the ordinary course of its business as a broker or dealer from or for the 
securities accounts of such person for safekeeping, with a view to sale, to cover 
consummated sales, pursuant to purchases, as collateral security, or for purposes 
of effecting transfer. The term "customer" .includes any person who has a claim 
against the debtor arising out of sales or conversions of such securi ties, and any 
person who has deposited cash with the debtor for the purpose of purch::wing se-
curities ... 
SIP A, § 16(2), 15 U.S. C. § 73!!1(2) ( 1938). The Subchapter IH definition of "custGmer" is, for 
present pnrjX>ses, substantially the same. II U.S.C. § 741(2) (1983). 
!73 A customer's ''net equity" is essentially the value of securities or cash cb jmed by the 
customer, as of the date the proceeding commenced, less c!airns of the debtor intermediary 
against the customer (such as unpaid customer obligations for securities purchEJ.scd on "mar-
gin"). SIPA, § \ 6(1 !), 15 U.S.C. § l ll(n); 11 U.S.C. § 741(6) (1988). 
1 7~ SIPA, § 8(c)(l), l5 U.S.C. § 78:fff..2(c)(l); 11 U.S.C. § 752(a). Under ooth SlPA and 
Subchapter III, " customer property" includes virtualiy all secUiities ava1lab!e w the estate of 
th~~ type Ih~t ve subject to customer claims. S!PA, § 1 0(4), 15 U.S.C. § 73/!l(-1); ll U .S.C. 
§ 741(4). The principal exception is for property thai is a "customer name 3<..->cu rity." Id . A 
"customer name s.xurity" is a SJJP..ci5c security held by the intermediacy that is registered, or is 
in the pmcess of re;sistration, in the name of a customer and that is not in negotic,ble form. 
~;IPA, § 16{3), 15 U.S.C. § 7'W!(3); li U.S.C. § 741(3). Altho~..:gh the d istributional formu la 
for customer prop-erty is essentially the same under SIP A and the Banl-:;-uptcy Cock:, the means 
of satisfying the claims differ substantially. Under SIP A, the tmstee dist:-ioutes or purchuses 
s~uritie.s for distribution to custon1ers. S!f'1~, § 8(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78fff-2(d). Under Sub-
:::hi.tpter Lf! , ~he tP..iStee r~-duc.es CUStOmer S~Uritit.:S to n10ney and then m~tkr:s ca-sh distrlb jJ .. 
tions to the custorners. 11 U.S.C. §§ 748, 750~ 752. Customer n::l~T!~ securities, ho\.vcver, .are 
distrih\kd in kind to custom~rs under both SiPA and S~.!bchapctr HI. SIPA, § il{c)(2), 1:i 
tJ .S.C . § ·;8frT-2(c)(2); 11 ·u.s.c. § "7j 1. For ~..r1 en.iight~ning discussion of the operat ion of the 
S.IP A. distribution~l rules for custo:mer cl:ai:rnsJ s.e-:: First Fed. Sav. &. Loan i.\5.~'n "-"'· f~t'J ill ~ 
Br:;;3ler Br. Schu!mr:n, :59 Bankr. J53, 358-73 (D.N.J. 1986). 
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break with the property construct that controls under state law. 
The merits of the SIPA/ Subchapter III risk-sharing rule have 
not been subjected to refined analysis. It is best seen as a specialized 
variation of the basic distributional formula applicable to creditors in 
bankruptcy-pro rata sharing among claimants who are similarly sit-
uated. 176 This principle often is expressed by the maxim "equality is 
equity." 177 Unlike property claimants such as lessors and secured 
creditors, the sui generis claims of customers of a securities intermedi-
ary are marked by a lack of control and knowledge and an almost 
exclusive reliance on the integrity and solvency of the intermediary 
(buttressed by regulatory constraints). 178 
The origins of the SIP A/Subchapter III distributional rule indi-
cate clearly that it is rooted in this notion of equal treatment. It de-
rived from section 60e of the Bankruptcy Act, which was added by 
the Chandler Act of 1938. 179 Section 60e responded to widespread 
dissatisfaction with the essentially fortuitous, arbitrary, and disparate 
purchase of securities, a customer may have a net equity claim, and thereby share in customer 
property, even though the customer has not received a transfer of a property interest under 
applicable state law. See SIPA, § 16(2), (11), 15 U.S.C. § 78/l/(2); 11 U .S.C. § 741(2), (6) 
( 1988). 
176 See SIPA, § 726(a)(2), (b); Hill v. Spencer Sav. & Loan As.s'n, 94 Bankr. 817, 824 
(D.N.J. 1989) ("SIPA contemplates equal distribution among similarly situated creditors."). 
177 See, e.g., J. Maclachlan, Bankruptcy 356 (1956) (It is "a general policy of bankruptcy 
that equality is equity between creditors of the same class."). 
178 See supra notes 59-62, IIO and accompanying text. 
179 Bankruptcy Act of 1938, § 60e, amended by Chandler Act, II U.S.C. § 96e, Pub. L. No. 
75-696, 52 Stat. 840, 870 ( 1938) (repealed 1978). Section 60e established three kinds of claims 
for securities claimants in stockbroker bankruptcies. First, customers who cou1d specifically 
identify their securities, or whose securities (or "substitutes therefor or proceeds thereof") 
were, more than four months prior to bankruptcy and while the debtor was solvent, "allocated 
to or physically set aside for such customer, and remained so allocated or set aside at the date 
of bankruptcy," could reclaim the securities. 1I U.S.C. § 96e(2), (4) (repealed 1978); Collier 
on Bankruptcy,~~ 60.73, at 1171-72, 60.74, at 1182-89 (14th ed. 1977). Arguably, even securi-
ties in a fungible bulk, if physically set aside for a customer, could be so reclaimed. See Co11ier, 
supra,~ 60.74, at 1187-89. Second, all other customers shared pro rata, according to the value 
of their "net equity" claims, in a "single and separate fund" comprised of ali nonspecitically 
identifiable customer securities of all issues. I1 U.S.C. § 96e(l), (2) (rep~ed 1978); Collier, 
supra,~ 60.73, at I1 71 -75 . Third, to the extent that customer claims remained unsatisfied, 
customers received unsecured, general creditor status. 11 U.S.C. § 96e(1) (repealed 1978). 
SIPA and § 60e coexisted from 1970, when SIPA was enacted, untii 1978 when SIPA was 
amended a..1d Subchapter !II, modeled on the amended SIP A, was enacted as a part of the 
B~·u1kruptcy Cede. Compare Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, ?ub. L. 91 -593, 34 
Stat. 1636 ( 1970) with Securities Investor Prote<::tion Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. 95-
283, 92 Siat. 249 and The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L 95-598, 92 Stat. 2681. 
Section 60e differed in detail from SIP A and Subchapter III, and it L"li led to resolve sstisfacto-
rily certain matters of scope and application. See, e.g., Guttman, supra not.':! 4, at 19-'hl to -'-~7 
(criticizing § C.Oe on the basis of ambigui ty as to who is a "stockbroker" (tm undefined term) 
and who is a "customer," and noting problems of tracing by cash customers); see also Not::: , 
?rot·ection of the Accounts of Stockbrokerage Cu;;torners, 77 }b.:rv _ L. Re·1 . 1290 {196-:!.). 
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treatment afforded stockbroker customers under applicable state law 
and the Bankruptcy Act. 180 The essence of the distributional rule of 
section 60e- that customers share ratably in all customer securities-
has been preserved by SIPA and Subchapter III. 181 
Early drafts of what became Article 8 included a section that 
tso See, e.g., Maclachlan, supra note 177, at 323 (quoted in Guttman, supra note 4, at 19-
41): 
Section 60e adopts the theory that all of the customers of a broker who permit him 
to have wide powers over their securities are subjecting themselves to the common 
risk of his failure. He should not be permitted to favor some over others when he 
and they contemplate the imminence of his failure. Furthermore, upon bank-
ruptcy the available assets should be distributed by applying equitable principles 
upon a broader base than that recognized under pre-existing bankruptcy law. 
Under pre-§ 60e law, a distinction was drawn between cash customers and those who bought 
on margin, with the latter treated less favorably, and customers who could not trace their 
securities were given general creditor status. See Guttman, supra note 4, at 19-38 to -40; 
Gilchrist, Stockbrokers' Bankruptcies: Problems Created by the Chandler Act, 24 Minn. L. 
Rev. 52, 53-57 (1939). Commenting on the (then-proposed but unenacted) Chandler Act, 
James McLaughlin noted: 
[E]xisting law turns upon refinements utterly unintelligible to the business man 
and involves elements of chance more appropriate to a beano party than to the 
administration of justic-e. If the problem be approached from the point of view of 
ea..~ and economy of administration, the solution of the Chandler Bill warrants a 
high rating. 
McLaughlin, Aspects of the Chandler Bill to Amend the Bankruptcy Act, 4 U. Chi. L. Rev. 
369, 397-98 (1937). As originally enacted, SIPA made a distinction between cash and margin 
customers. 15 U.S.C. § 78fff(c)(2)(A)(ii), (iii) (repealed 1978). The 1978 amendments to 
SIPA, ~.s wdl as Subchapter III, eliminated that distinction. SIPA, §§ 8(c)(l), 16(2) (ii), 15 
U.S.C. §§ 78fff-2(c)(l), 78 11!(2); 11 U.S.C. § 741(2) . 
18 1 Surprisingly, l have found no commentary that expiicitly acknowledges the radical dif-
t'erence between the pre-1 978 and 1978 § 8-3 1.3(2) proportionate property interest formulation, 
on one hand, and the risk sharing apprc.ach of Bankruptcy Act § OCk, SIP A, and Subchapter 
III, on the other. Moreover, some commentary inexplicably appears either to miss the distinc-
tion entirely or to misinterpret one or the other scheme of allocation. For example: 
Until securities are delivered to the purchaser, they are held by the broker in 
fungibie bulk. The customer is thus the mvnc::r of a proportionate property interest 
in the fungible bulk. In a banhuptcy of the broker, the customer would have his 
rights in the bulk determined by »tat~ Jaw. 
Guttman, supra note 4, al 8-27 (footnot<= omitted). 
If ther·: b.~ no speciD.ed securicy in the hands of the broker, the creditor customers 
will slusc pro ratu in t:~,e fungible but<, which will not be part of the banluupt's 
t'.ssds; (5--"Ction 8-313(2) and Section 60(.~) [sic] Bankn..lptcy Act) claimin;g any defi -
cir.s as gcnefal e.rcrJirors. 
G'f course the rules 2<S io sharing in fungibles would he equally applicabk }Jere [in 
b,;nkruptcy], un!c;s 1h;;re h'.S be·.::n a setl:ing aside of the swck to the custom-a's 
l)rder, i. e., [pre-1978} Section 3-313(l)(b) or (c) or (d) s.re found applicable. Tbe 
rnost ir.nJ:ortam aspo.:t of Section 8-3 l 3 is thu3 seen to be: in the realm of bank·· 
rup~cy la·w. 
Sv·~,te of l';[e\¥ Jersey, c-:ctnn!is~;:on to Stuc:y 0-od f~eport Ur,-on the ljnifom1 <2omrnercisl Code 
f~)r f,h-;\:Y Jersey, Second R .. epor~ to the GovcrT10rj the s~natt and the i\ss.::!:nOly of th;; State of 
~~l~w J::t~:ey 61.~.:2, 6· ~4, ·] 3-3 13, l'lt r~,. Jers,;y 3t~_1d:; Con1:rnen!3 (1960) . 
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explicitly dealt with distributions of securities upon a broker 's insol-
vency and generally incorporated the section 60e approach.182 The 
drafters subscribed to the underlying principle of the section 60e risk-
sharing rule on both cost-saving and nonnative grounds.183 One com-
mentary equated the risk-sharing principle to the "admiralty principle 
of •common venture-comrnon risk.' " 184 The coexistence of the draft 
182 See Commercial Code, Tentative D raft No. 1-A.rticle V , § 33 (l\.iay 10, 1947), re-
printed in 3 Uniform Commercial Code Drafts 287-88 (E. Kelly ed. 1984); Commercial Code, 
Tentative Draft No. 2-Article V, § 33 (August 28, 1947), reprinted in 3 Uniform Commercial 
Code Drafts, supra, at 533-34; Commercial Code, Proposed Final DraJt No. 1-Article V, 
§ 29 (April 26, 1948), reprinted in 4 Uniform Commercial Cede Drafts, supra, at 342-43; 
Commercial Code, Proposed Final Draft No. 2-Article V, § 30 (August 9, 1948), repri.-1ted in 
5 Uniform Commercial Code Drafts, supra, at 205-(}{i; U.C.C., May 1949 Draft, Article 8-
Investment Securities, § 8-316, reprinted in 8 Uniform Commercial Code Drafts, supra, at 
243-44. Each of these drafts also contained a provision contemplating that a broker's cus-
tomer would obtain a proportionate property interest in a fungible bulk. See Appendix II, 
infra. The first draft of the investment securities article was a partial draft and did not contain 
a provision for distributions in broker insolvency proceedings. Corr..mercial Code, Preliminary 
Tentative Draft No. 1-Article V (April 22, 1946), reprinted in 3 Uniform Commercial Code 
Drafts, supra, at 1-44. Although there were several variations in the broker insolvency distri-
bution scheme among the cited draft provisions, they differed from Bankruptcy Act § 60e 
primarily in their proposed reintroduction of the distinction between cash customers and mar-
gin customers. See, e.g., U.C.C., May 1949 D raft, Article 8-Investment Securities, § 8-
316(1 ), reprinted in 8 Uniform Commercial Code Drafts, supra, at 243-44. 
i83 See, e.g., Commercial Cede, Tentative D raft No. 2- Article V, Note to § 33 (August 28, 
1947), reprinted in 3 Uniform Commercial ~"Cle Drafts, supra note 182, at 561: 
The purposes of the section are, fi rst, to reduce the expens!:, deiay and 'l ncertainty 
which derive from an effort to apply the uncertain and confl icting rules of bona 
fide purchase and of tracing to t.he unravelling of che manipulations of a e-ommon 
fiduciary; and, second, to achieve real equity in the situation in which several per-
sons have put their trust, in com;non, in a defalcator. The reason is cl ear: once 
defal cation has set in, it is a matter of pure accident which securities become th<: 
particular objects of plunder, and the common risk shouiG 1:>--:: shared, instead of 
being left to accident. 
U. C.C. , May 1949 Draft, Article 8-Investment Sec,Jnties, § 8-316(1) C.01<1ment i, reprinted in 
8 Uniform Commercial Code Drafts, supra, a t 244: 
By adopting the basic policy of Section 60 E [sic] of the :Federal Bankruptcy Act 
which makes provision for a pro raw distribution anwng a ban!crupt broker's cus-
tomers as a s-eparate class, the time cocsuming ~-nd co~-;tly "~tDlc .i. ng" tech.~1iqu~ !10r -
maJly employed when a common fidu·.:;iary is guilty 'J i" mi:>appropri:;.ticn and 
malfeasance is avoided. 
! 84 Commercial Code, Proposed Final D nut No. l --·A ... nic ie V, not .~ to § 29 (April 26, 
194-8), reprinted in 4 Uniform Commercial Code Drafts, supra note iS2, at 332. The quoted 
rt ference obviously refezs to the admiralty law doctlli1e of •·general average" contribution. See 
g.~nerally G . Gilmore & C. Black, The LaV!'-Of Admiral ty .2 <~·:!.- 71 (.2d erJ. 1975). When general 
.sverage applies, the interest>J of a sh ip,s c-:.vners !n tht ship C;nd th .. :ir r.i.£)H to ccrnpensat ion for 
carriage ("fr.:ight") and the interests of the OWTh'!iS ·)f th·~ cargo ~hart ratably any lo-:;s or 
damt\~e to nny of their interests. Id. at 244-45 . ""I ... he ~1ect ::-·!n ·~ is not D.ppljed to 211 such loss or 
damage, but only when three conditions are sati:;fied . Fi ·;·si~~ thtt,~ must t.~ a d.B.nger or peril 
that is ccrnmon t•J the aship, cargo and CTe"Jf1/! and that 1:; ·~ '.in.:·-f i(f; . bl•-: , · ~-::~c.:p t by ":'·o!unUL.~ly 
incurring the less of a portion of the whole 1:0 o·.aw~ the rema.incL~r." !ct . .:-.; 245 (quoting Bar-
nn_rd v. A .. drJns, 51 U.S . (10 ttow.) 2701 JOJ ( l (~JO)) . 53ec.o~1d , :1 p·Jrt1::Yn of th·::- irrtercsts (such as 
4 
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U.C.C. section and the generally applicab1e proportionate property 
interest rule indicates that the drafters did not view the latter rule to 
be directed to insolvency distributions at all. 185 This risk-sharing rule 
for insolvency distribution eventually was dropped from Article 8 on 
the grounds that n10difications to section 60e were preferable to 
changes in state law, not on the basis that the principle was flawed. 186 
The potential for cost savings may ofrer a plausible basis for pro 
rata sharing among general creditors. 187 But it is doubtful that costs 
would be matetially increased if the Article 8 proportionate property 
interest formulation were applied in securities finn insolvencies. 188 
Aside from cost savings, does pro rata sharing, either in the SIP A/ 
the cargo or a ship's mast) must be "voluntarily jettison[ed]" in order to avoid the peril. ld. 
Tnird, the "attempt to avoid the imminent common peril must be successful." I d. (footnote 
omitted). The § 60e/SIP A/Subchapter Ill risk-sharing approach reaches a result similar to 
that of general average contribution-ail customers share ratably whether or not a shortfail 
exists as to the issues of securities they claim. And the prospe.::t of customer losses arising out 
of their intennediary's failure could be characterized as a common peril. But the metaphor 
seems to cmmbie at this point. Unlike the notion of a ship's captain voluntarily casting away 
cargo or demasting the ship in heavy seas, all for the common good and without self-interested 
concern for the particular sacrifice made, shortfalls in customer securities often may result 
from th.:: misb-ehavior or impmdence of Ihe intermediary's management. Nor does the risk-
sharing approach appear to bear any direct causal connection to efforts to save the common 
enterprise. 
lB5 But s.x U.C.C. § 8-3 13 comment 4 (sugge;;ting that the proportionate property interest 
fo rmula of D.C. C. § 8-3 !3(7.) applies in insol vency proceedings). 
186 The seventh draft of the investment securities article delet{.-d § 8-316 of the May i 949 
draft. U.C.C., Text Only Printing Except for the Article on Sales (Article 2) and the Article 
on Effective Date an d Repe.aler (Article 1 i), A..-ticle 3- investment Securities (March 1, 1950), 
reprinted in Un!fonn Commerciai :=:.Y.Je Drafts, supra note 182, at 120-39. Tne reporter for 
Article 8, Soia Ment:>chikoff, expiained that Bankruptcy Act § 60-e, would controi over the 
draft § 8-316 and that " the chances of a broker's insolver:cy coming up in a state court rather 
than in bankrup lcy are in my mind e:ttrernely remote." 26 .C\.L.L Proc. 332 (1949) (unpub-
lished). Unfonuna tdy, her explanation did noc consider that such a rule could apply in the 
esse of failed sr::c,Jri·£ies. intennediari~~) such a.s banks, v..-·hich Y~' •!re not .subj~t to the Bank-
ruptcy Act. See 11 U.S. C. § 22 (rev'ealed 1970) ("banking corporation" not entitled to become 
a ban~<.nJpt); s-::-e al::c' in1Ta notes 199-200. She further observed that if the U .C.C. ·were enucted 
!i$ a f~ih:r:J.J l.TW 1 ~· GVc rn j_ght ~ rep~""1.led by irnpEcatio;L 26 .1\. .L.I. Proc., supra, at 332. She 
SUJgc~:tt:::d tl12.t a .rr~ ;C.· iTl::.·n e;-~dHtion b~ 1n ~tde to confar tn § .S(~~ ~to the draft § 8-316. Id. 
13 7 For ~7\ttJstpl~, ban kraptcy ia~v r.night 3.tternpt lo appi·o;jrn~te the value of each unsecured 
creditor's c:.! airn bJ.Jec1 on the 1ikch11ctOd of that crct:litorts ff.:C0 \1 .::1J' outside of bankruptcy, con-
~: i deri·ilg fa 1;tors :\uch as the credhc:r 's leverage, 9Jh·.:.: ther ch.:: creditor has reduced its clairo to 
j udgrucnt, ~nd the 1!kc. ! 1c t only vvould such a d istributional sei.erne be costly to adn1inister, it 
also '.'Jould n:quin: rethinking and re•;,: riting prefer.~nce hw See 11 U .S.C. § 547 (1988); infra 
not·c 196. .~.Jthoug}l cc::rtain objei=tively classified un:;.ccured creditors are assigned priorit ies 
under 11 U.S .{:. § jl)7{r~), pro r2ta shtu-iJ!g is ais~J rr . .:~~dated fo r rn~n-t(:-e r,:; of a priority class 
~;;lh8 .:tre r~ tl:~ Ful1y ~~. a ti.sfie d. Id . § 726(o). 
!3 13 I t 7/ou:.d. not he dii.Yicu'!t tc i:nph;ment a sc?1CW1-: ;;.: hen:. in J~x3.mp1c l, C-2 and C-3 share 
:=:.:;·o rat8. !n ::he C (~o . s.~curi ri~s and c·--: .. ge ts the l_:,;n~"f1 t ·Jf a11 of the D C:o . secu1ities. \Vhen 
·~Oi"fl'p ~.:..r e.:~ ·,;.; ith t.h::: tr~cing approach of rJleRs;;ction 60e ia;-•i I it St ·e :{I1S cle..,.'J3" that either the pro-
;Jnrt i\) iElt ;= p rop::r ty in ·~ e.rest i~Jr;'nn hnion e:r the S:i PFi/ Subchapter I1! risk sha;ing approach 
v;ouid t-e less ::cstl ~!. 
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Subchapter III context or more generally, serve to maximize the col-
lective wealth of creditors? 189 The answer seems to be uncertain, at 
best, and highly controversial. 190 The post-bankruptcy effect of the · 
SIP A/Subchapter HI approach is purely distributional-it takes the 
value of customer securities of some issues away from customers 
claiming those issues and distributes that value to other customers 
claiming other issues. The aggregate value of customer securities and 
the aggregate amount of customer claims are the same with or with-
out the rule. 
Customers well might include a risk sharing arrangement similar 
to the SIP A/Subchapter III distributional formula in a hypothetical 
ex ante collective bargain because that formula furnishes customers 
with a higher likelihood of a lower potentialloss. 191 Even so, this does 
not prove that the SIP A/Subchapter III risk sharing rule has a mate-
189 Most would agree that collective wealth maximization is an appropriate goaJ of bank-
ruptcy. The principal disagreement is whether it ought to be the only goal. Compare Warren, 
Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 775, 812-13 {1987) with Baird, Loss D istribution, Fo-
rum Shopping, and Bankruptcy : A Reply to Warren, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 815, 833-834 (1987). 
190 T nomas Jackson approves of pro rata sharing among general !:: reditors b-ecause it is con-
sistent with what he claims a hypothetical creditors' bargain would produce and it "mimics the 
value of [creditors'] exp-xted positions immediately before bankruptc:y, at le':iS t given that the 
ruk must be fashioned in the absence of information about the creditors involved." T. Jack-
son, The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law 31 (1986). The quoted statement reflects a 
i.ruism. Obviously, once it is assumed that prior to bankruptcy al1. creditors have equal oppor-
tunities fo r a recovery, pro rata sharing would "mimic the value" of the creditors claims. But 
that ':iSSUmption cannot be true. For an earlier exposition of the creditors' bargain paradigm 
see, e.g., Jack5on, Bankruptcy, Non-Ba11kruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors' Bargain, 91 
Yale LJ 857 (1982). Tne paradigm is grounded on the notion that creditors, e..ach entitled to 
their ex ante legal1ights and priorities, would agree among themselves to vary th,;se rights in a 
collective b:mkl1lptcy p rc-;;e.-;ding only when the result would be a collective maximization of 
·;-.·e..alth. It would follow that if t he bankruptcy process redistJi butes the: assets of the firm in a 
way tha t not only varies from the creditors' pre-bankruptcy entil lemen ts, b•n a.lso varies from 
the hypothetical creditors' bargain, it is normatively unsound. For 3 :>trong crir.icism of Jack-
son's creditors' bargain paradigm, .see Carlson, Book Review. 3:5 Mich . L. Rev. 1341 (1987) 
(reviewing T. Jackson, supra). Carlson "suggest[s] that equal pri.ority may be a normative idea 
put in place to confirrn desired creditor conduct, rather than t~--~ e product of ·;;:vhat creditors 
:t\=:alty want s~ parau~ from l?t)V . n Id . at 1356 n. 43. 
191 So long 2.s the cu3tomers itliow the inter1nediary to c::ontro1 th :; st:.c l_~1~~-rie~; they r:;ta.in little 
controt the·mse1ve"3. See .supra note 110. ·\tVhen the intennediary'3 1 ~so{v~ncy prc-ce<::ding be-
g-in:3, the C1JStOiTICf prop-erty r.night cont..,'lii1 few securities (or nc.·rk~) of 1J ::~-~ i ss~J.e frnd enough 
se:ci..lri ti t:S of another iss;.:e to satisFy an custon1er c1ai:tns to Ih r.r~ ~ssu~~ . .t\pp}·icat1on of the pro-
}10nionate p1o~rty interes·t scl1erne in such largely fortuitous ci:rcurns~:~\Tl t.X."S could result in 
f{ ishly di:')parate treD.trr1c:nt of vari ·')lt~ CiJ.Storn;:rs. But, becarhc of the t · e ~;u ~a.ho~1 ttncl superY·i-
;~} ;Jfl of scc1Jri r ~ es :. :1tcr~nedia.rics: lncl1Jding the cus tDrTtt:r ·prctccrjc~n ru.l~s_ . . ~ t ~s 1-=Js likely that 
·::~'! \:: C:J.:i·t.:im;;r property in t~1e =·~t gg:r~ga i:e YlfOt~ 1d fs.ll to a very l. ov; _pt!tce.n~2.g·:: of (he (';Us tomers' 
::1o:.:·t r;qu i t ie~·: (alt.ho1.1gh t.h~1t hrts ha:ppcncd in (he cas~~ of s1naJ1 fil-:.n s). Irnerv i·.:~v ~lith 
~·-,lJ,::h ~·.~.~t :~.:.. -.C1on, Deputy General Counsel B:nd Se-:.rete..1·y ~ Secur;::i:;:; Jn;_.- r:~Tor :Pr0tection Cor-
~~ ~ c>:(:~.t~on (Oct . .17, 1989). ~I'hu.s, tht dsk sharin.~ a :~~pr0ach GiEk. .::s it le~3 1ikely th?.t u customer 
·~;,· o;_dd st:.stsd -.·t r:~. .s t~ v-.:: t· ~:: lo.ss . A~ sirni1ar ;:u1aJysis fnay .::x plJ.i.n. ·~h:-:-:: ',i;in:·n·_;".!J.ess c{ :nar ~<et pa:t-tici~ 
:;- :1 nts ~o ~.:-la.rc .:is~s iH chs cl i:.:.arin:~ (}.P.d settlernent prvccss. Sec supf:_i !~C it:: ·32. 
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rial impact on the behavior of an intermediar; or its customers. For 
example, strategic eve of bankruptcy behavior by the intermediary, or 
a dominant customer, that would favor a particular customer or 
group of customers to the detriment of other customers could under-
mine the collective wealth maximization of the group. 192 But it is 
plausible that the adoption of either the risk sharing or the propor-
tionate property interest approach would not have a pronounced ef-
fect on the behavior or expectations of securities intermediary 
customers. Customers whose claims are excluded from or would ex-
ceed the limits of SIPC protection are predictably highly risk averse 
and likely to view the effect of an insolvency proceeding for their se-
curities intermediary as intolerable, whatever the fommla for distribu-
tions of customer securities. 193 Thus, it can be expected that these 
claimants will select intermediaries that they believe are virtually cer-
tain to remain viable. 194 If that certainty turns to doubt, these inves-
tors will likely demand that their securities be held or acquired for 
them by another intermediary. 195 The potential for eve of bankruptcy 
strategic behavior by customers of a failing intermediary can best be 
addressed by application of preference law.196 
192 See, e.g. , Jackson & Scott, On the Nature of Bankruptcy: An Essay on Bankruptcy 
Sharing and the Creditors' Bargain, 75 Va. L. Rev. !55, 17 1-74 (1 989). In their articie 
Thomas Jackson and Robert Scott sugg~ted that a risk sharing analysis based on the "com-
mon disaster" context of admiralty la w's general average contribution ru! e may provide a ,,or-
mativdy justifiable explanation for various distributional rules under the Bankn.:ptcy O)de. 
Id. passim. In particular, they in voked the analogy to general average contribution as an illus-
tration that risk sharing in bankruptcy may be an effective means to control eve of bankru ptcy 
strategic beha,;ior by a domi>1ant s.e<::u red crcdiw;·. See id. at 171-74. The common disas:o::; 
analysis draws on Scott, A Relational Theory of Secured Financing, 86 Colum. L R~v. 90.\, 
967-68 (1936) [hereinafter Rd a tional Tht.'Ory], and Scott, Through Bankn1ptcy wi th ch;; Credi-
tors' Bargain Heuristic, 53 U Chi. L. Rev. 690, 700-07 (1?86) [hereinaf"it:r Through Bank-
ruptcy]. Fo.( critiques of the Ja-.;~son and Scott article, see Eisenberg, Cornm en::~cy on liOn the 
Nature of .Bankruptcy" : Bcm~<mptcy and Barg::Uning, 75 Va. L. Rev. 205 ( ! 989): Rc":, Com-
mentary on " On th<: i\Tamre of Bankruplcy": Bankruptcy, Priority, and Econornics, 75 Va. L 
Rev. ·21 9 (1989). For r~asons already e.\p lain~'CI, the gener2.l averag..; c:Jntlibut!on 9rinc~ple is 
an inapt metaph::Jr for the srr:i /Subchapter III .sharing schernc. See s:.rp,·a .tH)L•:; 18-t. 
19J ~)th ~h~ i·is~ Jha.Dn~~ ~1pproa~::1 ~tnd the proportionate property i nt~rc~; c. .cu.!-~ ~:iekl the 
})Ot~ n tial fol di .~utio-n of (;us tGti!Crs' clairn:.> . 
194 .3t::l;~ .;upra ~l ute); .5 2·<==, -s :tnd ;~'- \:::com.p s.nyins tc.:\t . 
l95 I :fin :.1 it i~·:onc~~ - , - :.tb i .:: that 3 C1JStomer ·with 4ctual conce!~ns :.tC01Jt Lb :: h:.~dnc_; }l coru .. li"tion 
or ietegri ty ·J f its int · r-rncdi ;? .~;. · \v ou]d fai} to derna11J d<~iivc:r-y or ;-noveEV:!T.:t ,:J{ .;::~·:. u.r.\ ·( \ ;-:--:~ "\v h i h.:~ 
bask.1.ng in th-:: comforfing -~k~'h' •jf a prc;S1~ctjve applicntion of th e Sf?:\;.:;~ c1.~h2.:JLer TU ris .~ 
sh0.ring f-::•rr.nu l ~~-
196 ~Pref;;f:::nc:es :)r~; :;o··/t·:--:··:::::d iJ y ! .l lj_S.C . § 547 (1938)~ >:\--' .h~c~ :ilso --i. pp ; i;;~ 1j, S.~ P .. :.\ ':) l· o--
Ci?edin~~s. ~Jl :P} . § D(b), .!51.J.S. C~ . --~ 7g1ff(b) (J98J); ll U.S.C:. § 547; s::: :: :-1.L·J SffP~ .. 0 9(c)(3), 
15 U . ~~ . C. -~ 72frT-3(c)()) (t.r: ·:;;~ee Gt3 J" rr~ ~:ov .:: r pror..erty tt3r.:sf::rr.;d by d(:blot_. chc.t :.:you1d r~a ·.:e 
i.>een ce;-;toinE:r p iDperty e ~-::.>;~)£ f',)J..- {r:~:.rrsfer, if tran.sfer is voidabl::: e r -,.- o~.j u ~1 Ce 1 B?. tt~t 1 .1 p -;:c:: 
Ccd ~) ~ 11 U.S.C'. § 7 - -~- ~"":(a) t"tk; S~trn~: cffec1 in. a Sl~bcb.apter 1IJ ca~>:!) . r\ t(ett.s•:::: r is -,.-c~t dab 1e 
und.;r § 5--!· 1· of lh .~ ;~)~l.ok.r.tp -~::-_. ' C>de C\L:iy if, int--::r :.1lia, it is n1adc ~;~;it.hin (/) da:.---3 C-~ ·u.ce :.~orn-· 
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Notwithstanding the controversy as to the basis for and effects of 
pro rata sharing in bank..ruptcy, there seems to be general satisfaction 
with the risk sharing approach among customers in securities finn 
insolvencies as well as with pro rata sharing in bankruptcy among 
general creditors and among other similarly situated classes of credi-
tors. Certainly the "equality is equity" maxim-embraced by pro 
rata sharing- reflects a widely held normative view. 19 7 Similarly, the 
seniority afforded to securities firm customers (as measured by cus-
tomer property) over general creditors reflects, in tun1, that only the 
debtor's property will be available for distribution to its creditors. 198 
If the SIP A/Subchapter III risk sharing approach is sound for 
securities firm insolvency proceedings, it would seem that it also 
should be made applicable to insolvencies of other intermediaries, 
such as banks. i 99 But customer property in the custody of insolvent 
mencement of the proceeding aiJd the transfer enables the transferee to receive mo•e than it 
would have received in a proceeding under chapter 7 of the Bank.ruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C. 
§ 547(b)(4), (5). The time of transfer turns on nonbankruptcy law. 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(l), (2). 
In the case of securities held in fungible bulk controlled by the debtor intermediary, the trarls-
fer would occur when the requirements of identification a.-'ld confirmation occur pursuant to 
U.C.C. § 8-313(d)(ii) or (d)(iii) (to the extent that the fungible bulk were sufficient to rover the 
interests of all those who share in it). However, if at the time of the original transfer there had 
been a shortfall in the fungible bulk, then each subsequent acquisition of securiti~ by the 
intennediary of the issue involved (i.e., each subsequent increase in the fungible bulk) ·would 
3eem to constitute a new transfer to each customer who~.e i.:1terest >vr...s thereby incre<J.&-~d . In 
that case, possibly fortuitous actions by the intermediary, probably Fnknown to the customers . 
could result in voidability. Arguably, transfers of securi ties would not be in "payment" of r.1 
debt, so as to be insuiated from preference voidabi!ity by the "ordinary couiSe of business" 
exception . 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2). A more rational -:onstruction would exempt all deliveries 
and movements, as well as "transfers," made ia th-~ ordinary cour>e of business. Ther<: is also 
a broad exemption from voidability for "settlement paymt:nts' ' pri.:Jr to the commencement of 
a proceeding. 11 U .S.C. §§ 5'+6(e), (f ), 741(8) (defining "settlem::nt p:::.yment"); set: Kai:o:er 
Steel Corp. v. Charles Schwab & Co., 9 13 F.:2d 346, (lOth Cir. 1990) (payments by i3suer to 
beneficial shareholders through NSCC:, DTC, and bro:G:rs , in leveraged buyo,_n transaction, 
were ll U.S.C. § 741(3) "settl·::rn -~nt payments" and, under § 546(e), W'!re not !lvoidabk); 
:&.!vill, Bresler & Schulma.'l Asset 1\.-:b.i').ag.:ment c:orp. Y. Sp':!ncer So.v. & Lmm Ass'n, 873 F ."2d 
742 (3d Ci:r. 1939) (transfers of se.::urhit:S by p£:·:lsir:a1 deli v ·.~ry to r·~p.o p3rtic1pa.:nts 't;oer:: ll 
U.S.C. § 74 i(8) Hsettleml~n t payrr.ents" :?:.nd, t.!.:t!d?r 11 -~J.S . C . § 5 '-~6(f) .. ~'eJ:e not s.voidab1 ::)~ ecc 
-~.d.:; o Coh·=n v. Sa'-lings Bldg. ~  Lean Co. (In :r..; 3~ v.i. H , "8f~31er 8r.. St:hulr:~r.~n )\.sset ~Aa:G ~\5~1"n:~rn 
{)Jrp.), B96 F. 2d 54 (3d Clr . 1990) {cl!~hto( s obiigs!~_ o n Io d~li 'l·~=r s,.~_,--: ! ~_ rides to s.ai'ek~~-cpiEg V/&; 
ohiigation to ma:{e 11 U .S.C. § 7~· 1{8) ~ ~sct deri1ent .t,8.YD"l~nr.~' ;~~1 d~ lJ.nJe.r 11 U.S.C . ~? 3 .52 (~)(7)) 
obligeets seto"!f righ ts ·.:Here not SDbje·.: t lo ~ utc,r.n :J tic stay) . 
.t 97 For exa.rnple~ 1ithongh Jackio.n's c!.nd ~rlson~s res0:-~:: i.i ve ~fie·ws of ban:<.11.lp ~ cy c.r~-: '!:';f)' 
di:fferent, each :J.gr.xs V!Ijth fh -~ r :;.."Suh prndnc-~d- by the rJ~I.:_l:din.~ ;_Jro ratn sha1iro.g !.1J1~ . St~ ) -·e.z. J 
T. JB.c¥...wn , supra note 190 , a.i 29-31; ~:arlsoG. ! supra not;:: 190, at i355-56 n. 43 . 
l93 s.ee 11 l.T.S. C. § .541 (::-;p.r:-ci~yitlg 1V ~"!~t t.':Or~:) ~i tures Hpr~J- ::i' !y of ~:h ~'! ;: s~~ :itf~' ~ ). ~ '72:S ~:a.) (c~ i :~ .. 
t rib).;tic.ns of ·-~propM~rt;/ cf ~ h~ :st~\~~ ~ :t ) . 
1·_;}9 It is not nec-e.s.sm-;' to d7.ir:11 on ·(~le 1~~.:z2d -fr:::-~u:~ ~~~·.i <Jr1< appEcnb1~ to i ti~'.olven t i:xlr.:~(S 1_:..i:! ~~L.:: .~­
l Jni[eri St.ate5 federal and stE.te hnY3. S.::e gen=rai.!y ;\. Po11ard, .J. P:ssaic, :~~ . E11is ~: J. I.J:1ly , 
supra note 59, at f-05··23 (failing a..'HJ f<J.ll,-;J bBilk~; co,·~ ;::d by FDIC). i'Iote t.hut r;;:rt::ii n f~ '>.· 
tnres of the federal sche::!lt fc)r ins,.Jlv -~nt ~~e;;<:>:-jto:-y instltu t ~O :\s ft;'{:.ently ha~·e ~e (:n E~o~li J.ed 
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banks generally is allocated according to otherwise applicable state 
property law.200 In the case of customer securities held by an insol-
vent bank in a fungible bulk, the proportionate property interest 
formula would apply. Modifying section 8-3 13(2) to incorporate the 
SIP A/Subchapter III sharing rule could impose that result in bank 
insolvency proceedings without the need to change laws applicable to 
those proceedings. 
B. Claims of Secured Creditors 
As a general matter, a securities firm's creditors who claim secur~ 
ity interests in securities are not "customers" and their treatment 
under SIP A or Subchapter III is not unlike the treatment given se-
cured creditors generally under the Bankruptcy Code.201 Because the 
substantially, See, e.g,, Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 
1989, Pub. L No, 101-73, § 212, 103 Stat. 183 (1989), (a;nending Federal Deposit Insurance 
Act, § 11, 12 U_S.C. § 1821 [1988]), The merits of the risk sharing formula would be essen-
tially the same as for securities firms , Yet some might take exception to that conclusion be-
cause banks normally maintain separate fungible bulks for trust department customers. See 
supra note 103. Tnose customers might feel disadvant.<J.ged by a rule that would mandate 
sharing with non-trust department securities customers. One plausible response would be to 
create a separate class of "similarly situated" trust department customers who would share ali 
trust department securities rather than applying the proportionate property interest formula-
tion on an issue-by-issue basis. 
200 lt seems to be well ac~pted that pro~rty in the hands of a failed bank that is identifi-
able as belonging to customers or others d~ not become a part of a failed bank's estate 
available for distribution tc creditors, See, e,g,, FDIC v, Mademoiselle of California, 379 F2d 
660, 664-65 (9th CiL 1967) (owner of p.articipation interest in bank loan is entitled to identifi--
able collections made by FDIC as receiver for failed bank); accord Chase Manhattan Bank, 
N.A. v, F DIC, 554 F. Supp, 251, 254 (W,D_ Okl::L 1983), In practice, the FDIC routinely 
turns over a'lSets held in trust, custody or safekeeping to claimants whose interests can be 
adequately identified. Telephone !nterYiews wi th Carroll R, Shifflett, Assistant General Coun-
sel, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (i\:!ay 15 and June 29, 1989), Nothing in the law 
applicable to failed federally insured ba.nks has beer: found that wouid upset a state law distri-
butional scheme (such as the proportionate property interest formula) for allccating such 
property among rightful claimants. Were st!<te law changed to provide for a SIPC/Sulx:hapter 
III-type risk sharing formula, that fommla wouid he appl icable in the ca.o.e of a fai led bank that 
controlled customer ;;ec~_;:;:-ities, S·:--e St!pra <JOtes 182--86 a..-Jd accompanying text (discussing 
such a distributional Cc\J,: 2.pp1icc.ble ~o failed broke·s in early U.C.C drafts), However, the 
virtual absenc~ of customer \osses on account of property held in •;;ustody by banks suggests 
that piesently there is lac.king r- St;ffi ~ient ·~cnCJ:m s~ as to inspire changes in law. See supra 
note 55, 
20! A ::;ec ured party tb_t r t-.ceives physi:::.al delivery of colht~ral or to whom the collateral is 
tra.nsf~.rred through ~.r.lottl:::r, third party, lnte.nncdiary, is not a "customer" beczuse it has no 
"claim or: accvnnt of s'_-;,.:urities r-eceived, acquired, or held by the debtor_'' SIPA, § 16(2), 15 
U ,S.C § 78/ll{2)(193?,); 11 U ,S.C § H l(2) (1938); ~supra note 172. If a secured credito r of 
the insrJ!Yt;D t 1ntern:.ediary h·ca,d a11c:7/ :~-d that intermediary to central the securities that com .. 
prise the coHateral and its stoJri ty inter,:;s·t o;vere drt~nnined to be v.:rfected, the secured party 
would s~~n to Tit ~he p1a in n1e.:11}i-P-g of the definition of "c~.!stomer" under both SiP A and the 
Subchapter HI. E<Dth defmitions .~xpres>ly indude <>-S customers person~ claiming securities 
that ar~ HrC\~ei·· . ..-ed, .acquired, or he1d . .. 1n the ord inary course of ... business . . . a." collat~ 
'1 
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secured creditor would not be a "customer", it would not share in the 
pool of customer property. Awarding a same-tier secured creditor 
with the benefit of securities that otherwise would be included in the 
customer property, however, would give its security interest a priority 
that would not be enjoyed outside of an insolvency proceeding, 202 but 
this appears to be the result under current law. 203 Subordinating the 
secured creditor's claim to those of the customers also could have a 
distributional effect equally inconsistent with otherwise applicable 
law. If the risk sharing distributional formula is superior, arguably 
treatment of such (same-tier) secured creditors as customers would 
era!." SIPA, § 16(2), 15 U.S.C. § 781/l(2) (1988); II U.S.C. § 741(2). But the authorities indi-
cate that a debtor intermediary's secured creditors are not customers. See SIPC v. Wise (In re 
Stalvey & Assocs. , Inc.), 750 F.2d 464, 471 (5th Cir. 1985) (reference to "collateral security" 
in SIPA, § 16(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78il/(20) includes only securities of a purchaser securing margin 
obligations owed to the debtor); In re Hanover Square Sec., 55 Bank.r . 235, 239-40 (Bank.r. 
S.D.N.Y. 1985) (lenders are not customers); cf. Guttman, supra note 4, at 19-72 n. 340 (ap-
proving of result in Wise and implying that if repos are characterized as secured transactions 
the secured creditor would not be a customer under the Subchapter HI). See also SIPC v. 
Executive Sec. Corp., 556 F.2d 98, 99 (2d Cir. 1977) (lender of securities to .securities firm, 
secured by cash collateral, not a "customer"); SEC v. F.O. Baroff Co., 497 F.2d 230, 284 (2d 
Cir. 1974) (lender of securities to securities firm not a "customer"). The Bevill, Bresler court 
did not reach this issue because it determined that the repos there involved were purchases and 
sales, not secured transactions, and that repo participants were "customers." Cohen v. Army 
Moral Support Fund (In re Bevill, Bresler & Schulman Asset Management Oxp .), 67 Bankr. 
557, 596-602 (Eankr. D.N.J. 1986), aif'd 805 F.2d 120 (3d Cir. 1986). Accordingly, repo 
claimants were given "customer" status under SIP A. I d. at 602. SIPC's papers filed in that 
case took the position that the repos were secured trans..'lctions and, consequently, that the 
lenders were not "customers" under SIP A . I d. at 564-65; see Focht & Harbeck, supra note 
122, at 12-14 (arguing that repo pa.rticipants are not "customers" under SIP A and Subchapter 
In). 
202 This assumes that the secured creditor had not received a transfer of an "identifie(d) . .. 
specific security" under U .C.C. § 8-313(l)(d)(i) or pre-1978 § 8-313( 1)(c). Applying the pro-
portionate property interest formula, the secured creditor's claim to a fungible bulk of securi-
ties controlled by the debtor intermediary would e,~tend only to the ·::reditor's proportionate 
share (shared with ownership claimants) of the fungible b'.1lks of securities of the is;;ues 
claimed. See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text. Th-e secured crct!itor's interest in 
collaterai wouid be enlarged beyond its propmtionat .~ property int~r·:~st by prornot i.n3 its ch.im 
a.r""lead of the custo:tners claiminz lhe same s-ecurities lssu·es. Assnn1in g that <.;uch petiected 
security interest;; are, as a ciass, senior to customers' claims, arguably the p.ti•xities as (lmong 
th·e se<::ured creditors wonld be decerrnined according to the proportionate pwp<::rt y interest 
formula. See supra note 120. Perhaps the best mei:hcd of resolvin;z prio:rit i":.'S (assuming such 
se-cured creditors' claims are senior to those of customen) wmtld 'ce to aypiy the principk:s of 
the ris:>:: sha,-i11g fo:rmula to the entire class of secured creditors. 'Note tl1at 7·~])0 p~ rtic !pants 
with an iMolvent couJJterparty receive special trt>..;,tment under t:1e Ban'.-:: ruptc;' Code. s~ 11 
U.S. C. § 559 ~':'IOtection of right of repo participant to \iquidare Gl)llt t c-\Ct n;:on inso.lvency of 
other party from stay, avoidanc.~ , m1d limitation und~r the Banl< .. n•.;Jtcy G:.J·::). 
203 Both SIPA and the B~~~ .  ruptcy Code contain prc,visjor.\3 cDntempJ0.tln:; ~~r:::~~ s.er,;ure.d 
clai1ns z...r-e s.:nior to custorner claims. See SJPA, § 6{d), 15 l}.S.C. § 7Sfff(d) (19 33); l.i TJ.S. f.'. 
§ 751(c) (1988) (all01::<'.tion of r-;maining liquidation proc.xds of c:ol!8.ttrzJ, wher-~ tl-:c; dett:;r-
intermecliary is the debtor in t!1c secured tr~ .. ns.act ion_, t-:t~veen cnstom;-:;r prop-.::rty a:1d th ~: 
debtor)s general est.~te) . 
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produce the most desirable result. 204 
C. Observations 
It is not necessary, here, to resolve the various policy and inter-
pretive puzzles arising in securities intermediary insolvency proceed-
ings. 205 Tbe foregoing discussion does offer a clearer vision, from 
both positive and normative perspectives, of the nature of claims to 
securities controlled by an intermediary in fungible bulk. Because the 
actual enforcement of property interests against financial institution 
204 By erJarging the aggregate amount of claims to customer property, however, increased 
demands could be placed on the SIPC fund in cases where securities of the issues claimed by 
secured creditors were scarce. See supra notes 173-74. Suffice it to note that the subject of 
same-tier priority conflicts and distributional considerations as among securities customers and 
secured creditors warrants further practical and theoretical exploration. 
205 In recent years several bankruptcy scholars have explored the theoretical bases for bank-
ruptcy law. See, e.g., T. Jackson, supra note 190; Baird, supra note 189; Baird & Jackson, 
Corporate Reorganizations and the Treatment of Diverse Ownership Interests: A Comment 
on Adequate Protection of Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy, 51 U. Chi. L. Rev. 97 (1984); 
Eisenberg, supra note 192; Eisenberg, Bankruptcy Law in Perspective, 28 UCLA L. Rev. 953 
( 1981 ); Carlson, Postpetition Interest Under the Bankruptcy CDde, 43 U. Miami L. Rev. 577 
( 1989); Harris, A Reply to Theodore Eisenberg's Bankruptcy Law in Perspective, 30 UCLA L. 
Rev. 327 (1982); Jackson & Scott, supra note 192; LoPucki, A General Theory of the Dynam-
ics of the State Remedies/Bankruptcy System, 1982 Wis. L. Rev. 311; McCoid, Bankruptcy, 
Preferences, ancJ Efficiency: An Expression of Doubt, 67 Va. L. Rev. 249 (1981); Roe, supra 
note 192; Roe, Bankruptcy and Debt: A New IYiodei for Corporate Reorgamzation, 83 
Colum. L. Rev. 527 (1983); Scott, Through Bankruptcy, supra note 192; Shanker, The Use 
and Abuse of Federal Bankruptcy Power, 26 Case Western L. Rev. 3 (1975); Warren, supra 
note 189; Carlson, supra note 190; Eisenberg, A Bankruptcy Machine that Would Go ofltse!f 
(Bovk Review), 39 Stan. L. Rev. 1519 (1987) (reviewing T. Jackson, supra). A relate.'(! and 
somewhat overlapping b•Xly of commentary has emerged that considers, and sometimes ques-
tions, the mle of and n~ for secured credit and its priority over claims of general creditors, 
both in Rod out of insolvency proceedings. See, e.g ., Ayer, On the Vacuity of the Sale/Lease 
Distinction, 68 Iowa L Rev. 667 (1983); Baird, supra note 1•1-2; Baird & Jnckson, supra note 
142; Buckley, Th~ Bankruptcy Priority Puzzle, 72 Va. L R ev. 1393 (1986); Carlson, Rational-
ity, supra note 142; Jackson & Kronman, Secured Financing and Priorities Among Creditors, 
88 Yale LJ. i 143 (1979); Jackson & Schwanz, Vacuum of Facto;- Vacuous Theory: A Reply 
to Professor Kripke, 133 U. Pa. L. Rev. 987 (1 935); Xripke, Law and Economics: Ivleasuring 
the :E.conornic Efficiency of Commercial Law in a Vacuum of Fact, 133 U. Pa. L. Rev. 929 
(1985); Phillips, supra note 142; Phillips, Tne Commercial Culpabil ity Scale, 92 Yale L. J. 223 
(! 982) [hereinafter Phillips, Culpabili!y] ; Schwartz, supra note 162; Schwartz, The Continuing 
?uzzk of3ecGred D ebt, 37 Vand. L. Rev . 1051 (l98c.J.); Schwa.nz, Security Interesr.s and Bank· 
mptcy Priorit ies: A Review of Cum-:nt Theories, 10 J. Legal Stud. 1 (1981); Sco tt , Re!?..tional 
T heory, Sdpra note 192; Shupack, Solving the Puzz.le of Secu>ed Transaci ions, 41 Rutg-ers L. 
Rev . 106 7 ( 1989) [hereinafter Shu pack, P uzzle]; Shnp~cl< , Defending Pure has,~ iv!oney St1;ur-
In:cer•.;:Sl5 l..Jndcr r\rticL:: 9 of the UCC fron1 Proff:SSO!- Buckley, 22 Ind. L. H.ev. 777 ( 1989 ); 
\1[~·1.it~. ~Efticir~ncy Justifications for Personn1 Prep~rty St!(.::urity, 37 ·vand. L. R·~v. 4-73 {198£!.) . 
'T}1~ iJ;:'t. n~cruptcy and secured ere-di e disconrse has ilY1()f~d irisolvcDcy pro-ceedings of ~~i1anr:: ·~ ::J 1 
i ntcrrrv:;i_~.i ~l..ri t..-s , such as S-C1.:nritics finn.s 9.nC banks, ir. ·:luJing SIPA and Subchapter II I p~·ocecd -
f\: r:ha.ps ·the dl ~.c:ot: rs.e corH..:.:rn.:_i·tg bc.nkrup t<:;y th-:=ory anc: s~.~.cu;r.:d credit and that con-· 
ce:-nin~ s. .::ct~1~ti~ ... s .i.nte·crn(;diary f:_;i h.tres .::cch cou.ld 0.:: c..d··t'<:HH.:·cd by co nnecting the rwo; but t ~1;;. :~ 
e ~fnri rr~ ~J.s ~ a~.;1·i~_lt s.n o·~ h-~r day . 
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intermediaries outside of insolvency proceedings is unlikely, it is the 
entitlement in those proceedings that is material. 206 If the intermedi-
ary performs as expected, the claimants receive the desired benefits of 
a property interest. If the intermediary fails, their claims may be 
enormously reduced in value. Consequently, the most powerful deter-
minant of outcome in the market seems to be the selection of an inter-
mediary. This description underscores the obvious similarities 
between fungible bulk securities claimants and claims of creditors 
generally. 
In sharply breaking with the state law property construct, the 
SIP A/ Subchapter III distributional formula exemplifies a model that 
should be embraced more generally by the legal regime for transfer 
and pledge of interests in fungible bulks of securities. It overrides the 
arbitrary and fortuitous "no transfer" result and the disparate cus-
tomer treatment provided by the Article 8 proportionate property in-
teresi formula .207 But it does not apply when the insolvent 
intermediary is a bank. Nor does it override these results in the case 
of fungible bulks of securities that are also claimed by owners and 
creditors who do not claim an interest in the fungible bulk through an 
account with the insolvent intermediary-claimants on different tiers. 
In that scenario, addressed next, the existing property law construct 
can interfere with the interests of market participants who, unlike the 
insolvent intermediary's customers, did not cast their common lot 
with that intermediary. 
206 Stated otherwise, customers of :;ecurities firms cannot rationally expect the prolX'rtion-
ate property interest formulation to be appiied in the case of a shortfall. At least as a matter of 
bankruptcy theory, resolution of the Baird-Warren debate about wh-ether prebankruptcy enti-
tlemen ts should be favored over purely dist ributional bankruptcy rules is of diminished impor-
tance in the context of the SIP A/Subchapter HI risk sharing approach. See Baird, supra note 
189; Warren, supra note 189. Voluntary prebankruptcy transfers and deliveries of securities 
thut enable customers to improve their positions can be dealt with by adjustments preference 
bw. See supra note 196. Because the dominant dement of the customers' bargain with the 
intermediary is that there are to be sufficient securi ties O!l hand to satisfy aJJ customer claims, 
the i=·roportionate property interest rule is best exphin.:d nm as a distributional rule but merely 
a conventional property law conceptualization that links ti1e ~mtomers ' interests to a fungible 
bulk ~ha t the intermediary is expected to maintain. Indeed, the proportionate prop-;'!rty interest 
<lpv:·oach is consistent with the general common iaw "~P\Jroach to comm ingled property. See, 
e.g .. R. .Brown, The L~"'w of Personal Pmperty §§ 6. 8-6. 9, 6. 1 J (Jd r:d. 1975) (diS<:ussing com-
rnon !aw doctrine o.f confusion); Frisch, U.C.C. Section 9-31 :5: A Historical and Mcxkrn Per-
sp;x~ive , 70 I\-i inn. L. Rev. 1, 14-21, 41 (1985) (disc~1~s.\ng common law dcctrine of co nfusion 
r~nd tre-1.trnent of interests in cotnrn.ingied property). 
207 S..Oe supra notes 104·1 0 9J1d accompanyii~3 ~ext. 
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IV. COMPETING CLAIMS AND PRIORITIES ON DIFFERENT TIERS: 
BONA FIDE PURCHASE, FIRST-IN-TIME, LAST-IN-TIME 
The priority contests between C-1 and J-2 and between C-1 and 
L, in Example 1, illustrate conflicting claims among claimants on dif-
ferent tiers. There are several possible approaches for sorting out 
these claims under current law.208 
Note first that distributional rules in /-l's insolvency proceeding 
would not resolve these priority contests. In a SIP A or Subchapter 
III proceeding the risk sharing distributional rule would pool C-1 's 
claim to "customer property" with claims of all other customers. 209 
But because the securities in Example 1 would not be "customer 
property" to the extent they are subject to the perfected security inter-
ests of L and /-2, these priority contests would not be resolved by the 
SIPA/Subchapter III risk sharing formula. 210 Nor would that 
formula apply if I-1 were a bank or other intermediary not subject to 
SIPA or Subchapter III? 11 Resort to applicable state law would be 
necessary to resolve the priority contests. Were C -1 's interest deter-
mined to be senior, C -1 could recover the A Co. securities from L and 
the B Co, securities from J-2, or the respective values of C-l's inter-
ests, on a conversion theory.212 
208 Were things to work as they are supposed to, such shortfalls in available securities would 
nor occur. Shortfalls may result from error, fraud, or intentional or inadvertent noncompli-
ance with applicable customer protection rules. See supra notes 59-68. 
209 See supra notes 174-77 and accompanying text. 
21o L and 1-2 are not "customers" of I- 1 under either SIPA or Subchapter III. See supra 
notes 172-201. 
211 See supra notes 170, 199-200 and accompanying text. 
2! 2 See Morgan Guar. Tmst Co. v. Third Nat'l Bank, 400 F . Supp. 383, 388-89 (D. Mass. 
1975) (Article 8 envisions common law conversion suits, citing pre-1978 §§ 1-103, 8-318), 
aff'd., 529 F.2d 1141 (1st Cir. 1976); Hanford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Walston & Co., 21 
N.Y.2d 219, 234 N.E.2d 230, 287 N.Y.S.2d 58 (1967) (conversion action against stockbroker 
permitted (under pre-U.C.C. law) where stockbroker failed to observe reasonable commercial 
standards). C-l's right to recover on a conversion theory would not necessarily be defeated by 
1-2's or L 's good fsith or absence of notice of C-1 's claim. See Nickles, Enforcing Article 9 
S;x:urity Interests Against Subordinate Buyers of Collateral, 50 Gr::o. Wash. L. Rev. 511, 524-
25 (1982) ("A buyer's status as a good faith purchaser for value without lr.nowledge of the 
security in terest does not absolve him of liability. If the secured party is entitled to priority 
and possession under Article 9's rules, the converter's pure heart and clear conscience are 
ordinarily irrelevant." (citation omitted)). However, to the extent that 1-2 was acting as an 
agent for I-1, as in connection with the transfer to L of the A Co. securities, if /-2 acted "in 
good faith (inciuding observance of reasonable commercial standards ... )" it would have a 
defense to a conversioa claim by C-i. U.C.C. § 8-318 and pre-1978 § 8-318. But that defense 
would not prot.,::ct 1-2 while acting in its capacity as a secured party if C-l's interest in the B 
Co. secur1ti,;:s were detennined to b'= senior. 
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A. First-in- Time Transfers to Upper- Tier Claimants 
Assume initially that the security interests claimed by L and /-2 
wer•:: created and perfected before C-l's purchase of the A Co. and B 
Co. securities. 21 3 As to the A Co. securities claimed by both L and C-
1, C -1 probably did not receive an effective transfer because, at the 
time of the putative transfer to C -1, the A Co. securities earlier 
pledged to L were not "shown on the account of" /- 1 "on the books 
of" J-2. 2 14 H owever, because the B Co. securities claimed by both J-2 
and C- 1 continued to be "shown on the account of " /-1 on the books 
of 1-2 (albeit subject to 1-l's security interest), the transfer to C-1 of 
those securities would be effective.2 15 Thus, the details of how securi-
ties accounts are structured and denominated may determine whether 
C-1 receives an effective transfer of a property interest in securities at 
a11.216 
Assuming that effective transfers to C-1 occurred, C-l's interest 
in the respective fungible bulks of A Co. and B Co. securities would 
be junior to the interests of L and I-2 unless C-1 were a bona fide 
purchaser. 217 C -1, as a transferee of an interest in a fungible bulk, 
could not be a bona fide purchaser. 218 Any argument that C··l became 
a bona fide purchaser because it received a transfer under section 8-
313(1)(d)(i)219 should fail. 1-1 is not in "possession" of the securities 
2 13 T he folio wing d iscussion assumes that the security interests of / -2 and L ar-c r.erfected, 
alt hou gh .L 's securi ty interest would not be perfected under the fac ts of Example 1 if the pre-
i 978 Articles 8 and 9 were applicable. See supra note 118. 
2 1:. U.C.C. § 8-J l3 (l )(d)(iii). If I-2's books had reflected J-l's ownership interest 3S well as 
L's sccuri.ty interest, ho;;vever, then a transfer to C-1 could have occurred. Likewise, had L's 
security inrc:rest been perfected merely by notification to i-2 , presumably the securi ties wouid 
have con tin ued to be shown on J-l's account. See id. § 8-313(1 )(h)(i) (perfection by notifica .. 
cion to debtor's fin ancial inte·mediary) . 
2 1s S~:e id . 9 8-3i3( l )(d)(iii). 
216 Had rhc /3 Co. securities ciaimed by J-7. and C-1 been transferred to a proprietary ac-
count of 1-2, ra ther than an account in J-1 's nam !!, J -2 also illight successfull y ar.;;ue that there 
"':as no <.:ifeciive transfer to C-1. On the other hand, there might have been an dfe<:tive transfer 
to C- \ of b'Ah :l~ e A Co. and the B Co. secu,ities, reg<>.rd less of th e account nomenclamre, if 
t.he books and records of J-2 somehm¥ reflected J-1 's beneficial ownership and tha.t the trans-
f~rs tc• L <i nd 1-2 were merdy secured transactions. 
2 17 U.C.C. ]:i :3 -301(1), 8-302(3); see supra notes 90-9 i and accomoanying text. The same 
re.J u.t c would obt:..1:n ii ( ' .. 1 'Nc.rc ~t perfected secured party rath-::r th?.n an out~~ght buyer e1ther 
th ro t1 ·:;h ~!pp .iica t1on r) f nerno d(i! Of because 1-2 and L \¥Ould have been tht: firs~ to perfect. &.~ 
rJ.c.c:. ':~ 9 ~ ·:\ 12(5)( (1} . 
~: s ~].C.·: . 5 3-31J(2) (ii rs t s;=;nt,ence); supra note 9'2. 
~ t ~: 'Tr~ns tf~r :)f c:{:rtificHted securi t ies pu:cs uant to § 8· 313( 1 )( d)(i) c:~~.n cur!ft:~r :YJna fide pur-
c~.:::-l. :ie:- :;~a!: n3. 1~:. 31).:.; ~ ·~ a trc.nsfr::: "fVOtdd req uire that .T- 1, in addition to se nclin~ C~ .l a confi t-
cn ,;::'.' ·• , ,f ti:e /!J:-cbr-tse, ·'oy C.--:>ok entry or othenvise iclefic:I'[yJ :!.S b:lo;:gin;I to . .. [C-I] a 
?:=· ~>~ .:. :·:~.~ :>.: r tl f"lc ~,-~ed s .;c ~ .. ;rit~/ ~n . . . ~1-· l !s ] possession .!, 'U. c: . C. § 8~~) ·.1. 3( J>-re-·1978 § 2 ~ 
.d ~1 { : ·.i(::! i:; e~>se n t ·~·::t l1y i cL~ rr t ic ?.. l to "fj . C. c:. § .3 -J 1 J.( 1 )(d){i), :: x r:i~fJt that the pce .. 1973 v•:;r~.ion 
:~; r~a.~:~ ·: ,;i t; : ·w~~ ? .. t ::· )\!St~T~lJt-:::·~ a ;lcL:ti ·/eryl) rruh~r tlu1.n ·:!v hat cc· l:.sti~u u:-s 2 ~ ·~~~tn:~r:~~ :· . " 
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within the meaning of section 8-313(1)(d)(i)220 (although there is au-· 
thority that could support a contrary conclusion based on "construc-
tive possession"221 ) and the securities are a part of a fungible bulk, 
22o Although Example 1 states that I-3 is in physical possession of the securities (assuming 
they are certificated), C-1 could be expectro to argue that I - I is in constmctive possession as a 
result of its agency relationship with I-2 and I-2's agency relationship with I-3. See infra not •~ 
221. But the better construction of paragraph (d)(i) is that when securities are a part of a 
fungible bulk shown on the account of a transferee's intermediary (such as I -1) on the books of 
that intermediary's upstream intermediary (such as I-2), the transferee's intermediary (I-I) is 
not in possession of the securities. Paragraphs (d)(i) and (dXii) each cover certificated securi-
ties "in the financial intermediary's possession," and there is no reason to believe that "posses-
sion" has a different meaning in paragraph (d)(i) from that in paragraph (d)(ii). If that 
language were construed to embrace generally the concept of constructive possession through 
upstream intermediaries, then paragraph (d)(iii) would be rendered essentially superfluous as 
to certificated securities; transfers of certificated securities that otherwise would be covered by 
paragraph (d)(iii) would always be covered by paragraph fd)(ii). Even if this interpreta tion is 
not accepted, I-1 might be deprived of constructive pos..<.ession by virtue of the preexisting 
security interests in favor of L and 1-2. See In re Paragon Sec. Co., 599 F.2d 551, 556-57 (3d 
Cir. 1979) (suggesting that lien on securities granted by intermediary to upstream intennediary 
would deprive intermediary of control necesf.ary for constructive possession pursuant to pre-
1978 § 8-313(l)(c)); Cohen v. Army Moral Support Fund (In re Bevill, Bresler & Schulman 
Asset Management Corp.), 67 Bankr. 557, 609-12 (D.N.J. 1986) (security interest in favor of 
intermediary's upstream intermediary together with contractual restrictions deprived interme-
diary of control necessary for constructive possession pursuant to pre-1978 § 8-313(J)(c) and 
u.c.c § 8-313(1)(d)(i)). 
221 See LDuisiana State School Lunch Employees Retirement Sys. v. Lege!, Braswell Gov't 
Sec. Corp., 699 F.2d 51 2, 515 (1 1th Cir. 1983); Levy v. Chemical Bank (In re Scott , G orman 
M unicipals, Inc. ), 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 283, 236 (S.D.N.Y . 1983); Matth ysse v. 
Securities Processing Sens., Inc., 444 F. Supp. 1009, 1017-18 (S . .D.N.Y. 1977) (imermediary's 
constructive possession through upstream intermediary pursuant to p:-e-1978 § S-3 l3(1)(c)); 
see also Cohen v. Army Moral Support Fund (In re Bevill , Bresler & Schulman Asset M ana.ge-
ment Corp.), 67 Ban kr. at 612-!5 (intermediary in constructive possess!on, th rough upstream 
intermediary, of securities (in which upst ream intennediary did not have a security in te.·es t) 
pursuant io pre-1 978 § 8-313(1)(c) a.."'Jd U.C.C. § 8-3l3(l )(d)(i)). Aronstein believes t.h,; rcs uhs 
in the Legal, Braswell. ,':;'cott. and Gorman cases, are "anomalous, but correct. " A.ron%oin, 
Investment Securities, 39 Bus. Law. 1375, 1385 (1 984). In rny view 1-1 could :.,e in construe· 
tive possessic ; for these purposes only if I -2 had been a transferee of the secu riTies fro;n 1-3 
pursuant to 1978 section 8-3 i 3( l )(c) or (d)(i), and 1-2 had, in tum, -ei'fected such a transfer ;o 
I -1. Such transfers ·would constitu te ddiveties to 1-2 under pre- 1978 § 8- 3lJ( l)(b) o r (c). 
Under both versions of § 8-J 13, such transfers or r.Jdiveries could r.pJ alify ! -2 f·x bona iid .: 
purchas.er st:.J.t,•s. Pre-l978 <tnd U .C.C. § 8-313(2) (first sentence): U. C. C. § 8-30 \(J) . J..2, 
t hen, wou1 d Q.e lD co.ost ructive possession so a3 to r.etransfer or rt;d~h 'li:'! f s~....-:u ri t ies to 1- l . B ut 
none of the twnsk rs in E .Larnple 1 were effected under pre-1 978 § 3-313( fl{b ) o r (·~) or U.C. C. 
§ 8-313{"i){_c(;(i) bec:n.1sc fungible bulks were in ·)'oived. See supra note 9:2 : infra fi i)1e--3 22.2, 22.:t . 
~fhus , neithe:rl-2 nor l ·· t cou1d have achieved construct ive I-:.rJ .sses :.:;~on . '1~he r•>Jt 1) f th .: .rniBUil ·· 
d~rst.an d1ng rr- .a:; t·~ c;"I .. ; D n_"jl.~ ~~il1 r:d r: li ~3.:ne:.~ ·in J·kfatlh.ysse on Le f,_i ::.~.rc hs.n t v. ~·iic-u re ~ 15(1 ['-..f .·Y . 
209, ~~ l'~ . E .. 77U ('~ 8:t~S\ fo r .:he _pr-:;po:::.it1ori chat a dov~' rlS t l" r;.:-Jrn in i: t~· rncC .i i:: . ry c::: n -~ J.T~c:t a 
deliver y tc.~ its custotn ,~ .r r~ot,v.i thstand1ng p\."'lSse·,;sion of se-.::uri t i c:"::~ by an ups:rear:1 i :; ·.:t c.TF~ t: ·:.~. l ai·y . 
See Matthysse ~ ~r4 F . Supp at 101 8-19. L.e J!archatu inv olv~d tit!-:; to secn.("i"~ i es, nut d~~ .li v ;; ry. 
Inder......d , the c t.1stc,n1::; r ::; of th-: d ·.J?Inst rear.c int ::::rn1edizry .in L e /l-i::!?'cha;; t ob ~~~.i ntd ti tl e :; ub_i.-:·~ : ~· to 
an e<."lrlier ;11ectse in f::lvor of the trp~t:rear:o i:nterrnedia:ry . Ths~ case c~~nnot supp·ort t.h.e :.:~rg -c ­
rnent that the Cio·r.·.:nst r f:arr ~ custon1er c.an L-...ecorne a bona tlde ::n1 rcf.w.str. ;~ .. :/arth);ssl:! I\.~1 .i. <:t1 on 
the t~ew "'\{ iJ rk An~1UtTt~ \Jn to ~fe- 197 8 § 8-313(l )(c) Yvh i ~:h . at.~o e rrcrn ~~Gs1y . i n d i cr.t .~d that ./.2 
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making identification of a "specific security" impossible. 222 
Prior to 1985 the cases that found an identification of a specific 
security had occurred involved physically identified certificated secur~ 
ities (i.e., specific pieces of paper). 223 But recent decisions indicate 
that, for purposes of 1978 section 8-313(l )(d)(i) or pre-1978 section 8~ 
313(l)(c), an identification of a specific security can occur in the case 
of treasury securities that are inherently a part of a fungible bulk. 224 
Marchant supported the principle of that subsection. Matthysse, 444 F. Supp. at 1018-19; 
N.Y. U.C.C. § 8-313(1Xc), annot. (McKinney 1964) (current version at N.Y. U.C.C. Law§ 8-
313(l)(dXi) (McKinney Supp. 1989)). 
222 See Aronstein, Security Interests, supra note 116, at 297, 304 (identification of a "spe-
cific security" under pre-1978 § 8-313(l)(c) is not possible when a broker holds a fungible 
bulk, such as a " 'jumbo certificate' representing the interests of a number of customers in the 
same issue," and U.C.C. § 8-313(1)(d)(i) embraces pre-1978 § 8-313(1)(c)). There can be no 
doubt that the securities involved in Example 1 are a part of a fungible bulk possessed by or 
registered to 1-3 and allocated pursuant to book entries on the books of I-3, 1-2 and /-1. 
Certainly book entries and business records of a securities intermediary that allocate to differ-
ent customers or creditors certain quantities of securities controlled by the intermediary do not 
change the nature of a fungible bulk. The fungibility would be affected only by some action 
that identified a particular, distinguishable, portion of the bulk that was owned by a particular 
customer. With certificated securities that would be possible only by identifying particular 
certificates. See generally infra notes 228-31 and accompanying text. 
223 Louisiana State School Lunch Employees, 699 F.2d at 513-14 (specific certificated securi-
ties prepared for mailing by upstream intermediary at downstream intermediary's instruction); 
Matthysse v. Securities Processing Servs., Inc., 444 F. Supp. at 1014 (specific certificated secur-
ities prepared for mailing and identified by upstream intermediary, on delivery forms, by certif-
icate number and names of downstream intermediary's customers); see also Levy, 36 U.C.C. 
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 287 {remanded for determination of whether "client tag numbers" on 
intermediary's "buy tickets" covering certificated securities in physical possession of upstream 
intermediary constituted identification of speciilc securities). The Legal, Braswell, Sco:t, 
Gorman, and Matthysse cases each involved pre-1978 § 8-313(1)(c). 
224 See Wichita Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Comark, 610 F. Supp. 406, 416-18 (S.D.N.Y. 
1985) (question of fact raised as to identification under pre-1978 § 8-313(1 )(c)), modified, 610 
F. Supp. at 418; Cohen v. Army Moral Support Fund (In re Bevill, Bresler & Schulman Asset 
Management Corp.), 67 Bankr. at 605-09 (identification under U.C.C. § 8-3 i3(l)(d)(i) and 
pre-1978 § 8-313(l)(c)); In re Lion Capital, 49 Bankr. 163, 187-88 (Ba.nkr. S.D.N.Y. 1985) 
(possibility of identification under U.C.C. § 8-313(1)(d)(i)). For a discussion of these cases and 
those cited supra note 223, see Crespi, supra note 126, at 171 -85 ; see also Katzman, supra note 
95, at 168, 173-75. Upon reargument and consideration of the Comark Memo, supra note 134, 
the Comark court stated that "in order to mitigate any possible hann to the government secur-
ities market caused by ... [the court's opinion on this point], we conclude that the ... opinion 
should not be treated as an authoritative interpretation of the federal and state iaw provisions 
there construed." Wichita Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass 'n v. Comark, 610 F. Supp. at 419. Mean-
while, the Lion Capital opinion had been issued relying substantially on the Comark opinion. 
In re Lion Cupital, 49 Bankr. at 186-88. 
Although the pre-1978 Article 8 applied oniy to securi ties eviden<::ed by •;ertificates and 
§ 8-313(l)(dXi) applies only to "certificated securit[ies]," the "bearer definitive" fiction im-
posed by the book-entry Treasury Regulations requ~res bcok-entry treasury securities to be 
treated as if they are certificated. Treas. Reg. § 30i5.11 8(b); U.C.C. § S-313(l){d)(i); pre-1978 
§ 8-102(1)(a) (defining "security" as "an instrument"). See genrorally supra notes 135-4-4 and 
accompanying tel\t. Because a transferee of an interest in a fungible bulk of securities cannot 
become a bona fide purcha.ser under either version of Article 8 8.5 applie0. through the current 
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The opinions in these cases, the arguments of the parties and amicus 
curiae, and the subsequent commentary generally focused on whether 
an identification could result from the actions of a claimant's interme-
diary (such as J-1 for C-1) alone or whether, when the securities were 
subject to a security interest in favor of that intermediary's upstream 
intermediary (such as I-2), action of the upstream intermediary (J-2) 
would be necessary for an identification to occurY5 I would have 
thought this was relatively clear. Both the 1978 and pre-1978 statu-
tory language state clearly that it is a transferee's intermediary (/- 1 
for C-1) alone that can effect a transfer or delivery (to C-1) by its 
confirmation and identification. 226 There are, as well, compelling 
practical and policy justifications for this interpretation. 227 
Book-Entry Treasury Regulations, it follows that no one can become a bona fide purchaser of 
book-entry Treasury so;urities except a depository institution that has a.TJ. account with a Fed-
eral Reserve Bank. See supra note 92; 31 C.F.R. § 306.118(a) (!990) (depository institution 
that receives a transfer of securities in its account with a Federal Reserve Bank can be a 
"holder."). Nevertheless, the Comark, Bevill, Bresler and Lion Capital cases did not follow 
this reasoning. The Bevill, Bresler court recognized that U.C.C. § 8-313(1XdXiii) could be 
applied to the book-entry Tre.;'\Sury securities involved, but its connection of that thought with 
its focus on transfer under paragraph (l){dXi) was not clear. See Cohen v. Army M0ral Sup-
port Fund (In re Bevill, Bresler & Schulman Asset Management Corp.), 67 Bankr. at 615-16. 
It may have considered, incorrectly, the only difference to be the requi rement of poSSP.Ssion in 
U.C.C. § 8-313(1)(d)(i). ld. 
225 See, e.g., Wichita Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Comark, 610 F. Supp. at 416-18; Cohen v. 
Army Moral Support Fund (In re Bevill, Bresler & Schulma.11 Asset Management Corp.), 67 
Bankr. at 606-09; Comark Memo, supra note 134, at 17-20, 23; Crespi, supr:a note J 26, at 175-
84. 
226 Identification is a wndition precedent to transfer, set forth in the chapeau to U.C.C. § 8-
313(1)(d), which applies to tra.i1Sfer under paragraphs (l)(d)(i), (ii), and (iii) alike. The lan· 
guage clearly wntemplates that the identifying intermediary is to be the same intermediary 
that sends a confirmation (normally the downstream intermediary unless the upstream inter-
mediary does so as an agent). Paragraph (l)(d)(iii) also unambiguously indicates that it is a 
transferee's immediate imermerliary, and not that intermediary 's upstream intermediary, that 
is to satisfy the identification requirement. There is no suggestion in the statutory language 
that identification under paragraph (l){d) has a different meaning for pu~ of paragraphs 
(l)(dXi), (ii), ar1d (iii). Similarly, pre-1978 § 8-313(1)(c) provides that "deliv~;:ry to a pur-
chaser ... or..-eurs when ... his broker sends him confirmation ... aJ1d ... iden tifies a spe.::itk 
security .. . " (emphasis supplied). However, an intermedia.ry could satisfy the identification 
requirement by causing its (upstream) intennediary to effe<;t an identiiic3tic-n . Y,._.:, Louis ian ::~ 
State School Lunch Ernp!oye>~ Retirement Sys. v. L·~gel, Braswdl Gov't ~c. Corp., 699 F. 2d 
at 513-1 4; Matthysse v. Securities Processing Servs., Inc., 444 F. Supp. 3t 1014. Consent cr 
action by an upstrea.rn intermediary that clz.ims a s-xurity interest in the securiti=s !"Jso may 
bear on the issue of the downstre."'-"'TI inter-mediary's ;_)Ossession, however. See :,npra note 220. 
227 ~Requiring participation or conseni by upstrea.:-n interr.oediruies in tht: prc~:!:s of iden tify-
ing securities would undermine th~ very efRcienc~es soug}1t to be achieved by faci litating trans-
fers on the b<'.;Ok$ of" intermed i.a..-ie.s. lt would mean that ar:. interm,=:d iarf could nr.:t c ::l11 Sf-~c a 
security to a transferee pursuant to UC.C. § 3-313(l){d) unless the interrn-~di~xy's :;pstre-am 
intermediary (and, presumably, :1H other intermediari,:os further up-stream) were also m m~'-..1<',; 
book entries or somehO"i!/ id-ent i i·~: th~ interests of al l do~vnstrearn ch~jrnants. For a Pf:J.-sus..sive 
expianatio i·: of hovr su.::h a r:~quir.;; r.~Tent ~vouJd b·~ undul~J burd~~nsorne to the se.curities rB.ark,-::ts, 
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The appropriate question is not how or by whom an identifica~ 
tion is to be made but what is to be identified-a "specific" secur-
ity.228 Identification of a "specific" security, in this context, must 
mean the identification of a particular, discrete certificate evidencing a 
certificated security that is the subject of the transfer.229 It cannot 
plausibly be construed to mean an allocation to a transferee of an 
undivided interest in a quantity of securities included in a fungible 
bulk. 230 The drafting history of pre-1978 paragraph (l)(c) makes it 
clear that this interpretation of "specific" is the correct one. The 
drafters contemplated that deliveries pursuant to pre-1978 paragraph 
(l)(c) would be unusual and normally would occur only during the 
process of preparing certificates for actual physical delivery to a bro-
ker's customer.23 1 A transfer of an interest in a fungible bulk of secur-
ities on the books on an intermediary bears little resemblance to 
transfer by physical delivery of a certificated security. Consequently, 
see Cohen v. Army Moral Support Fund (In re Bevill, Bresler & Schulmar1 Asset Management 
Corp.), 67 Bankr. at 607-08. The Bevill, Bresler court's explanation is sound, as is its conclu-
sion that identification can be achieved by the action of the downstream intermediary alone. 
Id., at 608-09. But it misses a turn when it appears to assume that unless book entry transfers 
by intermediaries can be made pursuant to U.C.C. section 8-313(1Xd)(i) or pre-1978 § 8-
313(1 )(c) they cannot be made at all. 
228 U.C.C. § 8-313(l)(d)(i); pre-1978 § 8-313(1)(c). Although Katzmai'l. never squarely 
takes a position on whether a non-DI transferee of an interest in inherently fung1bJe book-entry 
treasury securities can become a bona fide purchaser, and he fails to answer the question of 
whether such securities can ever be "specific" securities within the meaning of pre-1975 § 8-
313(l)(c) or U.C.C. § 8-313(1)(d)(i), he did pose the right question. See Katzman, supra note 
95, at 169. 
229 United States v. Doyle, 486 F. Supp. 1214, 1220-21 (D. Minn. 1980) (delivery under 
U.C.C. § 8-313(1)(d)(i) requires identification of a certificated security by certificate num ber 
and in absence of such identification securities are a part of a fungible bulk). U.C.•:::. § 8-
31J(l)(d)(i) is limited by its terms to "a specinc certificated security." U.C.C. § 8-31 3(l)(d)(i) 
(emphasis <'.dded). As used in pre-1978 § 8-3i3(1)(c), "sp<.->eiflc se-:.:•.Hity" has the same m·~B.ning 
l~-:;a~1se pre-1978 Article 8 applies only to 3<-'Curities evidenced by instrum<:Et:>. Pr.::- !978 §§ 8-
102(1)(a) (defining ":;,ecurity"), 8-313(1)\c). 
:no ·were 1978 paragraph (i)(d)(i) construed otil.-:rwise it would swailow paragra;•:u 
\ 1 )(d)(ii) and (iii)--if the pDsscssion and identification requiremo:nt~ Me m.et i.n E:\a:rnp l-::: l , it 
would be hard to imagine a traJl5i~r under paragraph (l)(d)(ii) or (iii) tbat ' 'i<J>.ild not ·.Jso 
satisfy paragraph ( l)(d)(i). Tne reference to identification "by bcok entry o r oth<;:;·1.vise" in t:v:. 
chapeau to paragraph (!)(d) do,."'S nol weaken the argwmnt that paragrap;i (l )(d)(i) app it<.":S 
on]y to the identification of a particular pier..:e ol paper. U.C.C. § 3-3 U(l;( d). _f'or e:,;:..rop1 •:, a 
bc~-Jk entry could ide.ndfy a spe-ei.fic certifiea ted securiry by its ce0.i fi :-::nt ~ uurnb~r . 3ee 1J nit,:J 
3·tates v. :c~oy1e ~ 42.6 ~;;' . Supp. at 1219. Nor is tht:! argn~nen t n'ca.ke-nr:d by patR ~raph ( i )(f}. 
~,.v h:ich prov~d.:;:..; for i.l trausf~r of .e. Hs_pe~ific unc .~rt.ific.ated &::cuii tyH by a Jl(>n- ;,::::t Ltetnci:::d i.Gte:--rne-
':li:::u~l rcg.is~ered OYdV::r 's acl-'uAO.'?ih:dgrnent, a1thougl1 the Jra.ftcrs ien (o C)Uf iJ. lVlg~n:?. i~ t..Yn Lb-.; 
tati ~Jn~.h~ f;.) f the curious use or Hsr/O,.~ific . " U. c.r.:. § 8-J 13(1 )(f). ?)Ic.tr: ;_-ds.o tb :\t j:!B.fa,gra:ph 
{1)(fYs anaJogu..:: f0f c..=:rti:fic.ated s,:_~u !'! tics) paragraph ( J. )(c) (\vfl ict1 ls substan t!2 l1 y th~ san1~ as 
_pr~ .. 1978 § 8-313( 1)(d))) fefers to an "identifi .:.;d certiflcat:::d s.:.:.r..:u i·it2/ ' but dc!.t-5 ~ut use t.hc: ·~/Gt d 
aspct:ific .'~ U . -C.(~ . § 3-313(1){e). I suspt:·c t that fhe ir.~ (';.()fls.ister:t l~\;l.gua g.e is a r·::-Jult of i :~.I. ;=J.d -
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barring a transferee such as C-1 from bona fide purchaser status is 
hardly remarkable. Nevertheless, the Department of Treasury and 
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York have expressed a different 
view. 232 
The Proposed TRADES Regulations would provide a different 
result for Treasury securities-one that would establish a "last-in-
time" priority. Unless /-2's security interest were to qualify for prior-
ity as a "clearing lien,"233 /-2's interest in the B Co. securities would 
be subordinated to C-1's claim. Assuming C-1 purchased the securi-
ties "for value, in good faith, and without notice of any adverse 
claim," C-1 would be a "good faith transferee"234 and would acquire 
an interest in the B Co. securities "free of any adverse claim which 
arose prior to the transfer of such interest to" C -1. 235 Why the Treas-
ury Department opted for this last-in-time rule is unclear. 236 Because 
232 See supra note 147. One possible explanation for this disagreement may be the New 
York Fed's misconception that delivery was a necessary condition for an effective transfer of 
property rights under the pre-1978 Article 8. See supra note 87. Political expediency is an-
other possible explanation. See infra note 237. 
233 See Proposed TRADES Regulations, supra note 7, § 357.3 (defining "clearing lien" as 
"a security interest granted to a clearing bank or Federal Reserve Bank, pursuant to a written 
agreement, to secure credit extended in providing clearing services," "clearing services" as 
"delivering and receiving securities and payments for securities on behalf of other persons," 
and "clearing bank" as "a depository institution ... which has a book entry securities account 
at a Federal Reserve Bank through which it provides clearing services"). Under Proposed 
TRADES Regulations, supra, § 357.15(a), "[a] clearing lien in a security shall have priority 
over all other claims of third parties to that security including claims of a transferee that 
qualifies as a good faith transferee . . . " Exceptions to this priority are made for security 
interests in favor of the United States pursuant to section 357.19 (e.g., priority for security 
interests securing deposits of public money, deposits to the Department of Treasury for tax 
and loan accvunts) and clearing liens in favor of a Federal Reserve Bank. Id. Section 
357.15(b) further limits the clearing lien priority "to the extent of credit actually extended in 
performing clearing services" and to liens that are perfected and "acquired in good faith." 
P roposed TRADES Regulations, supra, § 357.15(b). The proposed priority for clearing liens 
is grounded on the crucial role played by clearing banks in the market for Treasury securities 
a.;d the enormous intraday credit exposure of the clearing banks. See, e.g., November 
TRADES Summary, supra note 145, at 43035 ("[E)xtensions of credit [by clearing banks) 
must be fully collateralized to satisfy the safety and soundness requirements of the bank regu-
lators."); Stigum, Trade, supra note 4, at 181 ("To anyone familiar with the mechanics of 
clearing and with the handling of dealer loans, the case made by clearing bankers [for a failsafe 
clearing lien] seems strong."); Crespi, supra note 126, at 186 ("It is essential for the conti11ued 
efficient functioning of the government securities market that clearing agent security interests 
be made secure against divestment by unilateral customer actions."). See generally supra notes 
46-51 a;1d accompanying text. 
234 Propcsed TRADES Regulations, supra note 7, § 357.14{a). 
235 Id. § 357.14-{b). 
23.5 The proposal of preemptive federal priority rules was a complete turnabout from the 
approach t~ken in the fviarcb Proposed TRADES Regulations. The November TRADES 
Summary described the reasons for rejecting a bona :fide purchase mle i..-1 the March Pro:posed 
TRADES R.;guJations: 
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the good faith transferee n ile allows a lower-tier transferee of an inter-
est in a fungible bulk of securities to cut off adverse claims, the rule 
represents a striking departure from both the pre- 1978 and 1978 Arti-
cle 8 treatment of fungible bulk transferees on the books of in-
termediaries.Z37 T.11e rights of a good faith transferee are diluted by a 
sharing rule, however, applicable among good faith transferees of a 
common intermediary, similar to the proportionate property interest 
rule of section 8-313(2).238 In an insolvency proceeding of J -1 under 
In the March Rule, the Department expressed three concerns with adoption 
of such a ruie. The first was a theoretical concern about structuring such a rule for 
the book-entry environment. The second was a more practical concern that the 
concept of a BFP may be of limited use in a tiered book-entry system where trans-
actions affecting a transferee's rights in a security can occur at any time after the 
transferee acquires BFP status. The third concern expressed by the Department 
was that a BFP provision could affect the efficiency and liquidity of the govern-
ment securities market if it impaired the ability of clearing banks that extend daily 
credit to government securities dealers to collateralize their dealer loans. 
November TRADES Sum.."11ary, supra note 145, at 43035. The third concern was dealt 'i'lith 
by the "clea.-ing lien priority" rule. See supra note 233. The November TRADES Summary 
does not squarely address the other two concerns or the Treasury Department's reasoning for 
changing its mind. It appears to have been influenced by its receipt of eight comment letters 
urging it to adopt a Federal priority rule, three of which proposed a form of bona fide pur-
chaser priority rule. See November TRADES Summary, supra, at 43035. 
2 3 7 See supra note 145. One would have thought that the Treasury Department would have 
acknowledged this departure. However, the November TRADES Summart indicates that the 
good faith transferee rule is in the mainstream. 
To quclify as a [good faith transferee], one must acquire a secu1;ty under 
§ 357.12(a)(l), (3), or (5). This is to parallel somewhat the common law require-
ment that to qualify as a BFP one must take delivery of the property. As with the 
traditional BFP concept, a good faith transferee takes a security free of all adverc.,e 
claims. 
November TRADES Summary, supra note 145, at 43035. This explanation is then followed 
by a puzzling non :;equitur: 
In effect, the rule eliminates the possibility of tracing securities beyond what 
one's book-entry custodian itself maintains. The Department considers this to be 
an appropriate r-~ult given thai book-entry securities of the same issue are fungible 
a..rtd generally not subject to tracing. 
I d . Were the Department of Treasury really satisfied that book-entry Tre..qsury s.-::curi ties co uld 
not be trac.~, tl1en there would be no need for the clearing lien priority rule--lower·ti<:r claim-
ants could never e.:>tablish that a cbui.ng bank's security interest covered " their" securities. 
K have a J..-..ersc nai, whoHy subjective, •new of why the good faith tramferee ml:; was pro-
posed. The TILL\DES project followed ?. spate of government securities dealer insolvencies. 
See supra not<:::S 65-63. The de.:rr'mg lien prim;ty nlle deals with one of the principal concerns 
arising out of thew failures . The good faith transferee rule provides th.e ill usion of deD.ling with 
anothe:r--substsmti~J loss;!S inctmed by J.ower-tier repo participants doing busi.J1css with the 
fliiled firms. Id. This politie-.'1.1 eApcdiency explanation may be relaterl to the app~rent reluc-
L%'1Ge by the T:r,'OaSury Department m::.J those involved in the Federal Reser•e .System to m::-
knowledgP- openly that, under ,; urren t law, no one c,.w become a bona flde pur::hll.ser of 
Trez;.swy s;!cu.cities that !lie controUed by an intermediary (except for d;~pv;;itory institutions 
that mainwjn an acco unt '?ri.th the Fo:J) . ~-u: supra notes 148, 224. 
23ll See P:ropus.-:..'<1 TR/-\:L<ES Reguhtions, ~upra note 7, § 357.14{e); U.CC. ;§ ikl13(2) & 
pre ... 1978 § 8-31 3(1) (::~cor:d sent~:nce) . 'I'he set rning lncvng:rui1y of ~rrq::::)Siflg such ~i shE-ring 
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SIP A or the Bankruptcy Code, however, the applicable customer dis-
tribution rules would override the result of the good faith transferee 
rule of the Proposed TRADES Regulations. 239 In such a proceeding, 
although the secured claims of J-2 and L probably would achieve pri-
ority over the claim of C-1,240 /-2 and L could remain vulnerable to a 
suit by C-1 for conversion.241 
Even if the good faith transferee rule were to give C-l's claim to 
B Co. securities priority over that of J-2, L's claim to A Co. securities 
would not be cut off because, as under Article 8, no effective transfer 
to C-1 would occur as to those securities. 242 In one case C-1 would 
achieve priority over an upper-tier secured creditor and in another 
case C-1 would receive no effective transfer. 
There is another possible solution to this priority contest. Be-
cause C-1 is claiming an interest in the same fungible bulks claimed 
by, respectively, L and /-2, arguably the proportionate property inter-
est rule of section 8-313(2) would apply. Such an application would 
result in ratable sharing of the A Co. securities between C -1 and L 
and the B Co. securities between C-1 and /-2. One case and one com-
mentator have indicated that this is the proper interpretation of cur-
rent law. 243 However, that interpretation of section 8-313(2) would 
rule among bona fide purchasers, suggested by the Official Comments to U.C.C. § 8-313, ap-
parently gave little or no pause to the drafters of the Proposed TRADES Regulations. See 
supra note 92. 
239 See November TRADES Summary, supra note 145, at 43036 (good faith transferee pro-
vision "is not intended to preempt other federal law, such as the Bankruptcy Code or [SIPA], 
on the distribution of assets in an insolvency."). 
240 See supra notes 201-04 and accompanying text (discussing non-"customer" status of 
ser.ured creditors under SIP A and Subchapter III and seniority of secured claims to customer 
claims). 
241 See supra note 212. 
242 See Proposed TRADES Regulations, supra note 7, § 357.12(c) (transfer by book...;:ntry 
effective Oi1ly if securities are credited to account of intermediary effecting transfer (here, I -1) 
on books of another intermediary [here, /-2]); supra note 104. In Example i, the A Co. securi-
ties claimed by C-1 and L were credited to L's account, not J-l's account, on /-2's books. 
243 Cvhen v .. >\.rm.y Moral Support Fund (In re Bevill, Bresler&. Schulman Asset Manage· 
ment Corp.), 67 Bankr. at 615-16 (suggesting that a lower-tier transferee pursuant to U.C.C. 
§ 8-313(l){dXiii), such as C-1, and an upper"tier intermediary claiming a security interest in 
the securities, such as /-2, would share a proportionate interest in the same fungible bulk under 
U.C.C. § 8-313(2)); Mendelson, Investment Securities Review, 43 Bus. Law. 1407, 1411 & n.27 
{1 988) (agreeing with interpretation suggested in Bevill, Bresler, but characterizing the result 
.as "bizfu"Te"). Note that Mr. Mendelson did not participate in prepariJ1g that portion of the 
cited article dealing with the Bevill, Bresler case. Both the Bevill, B.~esler court and ti1e au-
thor(s) incorrectly assumed that the result would be different if the pre-1978 Article g {which 
did not contain transfer provisions equivalent to U.C.C. § 8-3 13{1 )(d)(ii) a.;1d (iii)) were ay-
plierl. Bevill, .Bresler, 67 Ba.Tlkr. at 615-16; Mendelson, supra, a t 141 1 & n.27. Yet the rc::sult 
should be the same under either version of Article 8. Although the pre-1978 § 8-313(1) de.:.otlt 
only with delivery, transfers of interests in fungible bulks of securities 'ivere etTective t1n d cc-
curred outside of Article 8's provisions. &:,: A.ppendi:~ H, infra, notes 12-1 4. T.-"Je proportion-
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seem to be based solely on a literal, but implausible, reading. 244 This 
is not what the drafters of any version of Article 8 had in mind. 245 
The proportionate property interest rule should be reserved for claims 
of those claiming through a common intem1ediary. Here, only C -1 is 
claiming through an account with /-1. 246 
B. First-in- Time Transfers to Lower-Tier Claimants 
Now assume that the transfers to C-1 occurred before, rather 
than after, the creation of the security interests in favor of L and J-2. 
-1-2 would not acquire its security interest in the B Co. securities free 
of C-l's claim because J-2 would not be a bona fide purchaser. 247 If, 
on the other hand, J-2 were in physical possession of the securities 
involved, then J-2 could achieve bona fide purchaser status. 248 And, if 
/-3 were a clearing corporation, it is arguable that J-2 could become a 
ate property interest rule, likewise, applied under the pre-1978 Article 8. Pre-1978 § 8-313{2) 
(second sentence). Because U.C.C. § 8-313{1) deals with transfer, not delivery, the addition of 
paragraphs (1)(d)(ii) and (1)(d)(iii) served merely to codify existing practices. Id.; see also 
U.C.C. § 8-313, Reasons for 1977 Changes (fifth paragraph) ("Subparagraphs (d)(ii) and 
(d)(iii) have no counterpart in the present statute but are considered desirable express state-
ments in the light of modem security holding practices of both brokers and banks. The final 
sentence of present [pre-1978} subsection (2) implies this result without stating it expressly.") 
(ernpha<>is added). 
244 U.C.C. § 8-313(l)(d)(iii) applies to a transfer of<m interest in securities that are a part of 
the acr.,ount of the transferee's intermediary with "another" intermediary. U.C.C. § 8-
3l3(1)(d)(iii). U.C.C. § 8-313(2), then, refers to "the fungible bulk." U.C.C. § 8-313(2). 
245 From the very first draft of Article 8 (then Article V), the proportionate property inter-
est concx:pt was to apply as among customers of the same intermediary. See Commercial 
Code, Preliminary Tentative Draft No. !-Article Y, § 13 {April 22, 1946), reprinted in 3 
Uniform Commercial Code Drafts, supra note 182, at 20 (quoted in Apf-">endix II, infra, note 
2). The comments to U.C.C. § 8-313 reflect a similar conceptualization. Se~ U.C.C. § 8-313, 
comment 4 (describing proportionate property intere:;t rule of § 3-313(2) as applicable as 
arncmg customers of the sam<! intermediary). Moreover, the proportionate property interest 
concept would not apply as among customers and secured creditors of an. insolvent intermedi-
ary u_nder SIP A or Suochapter III. &e generally supra Part III. 
246 Neither .T-2 nor L have an account with, nor have they ailowerl J -1 to control, securities 
in which they claim an interest. L has allowed only I-2 to control the &:<;urities it claims and 
I-2 ha.s •illowed J-3 to control the securiti~ that it and L cbim. 
2·t7 U.C.C §§ E-30\ (1), 8-302(1), (3); pre-1978 § 8-301(1), (2). Ex!lrr.ple l assumes that J -3 , 
not .!-?.. is in physiC-'ll possession of the certificated se<::urities involved, 'md there could not be a 
ddivery under U.C.C. § 3-302(1)(a). /-2, originally a tnmsfl;!ree on the books of l-3 puf'Jtlaflt 
:o U. •::: .c. § 8-3l3(l)(d)(ii), should not be e1noi:nted with constflJc tive po~~sion for purposes 
c-fh0n:?. fldc purcluser status. See :supra notes 21 8-3 1 (similar argument concerning C- 1 .<i3 a 
ua..ns~eree pursuant to U.C.C. § 8-313(J)(d)(iii)). I -2 ttho is not the re;;istcred •)Wner ofunxr-
tidcuted :oeGurir.ies or a trail:Sferee pursuant to U.C. C. § 8-313(i)(c), (d)(i), or (g). 1-2 is a 
tf8.:r . .::fen:e off! ::.tC1Jr:ity interest from 1-1 pursuant to U.C.C. § 8-313( ! )(j). See supra notes 113, 
115. 'Tlm.s, ·u.c.c. § 8-302(l)(h) and (c) do not app!y. U.C.C. § 8-302(b), (c). 
143 T'}tls conclusion a3surn.::-:3 that tl1e securities a~rc Hin be2.rer fcrrn or in registered fonn, 
i;;sue;J or !n dor:;.~d to" 1-2. § 8 .. JQ2{1 )(a). That ! -2 tG'QK delivery Q.ei(:ore it became a purcha:x:r 
c·:- '" .'::::curity inkrest from .f-1 sho uld ..:,ot cha."'!:;e this r<:!'mlt . Although the tnmsi'er to I-2 
~h)Eld !:,-,~ p 1ES' .;wt to § 8-3 i 3(l)(j), nothing in § 8-302( 1 )(a) or § 3 -313{ 1) makes bon.fl Hrle 
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bona fide purchaser as to the transfer of a security interest in B Co. 
securities from J-1 to J-2.249 It seems odd that J-2's manner of con-
trolling the securities-possession or non-possession--could deter-
mine whether J-2 achieves priority over C-l's interests. Neither C-1 
nor C-l's intermediary, I-1 , can dictate (other than by contract) or 
even ascertain (in the case of fungible bulks) how J-2 chooses to con-
trol the securities involved. But this result is inherent in the Article 8 
property law construct. A bona fide purchaser cuts off aJl adverse 
claims, upper-tier and lower-tier, but transferees that are not bona fide 
purchasers are subject to the first-in-time doctrine. 
L also would not qualify for bona fide purchaser status. 250 L 
might argue, however, that the securities it claims were first trans-
ferred by /-1 to J-2, and then from 1-2 to L. L would further argue 
that J-2 was a bona fide purchaser, and that L received its security 
interest free of C -1 's claim under the "shelter" principle.251 That ar-
gument would face some difficult hurdles. First, 1-2 could not be a 
bona fide purchaser unless I-3 were a clearing corporation.252 Second, 
it is not clear that there were two transfers involved (one from J -1 to 
J-2 and one from J-2 to L) when J-1 granted a security interest to 
L.Zs3 Third, even if two transfers did occur, it is not clear that J -2 
gave "value" so as to qualify for bona fide purchaser treatment. 254 If 
purchaser status depend on a delivery occurring at or subsequent to the time a transferee 
becomes a purchaser. 
249 If I-3 were a clea..."'ing •::orporation, / -2 could have become a bona fide purchaser when 
the securities were originally transferred to it on the books of I-3. U.C.C. §§ 8-313(1 )(g), (2) 
(first sentence), 8-320(3); pre-1978 §§ 8-3 13(l)(e), (2) (first sentence), 8-320(3) . But the trans-
fer of a security interest from J -1 to 1-2 occurs under U.C.C. § 8-313(j) without any 1-3 book 
entry and is not a transfer under U.C.C. §§ 8-313(l)(g) and 8-320. Yet it seems odd to deny 
bona fide purchaser status to 1-2, an earlier transferee on the books of a clearing corpora tion, 
since Article 8 generally treats such transfers as equivalent to a delivery. Id. A transieree 
under pre-1978 §§ 8-313( l)(e) fu>d 8-320 becomes a "holder" a11d such a transfer "has the 
effect of a delivery of a sa:urity in be..-..rer form or duly indorsed in blank. " Pre-1978 §§ 8-
313(2), 8-32G(3). Under the pre-1978 Article 8, then, 1-2 would be deemed to be in physical 
possession of the secm-ities at the time of I-1 's transfer of a security interesi to 1-2 a nd, conse-
quently, could become a bona fide purchaser. Pre-1978 § 8-302(1 ); Guttman, supra note 4, at 
8-29 to -30. There does not appear to have been any intention for thr~ U.C.C. .~-ti cle 8 to 
change this result. 3tt U.C.C. § 3-320, Re.a3ons for 1977 Cl1ange ("Subsccrion (3) bas b~Xn 
rewzitten to address cerk'lin con5equences directly, rather than merely by •malogy to the physi-
cal delivery of certifica ted securities."). 
250 As a tra.1sfer~ of a.TJ interest in a fungible bulk of sa:uri ties on the CC{)ks of an intc;rme-
diar; (/-2), L could not be a bona 1'1de purchaser for the S--':l"ne reasons that C ·l could not i::n: a 
bona fide purch9.ser. See supra notes 222-36 and accompanying te:;:t. 
251 See U.C. C. and pre-1978 § 8-30 1(1) & comment 1; supra note 38; ~ee als-o U.C.C. mxl 
pre-1972 § 8-3 13(3). 
252 See supra 110te 249. 
253 See infra note 375 (suggesting that thel"e may be two transfers in the cont.~;·; t oY cff!.I!S-
feror <:-YHH ?.nties, although the issue is not fr~ of doubt). 
254 Sc.e U.C.C . ar1Jj pre-1 973 § 8-302( 1) C' 'bona fide purcha.s-::r' is a :.>u rc}F~;S.t~.r for valu~ 
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L's shelter principle argument fails because /-2 is not a bona fide pur-
chaser, L might continue to assert that /-2 (L's intermediary) was L's 
immediate transferor and that /-2 had breached a transferor war-
ranty.255 If that claim were successful, then /-2 would bear the loss 
even though it was not involved in either the original transfer to C-1 
(on / -l 's books) or (except to act as 1-l's and L's intermediary) the 
subsequent secured loan from L to 1-1.256 
Finally, two other theories, not derived from Article 8, may offer 
L and /-2, as subsequent transferees, some hope of achieving seniority 
over C-1. First, prior to the transfer to C-1 on the books of J-1, pre-
sumably 1-2 controlled the securities for its customer, /-1, through J-
2's intermediary, /-3. By leaving /-1 (and the upstream in-
termediaries) in control of the securities, arguably C-l's interest could 
be subordinated to all subsequent transferees on estoppel or apparent 
authority grounds. That theory probably would not be successful. 257 
Second, L and /-2 could argue that /-1 is a trustee for C-1, as benefici-
ary, and that trust law applies to /-l's transfers of the securities, as 
trust property. A good faith purchaser for value of trust property 
from a trustee normally takes free of a beneficiary's equitable owner-
ship claim, provided that the purchaser does not have notice of a 
.. . "). Whether /-2 gave "value" would turn on whether the transfer to /-2 by /-1 (for "re-
transfer" to L) was "in return for any consideration sufficient to support a simple contract." 
U.C.C. and pre-1978 § 1-201(44) (defining "value"; the other examples of "value" in para-
graph (44) would not apply here). Perhaps /-2's agreement to "retransfer" to L would consti-
tute value, here. Also, if /-2 has incurred a warranty obligation to L, then value would have 
been given. 
255 See generally infra Part V(B). 
256 I-2 also might make a transferor warranty claim against J-1 under this "two transfer" 
paradigm. But because of J-1's insolvency J-2's recovery as an unsecured creditor would be 
uncertain. 
257 The U.C.C. does not generally abolish the doctrines of estoppel and apparent authority. 
See U.C.C. § 1-103. Traditionally, estoppel has been viewed as an "application of the rules of 
fair play." In re King Memorial Hospital, Inc., 19 Bankr. 885, 891 (Bankr. D. Fla. 1 982). 
Estoppel of an owner from recovering property from a good faith purchaser requires voluntary 
conduct on the owner's part which leads the purchaser to change its position to its detriment. 
31 C.J .S. Estoppei § 59(a), at 367 (1964 & Supp. 1990). For example, an owner may be es-
topped from recovering its property from a good faith purchaser if, by its act or omission, the 
owner entrusts possession to and vests apparent ownership in the seller. M Bank-Waco, N. A. 
v. L. & J., In.::., 754 S.W.2d 245, 251 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988). The doctrine of apparent authority 
sHows an agent to bind its principal when the principal gives its agent the appearance of au-
thority and the agent, using that authority, commits a fraud on an innocent third party. Re-
statement (Second) of Agency§ 261 (1958); 2A C.J.S. Agency§ 157(a), at 787 (1972 & Supp. 
1990). The doctrine of apparent authority sometimes is said to be a specific application of the 
rnore ge::1eral doctrine of estoppel. See, e.g., 2A C.J.S. Agency§ 157(c), at 789 (1972 & Supp. 
1990). In E;;;ample !, L would argue that by choosing /-1 as its intermediary. C-1 vested 
apparent authmity in /-1 and, therefore, C-1 is estopped from asserting a claim to the se-;uri-
ties in di;;pute. But because L has no pra-;tical means of discovering cllljms to or the e;,istence 
of the fungible bulk of ~.ecurities, that argument probably would fail. 
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breach of trust. 258 Although J-1 clearly has fiduciary obligations to 
customers for whom it controls securities,259 it is doubtful that J-1 is a 
trustee to which trust law principles apply.U>() 
Although Article 8 subjects all non-bona fide purchaser claim-
ants to a first-in-time regime, the last-in-time good faith transferee 
rule in the Proposed TRADES Regulations would result in priority 
for J-2 and L in the case of C-l 's pre-existing interests. 261 
C. Observations 
The emphasis on timing, whether first-in-time or last-in-time, is 
questionable considering that C-1 has little or no way to control or 
find out about the transactions with /-2 and L, either ex ante or ex 
post. The same can be said for J-2 and L with respect to J-l's transac-
tions with C -1. The principal control available to these parties lies in 
their respective selections of intermediaries. Yet, as shown above, C-1 
may sometimes prevail even though its intermediary, J-1, has failed 
and J-2 and L sometimes will lose even though their respective in-
termediaries have not failed. 262 
258 Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 284 (1959); 4 A. Scott & W . Fratcher, The Law of 
Trusts, § 284, 35-40 (4th ed. 1989). 
259 See C. Meyer, The Law of Stockbrokers and Steck Exchanges, § 40, 251-53 (193 1 & 
Supp. 1936); see also pre-1978 § 8-313 comment 1 ("[f]he relationship [between a broker and 
its customer] .. . is unique, partaking of various aspects of an agency, bailment, trust and 
piedge."). 
260 See C. Meyer, supra note 259, § 40, at 251-52 ("Although such a [stock] broker is some-
times referred to as a trustee, he is not a trustee in the strict technical sense of the word, but a 
quasi trustee, of the same character as any agent to whom money or other property is en-
trusted by his principal for the purposes of the agency.") (footnotes omiited); 1 A. Scott & W. 
Fratcher, supra note 258, § 8, at 95 ("A person may be both agent of and trustee for an-
other. . . . In such a case, however, it is the agency relationship which predominates, and the 
principles of agency, rather than the principles of trusts, are applicable."). Whether a securi-
ties intermediary, such as a stockbroker, is a true trustee or merely an agent who holds title to 
its pt·incipals' property will turn on the particular facts and circumstances involved. See Re-
statement (Second) of Trusts, § 12 comment h, at 38-39 (1959); 1 A. Scott & W. Fratcher, 
supra,§ 12.10, at 173-7:5. 
261 The opposite result would obtain under the Proposed TRADES Regulations when C-l's 
purchase followed the seemed loans by f-2 and L. See supra not~ 233-38 and accompanying 
text. Although the clearing lien priority may soive the most significant practical concerns, 
neither the T reasury l).epartment nor those that commented on the Proposed TRADES Regu-
lations, supra note 7, explained why, when a clearing lien is not involved, up~er-tier claimants 
should be senior some of the time and lower·tier claimants should be ;-,enior some of the time. 
Concerns for dearing liens dilfer from conc:=rns for other upper-tier ciaimants only in degree, 
not in character. 
262 If upper-tier claimants such as I-2 and L desire comp!ete protection from claims of 
existing customers of J-1, they could insist that the securities to lx transkrr;:d to them along a 
route that !e.~ds upstream through the books of a d e:J.rir.g corporation {or the Fed, in the c:l.Se 
of treasury securities), resulting in bona fide purchaser stams. See supra :notes 95, 128-32 a11d 
accl)mpa;1;'i:ng text. But that approach would r•::sult in additionai cost~ and could he disruptive 
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This discussion of different-tier priorities further illustrates that 
the property construct of the existing legal regime is subject to basic 
defects. As observed in the context of same-tier priorities, its applica-
tion to different-tier priorities is confusing, awkward, and unprinci-
pled. Application of the property interest construct is ill-suited to the 
resolution of these conflicting claims. With limited exceptions, it fails 
to deal expressly with the unique circumstances involved when securi-
ties are a part of fungible bulks reflected by the books of in-
termediaries. It relegates priority conflicts to the first-in-time 
principle where bona fide purchaser status is not achieved. Moreover, 
before appropriate resolutions of priority contests can be teased out, it 
is necessary to ascertain that two competing claimants are asserting 
rights in the same securities. But Article 8, the existing book-entry 
Treasury Regulations, and the proposed regulations provide no gui-
dance as to how this can be accomplished when the securities are all a 
part of fungible bulks. 263 It is troubling that codification efforts in-
of otherwise desireable market practices and relationships. Presumably the relationships of /-1 
and L with /-2 and /-2 with /-3 make sense to the parties. In many cases, /-2 and /-3 will 
perform "clearing" or "carrying" services for their respective downstream intermediary cus-
tomers, but this is not necessarily the case. See generally Fitzpatrick & Carman, An Analysis 
of the Business and Legal Relationship Between Introducing and Carrying Brokers, 40 Bus. 
Law. 47 (1984). Even if /-2 and L were to insist that their security interests be transferred 
through a series of transfers to and by other intermediaries that involved, at some point, entries 
on the books or a clearing corporation, upon completion of the transfers, assuming that 1-2 
and L wouJd then claim through a new and different intermediary, it then would be necessary 
to work through these same priority puzzles while contemplating the insolvency of the new 
intermediary. 
263 For example, the Treasury Department has acknowledged the fungibility of book-entry 
Treasury securities and the general impossibility of tracing. November TRADES Summary, 
supra note 145, at 43035. Yet the operation of the good faith transferee rule under the Pro-
posed TRADES Regulations, supra note 7, depends, in the context of conflicting claims on 
different tiers, on an identification of conflicting claims in the same security. C-1 would face a 
difficult task in asserting that the securities transferred to /-2 and L were the same ones that 
were (earlier or subsequently) transferred to C-1. But, assuming C-1 could offer a rational 
basis for tracing the securities it claims to those also claimed by /-2 and L, those parties also 
would find it difficult to establish that the securities they claimed were different from those 
claimed by C-1. For an example of the difficulty of tracing securities controlled in a fungible 
bulk, see Kirkwood v. Taylor, 590 F. Supp. 1375, 1377-83 (D. Minn. 1984) (plaintiffs alleging 
misleading registration statement in action under 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (originally enacted as 
Securities Act of 1933, § Ita) failed to meet strict tracing requirement). Under the proportion-
ate property interest rule, however, C-1 would be in a position to claim, as against J-2 or L, a 
proponionate interest in the securities claimed by those parties even if C-1 could not trace the 
securities strictly. Cf. R. Brown, The Law of Personal Property § 36, at 80-82 (liability of 
transfer~ of wrongfully confused personal property to owner of a proportionate interest in the 
property), § 79, at 297-98 (2d ed. 1955) (liability of transferee from bailee of commingled fun-
gible gocds to owner of a proportionate interest in goods); R. Powell & P. Rohan, Powell on 
Real Property~ 606, at 601-02 (One Volume Edition 1968) (one cotenant can sue m; a single 
plati!tiff, and is not required to join action in which all cotenants are parties, in order to rce-
cover property interest or damages for injury to property interest). C-1 's proportionate inter-
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tended to bring clarity and predictability to the law have left such 
uncertainty in their wakes. 
V. A NEW MODEL FOR REsOLVING DIFFERENT-TIER 
COMPETING CLAIMS AND PRIORITIES 
Part IV demonstrates that applying existing property law rules to 
competing claims on different tiers spawns complexity, uncertainty, 
and disagreement as well as arbitrary and fortuitous results. The size 
and significance of the securities markets and the importance of these 
priority issues notwithstanding, current law has not been subjected to 
searching analysis and criticism. 264 Part IV and this part seek to fill 
that void. 
The SIP A/Subchapter III risk sharing distributional rule pro-
vides a model for dealing with same-tier customer claims on a basis 
other than a property law construct involving the tracing of property 
interests and principles of first-in-time (nemo dat) and last-in-time 
(bona fide purchase). This part explores a new model for resolving 
different-tier priority contests that would build on and complement 
the SIP A/Subchapter HI approach. The potential benefits of a new 
model are examined here by considering a proposed priority rule for 
resolving different-tier priority contests involving transfers of interests 
in fungible bulks of securities controlled by intermediaries. 
A. The Basic Principle: Upper- Tier Priority 
The cornerstone of the priority rule proposed here is one overrid-
est could be 100% of its claim if securities of the particular issue available to /-I (but for the 
transfers to /-2 and L) were (but for the transfers to /-2 and L) sufficient to cover all same-tier 
claims of /-l's customers. 
264 Much of the attention paid to the 1978 Article 8 has focused on the perceived signifi-
cance of uncertificated securities. See supra notes 5-6. Although reduction of reliance on cer-
tificated securities might be useful, it would have a relatively small impact on the operation, 
structure, and inherent credit and fraud risks in the securities markets. See supra notes 37-38. 
Other matters given attention, while interesting and possibly useful, are unimportant when 
compared to these priority issues. Certainly an inordinate amount of energy has given to the 
1978 Article 8's commercially insignificant prohibition of more than one registered pledgee 
and the plight of junior security interests. See U.C.C. § 8-108; Coogan, supra note 5, passim. 
Coogan's article primarily addressed transfer and pledge of uncertificated secm;ties. He fo-
cused on issues such as whether the rules for perfection of security interests ought to b.; in 
Article 8 or Article 9 (Coogan, supra note 5, at 1016, 1052-58, 1%9-73), the effects of errors 
made by clearing corporations (Coogan, supra note 5, at 1041-48), and transfer of :;.er;urities 
controlled by a financial intermediar; whose customer is the "owner" of the entire issue of 
securities (Coogan, supra note 5, at 1059-60). Coogan seems to have overlooked or misunder-
stood significant issues involving the transfer and pledge of interests in securities, including the 
essential economic role of securities intermediaries. See also Rasor, supra note i 16, at 276-73, 
883-89 (devoting more than one-fourth of the article to junior security intert".Jt issu~~) . 
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ing principle: claimants on a higher tier will always prevail over · 
claimants on a lower tier. To state this principle of upper-tier priority 
(UTP) another way, the transferee of an interest in a fungible bulk of 
securities controlled by its intermediary can look only to its intermedi-
ary for the benefits of the securities transferred. Consequently, UTP 
also contemplates the adoption of a corollary rule: An intermediary 
on whose books an interest in a fungible bulk of securities is trans-
ferred would, as a matter of law, warrant that the transferee will re-
ceive (and will continue to receive) the benefits of the interest being 
transferred. 265 
UTP does not reject the notion that a transferee claiming 
through an account with a lower-tier intermediary receives a property 
interest. Rather, UTP deals with how interests in securities are to be 
allocated, as among different-tier claimants, in the event a lower-tier 
intermediary fails. The property available to satisfy the claims of 
lower-tier intermediary transferees would be limited to the securities 
that are not subject to competing claims through accounts with in-
termediaries on higher tiers. 266 Application of UTP to Example 1 
would resolve the priority disputes in favor of I-2 and L and against 
C -1 in every instance. 267 
Although UTP might seem harsh, even cruel, the caveat issued 
in the Introduction bears repeating: it is assumed that smaller, unso-
265 See generally infra Part V(B). 
266 UTP would not, however, promote involuntary transferees, such as lien creditors, who 
are not purchasers, even if such claimants could be characterized as "upper-tier." See U.C.C. 
§§ 1-201(32) (defining "purchase" as a " L'llcing by .. . (a] voluntar; transaction"), 1-201(33) 
(defining "purchaser"), 9-301(3) (defining "lien creditor"); see alw, Mazer v. Williams Bros., 
461 Pa. 587, 337 A.2d 559 (1975) (lien creditor is not a "purchaser"). In Exa:.'11ple 1, a judg-
ment creditor of J-1 would be required to employ judicial process against 1-l's intermediary,/-
2, in order to reach securities controlled by 1-2 for its customer, 1-l. See U.C.C. § 8-317(4) 
(debtor's interest in securities controlled by a financial intermediary "may be reached by a 
creditor by legal process upon the fina:1cial intermediary on whos.~ books the interest of the 
debtor appears.") In any event, judicial process on beha lf of a creditor of a securities interme-
diary would be ru1 extremely unlikely event. See supra note 165. 
267 As a member of the Book-Entry Treasury Regulations Task Force of the Ad Hoc C:::>m-
mittee on Uncertificated Debt Securities of the ABA Section of Business Law, which was 
charged with ma:.\ing <XImments on the PropoSied TRADES Regulations, supra note 7, dming 
1936 and 1987, I was a principal proponent of a UTP rule. Katzman criticized a proposal of 
that task force for such a priority rule (proposed as an alternative) because it "precludes any 
form offif3t priority claim." Katzman, supra note 95, at 199. In the March TRADES Surn-
:masy, supra note 39, the D,:part:m.::n>: of Treasury observed that a priority rule that would 
always favo;- either upr.er-tier or lower-tier claimants would be "unjustifiably arbitra..-y. " 
March TRA.D ES Summary, supra not<:: 39, at 8849. But neither Katzman or the Department 
of Treasury ;:mrsued the fu'a1ysis. ?art 1Y of this article demonstrates that both the first-in-
time rule of curn;nt law and the last-in-time good faith uansferee rule under the Propc-sed 
TRA.DES Regulations can produce arbitrary results. 'Ibis Part ~'-plains that UTP is 
principled. 
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phisticated investors are adequately protected by SIPC coverage and 
private insurance.268 Upper-tier versus lower-tier, then, is not a con-
test between large and small, sophisticated and unsophisticated, rich 
and poor, or strong and weak. 
Any priority rule, whatever doctrinal framework is chosen for 
implementing that rule, is a matter of loss allocation. In Example 1, 
the loss to be allocated resulted from the convergence of (i) the insol-
vency of J-1 and (ii) the insufficiency of securities available to J-l's 
estate to satisfy the claims of J-2 and L, on the one hand, and C-1, on 
the other. As a participant in the securities market, J-1 has exposed 
other participants to a credit risk and a risk that I -1 might misbehave. 
1-2 and L each chose to lend money to / -1 and to receive a transfer of 
(security interest in) securities to secure its loan, but neither chose I -1 
to be its intermediary for purposes of controlling the securities. C -1 
chose to purchase securities from (or through) J-1 and to allow /-1, as 
C's intermediary, to control those securities. The issue posed is 
which class of innocent market participants269 should bear the loss-
the upper-tier claimants, J-2 and L, or the lower-tier claimant, C-1. 270 
1. An Economic Analysis 
An economic analysis is an appropriate beginning for considera-
tion of UTP. 271 Because the priority conflict arises in the securities 
markets, between members of two different classes of innocent prop-
2 6S See supra notes 8, 171 and accompanying text. 
269 This discussion assumes that upper-tier claimants such as J-2 and L acquired interests in 
securities without knowledge of any lower-tier adverse claim, such as that of C-1. A claimant 
with knowledge of ex.i.sting lower-tier claims would not be "innocent." Alternatives for treat-
ment of non-innocent upper-tier claimants under a new model are discussed infra Part Y(C). 
For discussions of "innocent purchaser risk" in other contexts, see Carlson, Rationality, supra 
note 142 (priority rules for secured parties under § 9-312(5)); Weinberg, Sales Law, Econom-
ics, and the Negotiability of Goods, 9 J. Legal Stud. 569 ( 1980) (rights of owners and innocent 
purchasers of stolen goods). 
2 70 For convenience, 1 refer in this part to claimants through intermediaries on a higher tier 
(such as J-2 and L) as "upper-tier claimants" and claimants through intermediaries (such as J-
1) on a lower tier (such as C-1) as "lower-tier claimants." 
271 See Cooter & Rubin, A Theory of Loss Allocation for Consumer Payments, 66 Tex. L. 
Rev. 63, 66 (1987) ("[B]ecause loss allocation in the payment system is a technical and largely 
monetary subject, economic analysis intuitively seems to be an appropriate and promising 
place to start."). In recent years the explanatOrf, the positive, and the normative elements of 
economic analysis of law have been criticized. See, e.g., Baker, The Ideology of Economic 
Analysis of Law, 5 Phil. & Pub. A1f. 3 (1975); Carlson, Is Fraudnlent Conveyance Lm;; Effi-
cient?, 9 Cardozo L. Rev. 643 ( 1987) [hereinafter Carlson, Efficient]; Kdmail, Chcic.;: and 
Utility, 1979 Wis. L. Rev. 769; Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Prob!<:ms: A 
Critique, 33 Stan. L. Rev. 387 (1981); Lefi", Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism N'Jf>Ut 
Nominalism, 60 Va. L. Rev. 451 (1974). To oversimplify, these critiques point out that effi-
ciency, as a normative goal, does not offer the coherent, self-contained, value-neutral frame-
work claimed by its proponents, and the empirical burdens dema.'1de.d by &". efficiency analysis 
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erty claimants that are each comprised of securities market partici-
pants, basing a priority rule on an economic analysis- with 
"efficiency"272 as the goal-seems to be an appropriate methodology 
that is not likely to offend other norms. 273 
a. Some Basic Assumptions and Premises 
In addition to assuming adequate protection of investors covered 
by SIP A and private insurance, this analysis assumes that it is neces-
sary for the legal regime to establish priority rules to sort out conflicts 
among different-tier claimants. Private agreements among market 
participants would be costly, unlikely to occur, and impossible to con-
clude with each other market participant. 274 This analysis fu rther as-
are not likely to be sustained in any given application. For a. response to some of these criti-
ques, see R. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 22-26 (3d ed. 1986). 
272 Economists give a variety of meanings to the concept of "efficiency." See e.g., R. Cooter 
& T. U1en, Llw and Economics 44-45, 49-51 (1988); Posner, supra note 271 , at 12-15; Carlson, 
Efficient, supra note 271, at 646-49; Carlson, Reforming the Efficiency Criterion: Comments 
on Some Recent Suggestions, 8 Cardozo L. Rev. 39 passim (1986); Coleman, Efficiency, Ex-
change, and Auction: Philosophic Aspects of the Economic Approach to Law, 68 Cal. L. Rev. 
22 i , passim (1980). As used here, efficiency means, with an imp<Jrtant qualification, the so 
called Kaldor-Hicks, or potential Pareto-superior, concept of efficiency: If the losses (costs) 
imposed on society by a particular legal rule are more than offset by the gains (benefits), the 
rule is efficient. See Posner, supra note 271, at 12-14; Carlson, Efficient, supra, at 647-49; 
Shupack, Puzzle, supra note 205, at 1070-71 & n.lO. The analysis here compares only the 
direct costs and benefits for securities market participants that result from current law with 
those that would result from adopting UTP-apartia/ equilibrium aMiysis . See Posner, supra 
note 271, at 72-74; F. Stephen, The Economics of the Law 62-63 (1988). Although this analy-
sis provides a useful means of identifying and exploring costs and benefits for these partici-
pa>'1i.S, the qualification is necessary because it does not o::onsider external costs and bene.fit<; . 
Fer e:Aa.mpk , the effects of priority rules in other markets in other parts of tht economy are not 
treated. Thus, I do not claim that UTP necessarily would result in an efficient result for the 
SC'/.:ieq · as a whole. 
2'13 Even ti1e: sharpest cri tics of normative er-Dnomic ;malysis of law mi.~ht Goncede tflat 
wea.lth m:cc\i:m.\zution is one appropriate standard for resohi ng priority disputes among securi-
cic_;; idfl. rket ya.rticipa.Ms, at least when the player3 involve-.::! 3fC not wrongdcers . I mil2<c no 
d a in1, ho•Nc'!a, that "noneconomic" values should be ignored in fashioning legal n.des merely 
i':<:c;wse 1.b -:- i ntcrt~ t.s of large, wealthy parties may t-.e at stak ,~. s~ infra not.e.s J .s}-9 1 a11d 
.. ,c·~viL0·1P)- " .s text (d iSJ~uss ing liability of upper-tier claimants th$.t have kiwwledg<: of lorver-
tier D.dv t~ J ~~":- ~1ai_cn .~ ) . 
::'?··:· In li1•:ory pr~'/l'lt- agn;ements a..mong market participants could provid;;: an .c5cient n;so-
iHti:·!l ,, :· ·:!:-: :-: priority conte>ts. SeeR. Cooter & T. Ulen, supra note 272, at 105 (stating the 
' ~ ??o:;i~ 1 v~ Cca.se '"fht-·orenl" as uwhen parties can bargain togeiher 3.nd s.ett ie tht!r di3agree-
rt·~-::.·x-.~. t :.; tJ _·~· i>.>op t:fiHl·o_G , their behavior will be efficient regardle..~s of the U!1dr:r1ying rul::! of 
.t~ ~ -~ \<·. ' )). n~x:.~~ ·-i~~ any 3l1Ch contractur.'"ll solution WOl!ld arise tn t}H; prE;:;enc>.;:; of a ck:.ar rnar:<et 
ht~} u ;.· .::._ h · .YlN -'; -.,,. .~r . F.:ha.ncr: on private bargcUning ·w.ou}d not be Ek~~ly to rtsul t in ?.-n ~ffici .; n·~ 
~ ; u~ :~/'t r_:;· .. ,:: . .f1:.!•:: l:-.i~~.::j_t i fai1•.:rre springs, in part, frorn the stnJ ·:.: tur~ of ~~-:.--;; u:~-·~ti .::-s n~_ ;1~ -~.:(r;t_; and t'h~ 
~>· ~:-r ... ~"- ' t ~;( ·.: .. :-; :;!~ 1i..n~; d~ .:·:J': ~ ~:l- ~ i:-1t~rnJ-ediarjes, resu1ti.n.g in irH'td,:.qn::?cy (.·f t.-e.Jor rn;rt io_.:l. 2.tVt.-Ul .3.b}.~ to 
1.L.-: Io. ·-:: · !·~ -~-~ ·t:~:-: 1.~~_;.;;)fHi '! [; :1.s tj~~ -:rv:ho t~1e otb -~r participants arc aud ~.;:~~ :~ :!':·-~1.::utitie5 they .:.:l.1lrn. 
1 ,-;~: ;; f ~.; r t: _. . ;_; ii._'r..:dy th;:n i n fG ·(r~1at~un il'·lailabl~ to nla.rk-':t. ?Hn i c!. pf.HH~~ ~· (::Jid t_--,! ·J3yi'.:cnn~ til-1c~l] 
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sumes no change in current law except as it would be changed by the 
UTP rule. 275 Under current law, (1) lower-tier claims are subject to 
dilution under the SIPA / Subchapter III sharing rule or (when that 
scheme does not apply) the Article 8 proportionate propetiy interest 
formulation, (2) an upper-t ier claimant (such as 1-2 or L ) is senior to 
a lower-tier claimant (such as C -1) if the upper-tier claimant achieves 
bona fide purchaser status or if its in terest is first-in-tL1De,276 and (3) a 
lower-tier claimant, because it cannot become a bona fide purcbaser 
where a fungible bulk is involved, is senior only when its interest is 
first-in-time. 277 It follows that the only change in result that would 
arise from imposing a UTP rule would be subordination of a lower-
tier claimant when an upper-tier claimant is second-in-time and does 
not become a bona fide purchaser. 278 
lower-tier claimants). SeeR. Cooter & T. Ulen, supra note 272, at 48-49 (asymmetrical infor-
mation leading to market failure). Moreover, the transaction costs involved in agreements 
among market participants would be enormous and would make actual agreement unlikely. 
Because third pz.rty rights are involved, it would be necessary for each market participant to 
agree with each other participa11t as to the same applicable priority rules. See id . at 100-102 
(discussing "the Normative Coase Theorem: Structure the law to remove the impediments to 
private agreements .'') (emphasis in original); Coase, The Problem of Social Cost , 3 J. L. Econ. 
1, 15 (1960) ("These operations are often extremely costly, sufficiently costly a t any rate to 
prevent many transactions that would be carried out in a world in which the pricing system 
worked without cost."). In some large transactions, however, parties do contract concerning 
priorities. for example, in a government securities " tri-party repo" transaction, a repo securi-
ties purchaser (funds lender) does not incur the cos ts oft>ecoming (or causing the intermediary 
of its choice to become) a bona fide purchaser. Ins tead, an agreement is negotiated wi th the 
seller's intermediary (usually a clearing bank which, in the absence of agreemen t, would claim 
a security interest in the securities) whereby that intermediary (for a fee) acknowledges both 
sides of the tmnsaction and agrees to hold securities in "custody" for rhe benefl t of tht: pur-
chas.":r. See Stigum, Repo, supra note 51, at 2C0-01. This illustrates lower-tier claimant aware-
ness of the risks of upper-tier priority under current law and the willingness of .an upper- <ier 
claimant to subordinate its claim when it can 1Y.: aware of conflicting iowcr-ti~r claims. 
275 A.lthough one cannot plausibly ':ll"gue the normative from the positive, there appears to 
be general satisfaction with the results of basic priority rules under current :aw conceming the 
transfer and pledge of interests in securities, except for the issues invoived in moving from 
current law to a UTP rule. As discussed in Part IV, where fungible bulks are involved both 
cuiTent law (first-in-time) and the Proposed T R.A.DES Regulations ' good faith transferee mle 
(last--in-time) result in arbitrary and fortuitous results that v<__nnot be predicted by transfe rees 
on any tier. A. strictly apphed lower-tier p riority (L T P) rule, on the other hand, would have the 
effect of encouraging upper-tier claimants to eschew claim in g an interest in a fungibl e bulk or 
to take steps to achieve (or caus.; their intermediaries to achieve) boa a rid~ pmch~r s~:.~m. 
such as passing the transfers through a clearing corpDration . See supra not": 95. The resul( of 
L T P, then, wo11ld be UTP! Because upr..er-ticr claimants :::an become bo na !1de purcha>er:;, 
UTP often wil i 0-.e the result under current law as wel l. .But achievin_~ L")na !'lde pu:;(;;h 'itr 
statu:~ may be costly foT sorne upper-t ier claima."'lts. 1n the abserv~ e of pcrsnasive ar :surnents f .)f 
moving to either '-" last-·in··time or a L TP sch.:::rne. 1 ar:1 satisfied Fe,:· nmv to c: xamii'e tb~ rd'i tiv<;: 
c,:;st.s and benetl ts of c;!rnnt iaw and the prop<:.sed UTP f l.lle. 
2 7 6 S.ee gena ;j_tly supra }'art IV. 
1 77 t eL 
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It is assumed finally that lower-tier claimants are generally aware 
of the risks of dilution and subordination that could follow from the 
failure of their intennediary.279 If this is so, then a lower-tier claim-
ant's selection of an intermediary demonstrates that claimant's will-
ingness to be exposed to those risks with respect to that intermediary. 
Given the scope and potential magnitude of intermediary failure risks, 
it is unlikely that lower-tier claimants place material reliance on the 
limited potential, under current law, for a claim against (or a senior 
claim to securities also claimed by) an upper-tier transferee or secured 
lender. 280 Because the prospect for obtaining seniority over an upper-
tier claimant is likely to be ignored by a lower-tier claimant as de 
minimis, were UTP the law a lower-tier participant would be likely to 
choose the same intermediary that it has chosen under current law. 
Stated otherwise, a lower-tier claimant would place a low value (per-
securities could be traced to securities subsequently transferred to an upper-tier claimant. See 
supra note 263. 
279 I do not claim that all such investors necessarily have a subjective awareness of the 
details of the operative priority rules. But it is reasonable to assume that the investors consid- · 
ered here generally realize that they could suffer greatly upon insolvency of their intermediary. 
Recent large losses experienced by investors with failed government securities dealers repre-
sent an aberration best explained by outright fraud and the absence of regulatory controls. See 
supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text. Indeed, the notoriety resulting from such losses, 
the enactment of the Government Securities Act and the issuance of regulations thereunder 
make it even less likely that such aberrational losses will occur in the future. Id. Jay West-
brook has suggesteD that a requirement of full and formal disclosure of intermediary risks 
might cause many investors to eschew the use ofintermroiaries. Letter from Jay L. Westbrook 
to Charles W. Mooney, Jr. (August 24, 1989). But whatever impact such disclosures might 
have on less sophisticated consumers who might not be satisfied with SIPC protection, I find it 
difficult to imagine that larger investors and traders are oblivious to fundamental risks that 
have b~n inherent in the legal regime for many, many years. In the course of numerous 
interviews and discussions I have gained a clear sense that these investors and trs.ders are 
acuteiy aware of intermediary risks and that this awareness features heavily in their selection 
of intermediaries. See supra notes 52-57 and accompanying text. 
280 At the margin market participants would, in theory, take account of dilferenc-...os in risk. 
8\lt when differences are tiny they may be disregarded in practice. See Carlson, Rationality, 
3Upra note 142, at 222-23 (v·ery small differences in recovery prospects may not be considererl 
by h:nders in pricing credit). Unlike extensions of credit such as loans, where a lender may 
charge a risk pre:mium for increased credit risks, the selection of an intermediary is essentially 
an all or nothing, yes or no, up or down, decision, in which charging a risk premium often is 
not feasib!l!. Intermedia.;ies do charge fees for certain services provided to their customers, 
und customers might demand !ower fees as compensation for their perceptions of greater credit 
risx. But inve>tors expect that IBM stock, for example, will cost the S3me price and have the 
J.&J.1'1C vaJu.; throughout the market regardless of what intermediary controls it. Secured Iend-
.ets to an intermediar; ".vho ~rmit the intermediary to control the s.-::curities, as we!l as "hold 
iE custody" repo parties, however, do charge a risk premium. But even for these parties, the 
re<-1 choice i-; whether to allow t:-,e dcbtor-intermedia.ry to control the securities or to have rhc 
:><.~";i~i es "movd" to another intermedia.t;'. I doubt that these pa.rties are influenui:i by the 
lirn i h~l r-otential for 3·eniority to up~r-tier claimants. 
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haps no value) on either the retention or the loss of the limited current 
potential for seniority. 
Since lower-tier claimants likely disregard the limited potential 
for seniority over upper-tier claimants, and the likelihood of lower-
tier seniority is necessarily identical to the likelihood of upper-tier 
subordination, one might think that upper-tier claimants also disre-
gard their equally limited potential for subordination. But that is not 
necessarily the case. A lower-tier claimant that selects an intermedi-
ary thereby indicates its willingness to be exposed to the broad risks 
inherent in the intermediary's insolvency.281 The fact that an upper-
tier claimant has not chosen that intermediary to control its securities 
demonstrates its corresponding unwillingness to be exposed to the 
same risks.282 Upper-tier claimants such as J-2 and L often obtain 
collateral precisely in order to minimize the impact of the insolvency 
or misbehavior of a lower-tier firm (such as J-1). 283 A lower-tier 
2 8 1 By posing the issue of whether to retain current law or move to the proposed UTP 
scheme, I have assumed that the adverse consequences for lower-tier claimants associated with 
intermediary insolvency under current law will remain. See supra notes 275-78 and accompa-
nying text. 
282 As a result of th.is choice, upper-tier claimants are not "customer-s" of the downstream 
intermediary, and under current law are not subjected to the S!PC/Subchapter III risk sharing 
formula or the Article 8 proportionate property interest formula in the event of inwlvency. I 
do not claim that the statement in the text is invariably factually accurate with respect to every 
upper-tier claimant in every transaction. For example, it is possible that L, in Example 1, 
subjectively believed that the financial strength and integrity of / -1 was equal or superior to 
that of I -2. But rhe statement in the text is a reasonable assumption for most cases because of 
the general awareness of substantial risks of intermediary insolvency, the market participants' 
means to "vote with their feet" by selecting intermediaries to control their se<::urities, and the 
fact that a lower-tier claimant necessarily is exposed to material insolvency risks of its interme-
diary. The .:xercise here is a comparison of aggregate costs a..11d benefits of the respective 
classes of upper and lower-tier claimants. lt would, however, be a.• overstatement to assert 
that ail upper-tier secured creditor such as 1-2 or L has no credit risk arising from extending 
credit to the downstream intermediary, such as 1-1. Se~ Stigu:m, Trade, supra note 4, at 178-79 
(discussing clearing ba.'lk perceptions of credit risk). 
2 83 :in Example 1, the principal purp<->se of the collateral transferred by I -1 to 1-2 and L is to 
minimize the impact of 1-1 's insolvency ~md misbehavior. Lenders to s:~cu riti es tlrms r·eport 
tha t there are many insu.nces when credit would J>Ot be extended except on a fully S..."Cured 
basis, regardless of any risk premium that could be charged fo r unsecured credit. Interview 
with James Clark, Vice President, Citibank, N .A. (June 22, 1989). Credit e:aended by banks 
that perform dearing services for govemment securities dealers is an extreme e~ample. See 
supra notes 49, 23 3 and accompanying text. The debate sunounding the Proj)Oscd TRADES 
Reguiations, supra note 7, and the insistence up:m explicit pmttction for "clearing liens" .illus-
trat•:s th.ese concerns. See supra note 233 and accompanying text; S<:t! also K ripke, supra note 
205, at 941 (" [11n most situations invohing secured credit, the crer.iit could not have been 
obta.irH;d ·without granting security.") I do not embrace tbe whole of Kripke's rather thorough 
"trashing" of tfic commercial la w-related law a.-ld r.,;onomiu. lit.:: ;·;'lture. ~k:e Jackson & 
&hwartz, suprs note 205. However, assuming, as 1 do, that the law •niii continu·~ t0 pres<:rv,~ 
seeun:d claims that a.r•: genercll y protected in bankruptcy and against t [,jpj p;;rties, Kripke's 
St.:=1t:::!rnent sccrt1S to apply to S.ef;ured credit extended in (he securities mark~ts. For a p-ersu.usive 
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claimant who has willingly exposed itself to the risks of its intermedi-
ary's insolvency, then, absorbs the risk of the insolvency of that inter-
mediary better than an upper-tier claimant. 284 
The implications of the foregoing for the proposed UTP rule can 
be evaluated in light of three conventional models for considering the 
efficiency of legal rules that allocate losses. 285 
b. Lower Cost of Reducing or Avoiding Loss 
In economic terms, efficiency of the market could be enhanced by 
adopting a priority rule that assigns the loss to the class of partici-
pants that could avoid or reduce the losses at the lower cost. 286 For 
example, assume T steals goods from 0 and then sells the goods toP. 
As between the two innocent parties, 0 and P, the efficient rule would 
allocate the loss to the party that could have avoided the loss at the 
lower cost. 287 If 0 's costs of protecting the goods from theft are 
argument that in some contexts credit will not be extended without collateral and that secured 
transactions can be (but are not necessarily) efficient, see Shupack, Puzzle, supra note 205. 
Moreover, registered broker-dealers generally can obtain secured financing only from banks. 
See 15 U.S. C. § 78h ( 1982 & Supp. 1986). And bank lending is restrained by prudency consid-
erations. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b) (1988). 
284 The reasons why a lower-tier claimant can better bear the risk are more fully developed 
infra notes 310-19 and accompanying text. I have explained elsewhere that the transactional 
and commercial context can cause different players to place different values on the loss of 
rights in the same property. See Mooney, supra note 124, at 710-14. The statement in the text 
is not inconsistent with the more general assertion that lower-tier claimants are highly risk 
averse and selective in their selection of intermediaries. See supra notes 52-57 and accompany-
ing text. Rather, it illustrates that intermediaries normally are selected based on the belief that 
the intermediary insolvency is highly unlikely. Experiences involving uninsured (and insuffi-
ciently insured) claimants in securities firm insolvency proceedings seem to bear this out. See 
supra note 55. 
285 The following analysis follows Cooter and Rubin by focusing on the efficiency of the 
UTP in terms of the principles of loss reduction, loss spreading, and loss imposition. See Cooter 
& Rubin, supra note 271, passim. 
286 See e.g., R. Cooter & T. Ulen, supra note 272, at 153-54 (efficiency of rule that good 
faith buyer of stolen goods takes subject to or free of interest of rightful owner depends on 
which party could protect against the loss at the lower cost); Posner, supra note 271, at 71 
(that bona fide purchaser of goods from owner's agent (who misunderstands her authority) 
takes free of owner's interest "is a simple case of [the owner's] being the lower-cost a voider of 
the mistake than [the purchaser]."); Cooter & Rubin, supra note 271, at 73 ("[A]n efficient 
legal system assigns liability to the party that can reduce losses at the lowest cost."); Weinberg, 
supra note 269, at 583 (1980) ("An efficient rule places risk on the class of persons that can 
prevent it with the smallest efficient expenditure of resources."). The concept is a familiar one, 
however, and need not be couched in economic terms. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 3-418 comment I 
("The traditional justification for the result [of Price v. Neal, 3 Burr. 1354 (1762)] is that the 
drawee is in a superior position to detect a forgery because he has the maker's signature and is 
expected to know and compare it .... "). 
287 See R. Cooter & T. Ulen, supra note 272, at 153-54; Posner, supra note 271, at 71. 
Posner assumes that 0 (in my theft example) would be the lower-cost loss avoider, but he 
explains that 0 is the winner under current law (in the United States) because allowing P to 
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}ower, the loss should fall on 0. If P's costs of investigating T's 
source of title are lower, the loss should fall on P. If J-1, in Example 
1, is characterized as the thief, the question is whether C-l's costs of 
avoiding the loss (viewing C-1 as the first-in-time 0) or those of J-2 or 
L (each a second-in-time P) are lower. 288 
Because J-2 and L have no practical means of determining that 
the securities involved are free of claims of /- l's customers (such as C-
1), they must choose among (i) eschewing the transactions with /-1, 
(ii) charging /-1 a higher interest rate (risk premium), and (iii) incur-
ring (and passing on to /-1) the costs of becoming bona fide purchas-
ers so as to cut off C -l's rights. Each of these choices is likely to 
involve material costs. 289 C-1 also lacks any practical means of pro-
tecting its interest against /-l's wrongful transfers once C-1 has 
elected to allow J-1 to control its securities in fungible bulk. But, ex 
ante, C- 1 has a near costless choice: C-1 can select another intermedi-
ary. 290 Because C -1 's marginal costs of avoiding the risks of losses 
win would encourage theft and "[w]e do not want an efficient market in stolen goods." Posner, 
supra note 271, at 71. A thief can transfer no better title than he has, which is none. See 
U.C.C. § 2-403(1) (stating shelter principle and, implicitly, rule of nemo dat). The lower-cost 
loss avoidance analysis projects an illusion of simplicity, but application can be enormously 
difficuit. See, e.g., Weinberg, supra note 269 (empirical and economic analysis of theft is in-
conclusive as to whether real owner cr good faith purchaser from thief should have priority); 
Levmore, Variety and Uniformity in the Treatment of the Good-Faith Purchaser, 16 J. Legal 
Stud. 43, 45 (1987) (arguing that treatment of goc<i faith purchaser of stolen goods is a "hard 
question" the answer to which is subject to reasonable disagreement within and among various 
societies). 
288 The theft scenario is distinguishable because C-1, in Example 1, chose to allow J-1 to 
c.ontrol C-1 's securities. In the theft example just mentioned, 0 did not voluntarily allow T to 
control the goods. It is also distinguishable as to the likely el!"ect of the priority rule on the 
behavior of 1-1. Posner argues that allowing a purchaser from a thief to cut otf a real owner's 
rights would encourage theft. Posner, supra note 271, at 71. Because an upper-tier securities 
claimant couid achieve such priority by becoming a bona fide purchaser, whether or not UTP 
were adopted, it is doubtful that UTP would encourage intermediaries such as 1-1 to misbe-
have by wrongfully transferring customer securities. 
289 In addition to the obvious costs of refusing to do business, imposing additional risk 
premiums, and achieving bona fide purchaser status (such as by " laundering" securities though 
a clearing corporation), efficiencies and co:>t savings may arise from the relations between the 
parties. For example, 1-2 may be acting as a carrying or clearing firm for I-l. &>.-e supra note 
262. It would disrupt the basis of the relationship between J-2 and 1-1 were yet another inter-
mediary to become involved in a secured loan from /-2 to I-1. 
290 It is not suggested that either selecting an intermediary or continued monitoring is 
costles.s. Rather, it is assumed that a lower-tier claimant's costs (such as investigation and 
com:ideration of reputation, financial condition, etc.) are sunk costs that have already been 
expended by the iower-tier claimant when it selected its intermediary and assumed the risks 
nowing from that S.':!ie-.::tion. Ongoing costs of monitoring can also be characterized as sunk 
costs for this analysis because it is a$Surned that Ihe low·:er-tier ciaimant is going to select an 
intenmx:liru-y in lU1Y event, and any ongoing cosG would be incurred in the face of risks im-
r..med under current law, whether or not UTP were in place. The statem -ent in the text aho 
assumes tht: existence of rc.adily available substitutr:::s for 1-J. Such substitut-es app-ear to be , 
::""1 
( 
i 
388 CARDOZO LAW RE VIEW 
occasioned by J-l's insolvency-by choosing another intermediary-:.... 
are less than the corresponding costs of 1-2 and L, moving from cur-
rent law to UTP would enhance efficiency.291 
Here is another way to compare upper- and lower-tier claimant 
costs of loss reduction were current law to change to UTP: Under 
current law, there are no means for a lower-tier claimant to achieve 
protection from the risk of substantial loss upon its intermediary's 
failure, short of choosing another intermediary. 292 Also under cur-
rent law, an upper-tier claimant can achieve seniority over earlier-in-
time lower-tier claims by becoming a bona fide purchaser. Conse-
quently, moving from current law to UTP would leave lower-tier 
claims with essentially unchanged prospects-substa..11tial risk of sub-
ordination. And UTP would enable upper-tier claimants to achieve 
seniority without incurring costs of becoming bona fide purchasers. 
It appears that the single, most powerful, control that a market 
participant can employ to reduce intermediary risk is to exercise pre-
caution by selecting an intermediary that will not fail. 29 3 A UTP rule 
available in the United States markets today, given the large number of securities firms and 
banks. 
291 Because a change in law can enrich the beneficiaries of the cha .-1ge (here, upper-tier 
claimants) and impoverish the losers (here, lower-tier claimants), the " wealth effects" of the 
change can affect the demand of both losers and winners. The results can be a1fected by the 
assumption as to who initially possesses the wealth that a proposed legal rule would seek to 
change. In an extreme case, a new legal rule that redistributes wealth could crea te a new world 
where it would be efficient to reinstate the old rule. See Carlson, Efficient, supra note 271, at 
649-51 (citing Scitovsky, A Note on Welfare Propositions in Economics, 9 R-::v. Econ. Stud. 77 
(194 1); Kennedy, supra note 271). "This never-ending modulat ion between two effic ient uni-
verses is called the 'Scitovsky Paradox.' " Carlson, Efficient, supra note 271 at 650. 
It i:> a plausible assumption that the wealth effec ts of a move from current law to UTP 
would be minimal or non-existent. Because lower-tier claimants vaJue the potentia i fo r senior-
ity to upper-tier claimants at zero or near-zero, UT P would rdlect the exi.>ting expectations of 
lower-tier claimants. As for upper-tier claimants, the actual subordinat!on of upper-tier claim-
ants to lower-tier claimants under current law is an infrequent occurrenc.e. It is unlikely that 
the demand of either class of claimants would be 1-'ifected materially. Nevertheless, question-
ing the efficiency of moving from cun·ent law to the new model gives the Oe'1e6t of any doubt 
to current law. Id ., at 650-51 & n .JO. 
292 See supra note 281. 
293 Cooter and R ubin articulated "four distinct elements of the [los~ n:duc~ \on ] principle's 
operation : precaution, innovation, responsiveness, ?.nd loaming." C.ooter & Rubin, supra note 
271, at 73. The process of ~eb:ting an intermedi.ary is the mos~ dire..~t means of exercising 
pr~:e.aution . Given the a<>Sumption that unsophisticated. d aimants are ad.~uately protec ted by 
SIPC and private insurance, it is re....-=t.SOnable to a.ssun1e that no signiflcant d iifer~nl2e,~ exist 
a.111ong other cla.imc.nts-whether upper·- or lower-tier-- in their abi1itit."S cr propensities to 
learn or resr-ond to risks impcr.;ed by legal rules. Ahi1ou~(h :1l1 ma;·:ket prtrticipants could avoid 
relationships with intermedia,--ies that would expose t~~i r intere-sts to ri.sks shoul d t.hase in -
termediaries fail, participa.1 ts must involve and ernpioy ~e{:uri ~i es inkrmediari es in order to 
par-ticip.ate in the market and, in theory , any such !ntermedi::ry could f:o;.il. 1nnov:::tion is dis-
cur~.d infra teAi uccotnpanying notes 305-09. Evidence of curr~nt m.~r~ ·::t bel12vior indicates 
th.at marke~ participants who are not fu ily protected by ,SIP(: B.nd p1~."-lat-:: inst~ra:nc•:: -~.n: highly 
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would place the risk of loss on C-1, the party that chose /-1 as its 
intermediary, and would promote J-2 and L in every case because 
" they did not choose /-1 as their intermediary to control the securities. 
But UTP would not mean that, in Example 1, C-1 would be forced to 
choose between refusing to do busir1ess with /-1 or being exposed to/-
l's credit and integrity risks. C-1 could have purchased securities 
from or through J-1 while choosing another intermediary to control 
the securities in order to avoid such exposure. 294 
Three other means of reducing or avoiding loss ought to be men-
tioned, but none is contrary to the notion that lower-tier claimants are 
the lower-cost loss avoiders. One means is to make it more likely that 
such intermediaries do not fail. The regulatory approach is directed 
to this end. 295 It is doubtful that either upper-tier or lower-tier claim-
ants are positioned to assert a material influence on the failure or sur-
vival of a securities intermediary through direct supervision.296 
However, to the extent that market participants are more or less likely 
to select a securities intermediary based on their assessments of its 
creditworthiness and integrity, and regulatory compliance market dis-
cipline might discourage intermediaries from engaging in risky activi-
ties or rnisbehavior. 297 The selection or rejection of an intermediary 
is, again, central. As among claimants against a given intermediary, 
:;elective in their relationship-s and choose to be exposed only to the possible failure of in-
termediaries that they perceive to be exceedingly unlikely to fail . The small incidence and 
amount of losses incurred by market participants who are not provided SIPC protection are 
consistent with this behavior pattern. See supra note 55. 
294 If C-1 were not an investor entitled to "delivery against payment" privileges, however, 
there could bie some short term risk between the time C -1 pays I -I for the securities and the 
time that a rransfer to C-1 is ef:fecterl on the books of another intermediary. Non-"delivery 
against payment" investors who choose to receive physical delivery of certificates are subject to 
the same .risks after payment to their intermediary until a certificate is delivered. 
29~ See generally supra notes 59-68 and accompanying text. 
296 By "direct" supervision I meal! policing activities such as audits, examinations and in-
spections. Although claimants might detect circumstances that regulators have overlooked, or 
at least discover them earlier, it seems unlikely that either lower-tier customers or upper-tier 
tra...'1sfere::s would improve materially on existing regulatory supervision. 
297 Monitoring by creditors of firms can discourage risk-taking (opportunistic) behavior. 
See, e.g., Macey & Garrett, Market Discipline by Depositors: A Summary of the Theoretical 
and Empirical Arguments, 5 Yale J. on Reg. 215, 223-39 ( 1988); Macey & Miller, Bank Fail-
ures, P..isk h1onitoring, and the Market for Bank Control, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1153, 1162-65, 
1172-91 ( 1988). Customers that are fully protected by SIPC, however, cannot be expected to 
provide effective monitoring. Tbe "moral hazard" problem is induced by analogous deposit 
insur&.!lCC prote-;;tion for depositors of depository institutions, and is exacerbated by market 
perceptions (and re2lity) that ail depositors have de facto deposit insurance protection. See 
Fischel, Rosenfield & Stiliman, The Regulation of Banks and Bank Holding Companies, 73 
Va. L Rev. 301, 313 (!987); Macey & Garrett, supra, at 236; Note, The "Brokered Deposit" 
Regulation: A Resp-onse to the FDIC's and FrlLBB's Efforts to Limit Deposit Insurance, 33 
UCLA L. R.~v . 594, 606 (1985). Thus, fi nancially weak depository institutions are not dis-
t:ua-::leJ by depositor C'-DflC'~m from undert;:k.ing risky, opportunistic behavior. 
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under both current law and UTP the risk is greatest for lower-tier 
claimants who allow the intermediary to control their securities. 
These claimants, then, may be the more accurate, thoughtful, and ef-
fective disciplinarians. 298 But even if upper-tier claimants are better 
monitors, for some of those claimants achieving bona fide purchaser 
status may be less costly and more reliable than monitoring. 299 
A second possible means of reducing or avoiding losses attributa-
ble to intermediary failures is to make it more likely that when in-
termediaries do fail there will be sufficient securities available to 
satisfy all claims, both upper- and lower-tier. 300 It is doubtful that 
either upper-tier or lower-tier claimants can monitor effectively the 
relationship between securities claimed through intermediaries and 
the securities available to satisfy those claims. 301 Establishing and 
complying with a system of public notice for claims to interests in 
fungible bulks of securities controlled by intermediaries would involve 
298 Intermediaries not often chosen by lower-tier claimants (except those who are fully pro-
tected by SIPC) may be exposed to little monitoring from any quarter except that imposed by 
regulatory requirements. For example, it is unlikely that ~mall securities firms would be cho-
sen to control portfolios of large investors regardless of the strength of market discipline. 
Lower-tier claimants may impose market discipline by rejecting certain intermediaries rather 
than by monitoring intermediaries with whom they have a relationship. In the absence of 
material unsecured creditors, such intermediaries are exposed to the "moral hazard" problem 
that is exacerbated by SIPC protection; only regulatorj restraints are available to discourage 
risky, opportunistic behavior. It does not follow, however, that efficiency concerns dicta~e that 
upper-tier claimants be exposed to risks of subordination to lower-tier claimants. Lower-tier 
claimants are not attracted to weaker intermediaries merely because of the limited potential for 
a windfall claim against an upper-tier claimant. And, under current law, upper-tier transferees 
of, and secured lenders to, such intermediaries (who, by hypothesis, are not willing to be ex-
pos..-"Xl to insolvency risks of a lower-tier intermediary who they would not choose to control 
their securities) might be driven away or might charge a higher 1;sk premium. r.·lore plausibly, 
in many cases the upper-tier claimants migi1t be forced to incur costs of ensuring that they 
achieve bona fide purchaser status. 
299 Stated otherwise, lingering subordination risks for upper-tier claimants do not necessar-
ily result in effective monitoring when there is a less costly way to obtain protection. M ore-
over, as between current law {bona fide purchaser protection) and UTP, UTP would result in 
even greater cost savings. 
300 Again, this is an important goal of the regulatory approach . 
301 In Example I, 1-2 and L have no feasible means of finding out about C-l's claims, 
whether the transfer from I -1 to C-1 occurs before or after the transfers to 1-2 and L. The 
same can be s.aid for C-1 as to the claims of / -2 and L . See supra note 110. This is in contrast 
to the case of transfers of interests in discrete goods. A prospective transfer~ of discrete good:> 
can reduce the "i1mocent purchaser risk" by investigating the source of its transferor's ti tle. 
See, e.g., Mo::lney, supra note 124, at 749-51; Weinberg, supra note 269, at 58·1. Similarly, ~n 
owner of goods can take precautions to reduce the risk of loss or theft . See, .:.g., R. Cooter & 
T. U1en, supra note 272, at 153-54; Wo:inberg, supra note 269, at 584. TI1e public notice prO'ti-
sions of Artide 9 also provide a means for a secur;;d party to obtain protc.:etion ag;:U i1st sube....e-
quent claims against goods collateral and for a pros~'Ctive purchaser to discover that a 
security interest may exist. U.C.C. §§ 9-302, 9-402. 
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enormous costs and would almost certainly be impracticable.302 Nor 
can lower-tier transferees effectively protect against subsequent trans-
fers to other transferees, some of whom may become bona fide pur-
chasers. 303 Even if either upper-tier claimants or lower-tier claimants 
could avoid or reduce loss at a lower cost by ascertaining the status of · 
conflicting claims to, and policing, the securities they claim, it is likely 
that the costs would swamp the benefits. 304 
The third means of reducing or avoiding loss is less obvious. Al-
locating losses to the class of claimants that can best cause loss reduc-
ing innovation in the marketplace might provide a more efficient 
means of loss reduction than would allocating losses on the assump-
tion that market structure and practices will remain more or less 
static. 305 But the potential for loss reduction through innovation is 
enormously difficult to assess. By definition, we cannot know specifi-
cally what the innovation would address, what techniques would be 
involved or whether any material degree of success could be 
achieved. 306 Even if innovation considerations were to favor allocat-
ing loss to upper-tier claimants, the benefits of that allocation might 
be insufficient tn offset the other lower-cost loss avoidance factors. 307 
302 See supra note 142. 
303 See supra notes 90-91 a.'1d accompanying text. 
304 Certain upper-tier claimants, such as carrying or clearing brokers for other (down-
stream) intermediaries, may have an information advantage over lower-tier claimants who are 
customers of th.:: carrying or clearing broker's downstream intermediary-customer. The carry-
ing or clearing broker is likely to have access to information concerning the customers of its 
customer. See Fitzpatrick & Carman, supra note 262, at 53-54. But the carrying or clearing 
broker's costs of verifying the absence of lower-tier customer claims probably would be prohib-
itively high. Carrying all.d clearing firms are subagents of their downstream intermediary-
customers who are, in turn, agents of their downstream customers. See id. at 63-64. Imposing 
on the can-ying or clearing i']rm the risk of wrongful instructions by its principal, with the 
associated costs of verifying such instructions with the customers of its principal, could offset 
the efficiencies wught to be obtained by carrying and clearing arrangements. 
305 See Cooter & Rubin, supra note 271, at 77-78. For example, the check hold limitations 
imposed by the Exv---Uited Funds Availability Act and Regulation CC issued thereunder were, 
in part, .intended to provide a il innovation incentive for banks to shorten the period for check 
collections and returns. See Expedited Funds Anilability Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 4001-10 (1988); 
12 C.F.R. pt. 229 (j990); Cooter & Rubin, Orders and Incentives as Regulatory Methods: Tne 
EApedited Funds Availability Act of 1987, 35 UCLA L. Rev. 1115, 1157, 1164-67 (1988). 
306 If we k.i1ew the answers to these questions then the steps to be taken would not consti-
tute innovation. 
307 Assume that C-! (in Example I) is a:n institutional investor such as an insurance com-
pany, investment company, mutual fund, or pension fund. Further assume that J-2 and L are 
securities firms, banks or other securities professionais. Arguably the sa:urities professionals 
would be better positioned than the institutional investors to influence innovation in the securi-
ties markets. B•Jt, if it is correct that the lower-tier claimants are otherwise the lower-cost loss 
avoiders, it would not be efficient to assign loss to upper-tier claimants unless innovation con-
siderations w;:re sur!lcient to offset the other lower-cost loss avoidance factors. In general, this 
would not .:;eem to be the c;>se (but one could never know for sure). If the goal of the loss 
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Moreover, most secunties professionals sometimes are upper-tier 
claimants and sometimes are lower-tier claimants. Because securities 
professionals sometimes are lower-tier claimants, and because of war-
ranties made by intermediaries to their customers, 30 8 substantial and 
adequate inducement for innovation may already exist. 309 
To sum up: the issue posed is whether to move from current law 
to UTP. The costs of achieving bona fide purchaser status imposed 
on upper-tier claimants, under current law, are likely to be less than 
the costs of either monitoring or innovation. If this is so, then upper-
tier transferees from intermediaries, who do not wish to allow those 
intermediaries to control the securities, are more likely to choose to 
achieve seniority over earlier-in-time lower-tier claimants by becom-
ing bona fide purchasers than to opt for uncertain protection from 
monitoring and innovation. Thus, even assuming that upper-tier 
claimants would be better (lower cost) monitors of intermediary sol-
vency, better monitors of the availability of securities to satisfy securi-
ties claims against intermediaries, and better innovators, 
consideration of these three additional means of loss reduction does 
not alter the initial conclusion that lower-tier claimants seem to be the 
lower-cost loss avoiders. 
allocation rule here were to encourage innovation by securities professionals, then loss might 
be allocated to upper-tier claimants in all cases rather than only in a limited set of cases as 
under current law. For reasons already explained, however, the analysis here assumes that the 
choice is between current law and UTP. See supra note 275. A strict L TP rule would materi-
ally increase costs to the upper-tier claimants without corresponding reductions of costs for 
lower-tier claimants. (Presumably, seniority to upper-tier claimants would not produce mate-
rial additional comfort to iower-tier claimants who would remain subject to dilution under the 
SIP A/Subchapter III risk spreading fonnula or the proportionate property interest fonnula.) 
And there would be no assurance that those costs ultimately would be reduced by successful 
innovation. Unlike the check collection context where Regulation CC applies, upper-tier 
claimants have a readily available protective alternative-obtaining bona fide purchaser status. 
Although becoming a bona fide purchaser can be costly for upper-tier claimants, it might be 
perceived as less costly than (potentially unsuccessful) innovation designed to allo•.v upper and 
lower-tier claimants to have their cake and eat it too. 
308 See generally infra Part V(B). 
309 The last twenty years have seen widespread innovation resulting from enormous efforts 
by the securities industry and regulators to reduce risk and enhance efficiency in securities 
trading, clearing, and settlement. See, e.g., supra notes 23-38 and accompanying text (develop-
ment and operation of DTC-NSCC clearing and settlement system); supra note 39 (new PTC 
system for clearing and settlement of Ginnie Mae transactions); supra note 49 (new GSCC 
system for netting in clearing and settlement of government sx uri ties trades); supra notes 8, 
171 and accompanying text (SIPC protection for customers of registered broker-dealers); DTC 
1989 Report, supra note 23 , at 22-34 (expansion of eligible issues by 19% during 1989 Same-
Day Funds Settlement System, municipal bond program, "book-entry only" securities, Institu-
tional Delivery System, automation of depository system, domestic ar.d interna tionai interfaces 
among clearing organizations); G-30 Report, supra note 11 (recommendations for cleanmce 
and settlement practices and sta.'1dards for major wcrld securit ies markets). 
i 
1 
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c. Loss Spreading and Risk Bearing 
The efficiency of a loss allocation rule also may be evaluated in 
terms of the principle of loss spreading. If, as a result of loss spread-
ing, lower-tier claimants can bear losses resulting from intermediary 
risk at a lower cost than upper-tier claimants, the latter would be will-
ing to pay the former to assume such losses and assigning losses to 
lower-tier claimants would promote efficiency.310 Loss spreading will 
be most effective when the party to whom losses are allocated can 
spread the losses among a large number of transactions or relation-
ships, when the expected losses are small in comparison to that 
party's capital, and when the occurrence of the losses are sufficiently 
frequent so as to be predictable.311 
At first blush, upper-tier claimants might seem to be more effec-
tive loss spreaders because they can be expected to have many securi-
ties intermediaries as customers or borrowers while lower-tier 
claimants normally select only a few intermediaries to control their 
securities.312 But losses arising from an intermediary insolvency do 
not fit the loss spreading paradigm-they are potentially quite large 
and the occurrence is relatively infrequent and unpredictable. Allo-
cating such losses either to upper-tier or lower-tier claimants based on 
a loss spreading rationale would be of doubtful wisdom. 313 Although 
SIPC protection for smaller claims is a means of spreading customer 
310 See, e.g., Cooter & Rubin, supra note 271, at 71 ("Whenever one person can bear risk at 
a lower cost than another, there is an op~ortunity for a mutually beneficial exchange, because 
risk averse people will pay risk neutral people to assume the risk of loss."); see also H. 
Denenberg, R. Eilers, J. Melone, & R . Zelten, Risk and Insurance 3-29 (2d ed. 1974) [hereinaf-
ter Denenberg]. It is not contemplat:xl here that either lower-tier or upper-tier claimants 
would actually pay members of the other class. Rather, the question posed reflects a technique 
of exploring whether one class or the other could better bf.ar the loss. 
31 1 See Cc'Oter & Rubin, supra note 271, at 7!. Loss spreading, or "pooling," is the basic 
economic p1inciple that underlies insuran~e. See Denenberg, supra note 3 i 0, at 10, 12-14. 
312 See supra note 57 and accompar1ying text. 
313 When the failed intermediary is a securities firm, under SIPA and tbe Bankruptcy Code 
the risk sharing formulation for claimants on the same tier is a form of loss spreading. So~ 
supra Pa,-t HL Would expanding that formulation to upper-tier claimants, including secured 
creditors such as l -2 :md L (in Exmnple 1) have merit as a method of loss spreading? Under 
that formulation, losses would be .>pre.ad au10ng upper- and lower-tier claimants rather than 
allocated to one cl::...ss or the other. See supra notes 243-246 and accompanying tee!.t (discussing 
a11d rejecting a similar interpretation of the U .C.C. § 8-313(2) proportionate property interest 
p.J.le). That approach ah o would not be likely to enhance efficiency. Although it would be 
more beneficial to up~r-tier cb.ima:1ts than subordinati.;;g their claims to lower-tier claims or 
reducing them to unsecured status, the ! O:',&;& would remain potentially quite large and unpre-
dicUJ.ble. This ris!c sharing approach may be wund whe:il applied on the sa<'!le tier, and it might 
be wise to extend it to non-sen:ritics firm intermediaries such as ban..l<.s, but it is doubtful that it 
would provide much comfort (i.e., redc;ction of risk anrsion) either to lower-tier claimants or 
to upper-tier claimants, ·.ri~wed ex a:nte. 
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losses among all SIPC members, 314 expanding SIPC coverage to 
larger claims also would be problematic. That approach could pro-
mote a "moral hazard" problem and reduce the level of care exercised 
by market participants in their selections of intermediaries.315 
Loss spreading aside, the following analysis suggests that lower-
tier claimants can better bear credit risks of their securities in-
termediaries. Keep in mind that the issue posed here is the efficiency 
of moving from current law to UTP. Because, under current law, 
lower-tier claimants are already subject to substantial intermediary 
credit risk, are likely to disregard any potential for seniority, and 
would likely disregard any potential for subordination under UTP, 
UTP would not materially affect their perceptions of that risk. 316 
And because C -1 would disregard the risk of subordination to a later-
in-time non-bona fide purchaser were UTP were the rule, C-1 would 
not choose another intermediary merely to avoid that subordination 
risk. Conversely, because of the other risks of loss and subordination 
31 4 The ultimate source of the SIPC fund is assessments against SIPC members--essentially 
all registered broker-dealers. See supra note 70. The imposed sharing, among participants, of 
losses arising out of defaults in the clearing and settlement process is another example of risk-
sharing. See supra note 32. 
3 1 s See supra notes 298-99. A strict lower-tier priority rule could have the same effect were 
it not for the ability of upper-tier claimants to achieve bona fide purchaser status. See supra 
note 275. Perhaps a moral hazard problem already exists under current law for certain securi-
ties intermediaries. See supra note 298. If so, it derives from the combined circumstances that 
current law awards seniority to upper-tier transferees, including secured creditors, who achieve 
bona fide purchase status, and SIP A provides protection for qualifying customer claims. As 
already explained, the impact on lower tier claimants, were seniority extended under UTP, 
would be minimal. See supra notes 275-84 and accompanying text. UTP's expanded subordi-
nation of lower-tier claims would, to the extent such claims are covered by SIPC, place corre-
sponding additional burdens on SIPC that, for the same reasons, would also be viewed as 
minima!. Whether a moral hazard problem resulting from inadequate private monitoring 
raises a broader concern that the recent bank and thrift insolvency debacle could be repeated 
for securities firms is beyond the scope of this article. See supra note 297 and accompanying 
text. But, experience to date suggests that regulation and supervision of s...<>curi ties fim1s gener-
ally has been effective. ~ supra notes 55, 65-68 and accompanying text . The willingness of 
:regulators to allow the private liquidation of Drexel, Burnham and Lambert, Inc., a1ising out 
of the chapter 11 filing by its parent corporation, suggests that de facto insurance by the fed-
eral government (t~upayers) of all creditors and customers of important securities firms is not 
HOW a reality. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
3 16 S<>...e supra notes 179-34 and accompanying te;ct. This observation also supports the prop-
osition that loss spreadi!!g is not appropriate in this context because only upp-er-tier claimants 
are risk sensit ive as to n change from current law to UTP. Again, 1 need not claim that a 
lower-tier claim.ant such as C-1 ne"""'""'>Sarily (or even probably) would become aware of :any 
deterioration of /- l's financial condiditon . C-1 might be quite sur-prised at J - l 's failure. !n-
de..'"d, I-1 itself might be surprised! The point, here, is that C-1 bears the substantial1isks ofi-
1 's failure anyway under current h:w1 as a result of selecting J- 1, and moving to UTP woul.d not 
nHte1ially increase those risks. Were I-2 and L aware of 1-l 's deterioration, they could take 
steps to bo-ccume bona fide purchasers under current hw, but C-1 would be no better off and l -
1 's .Ommcing costs would increase. 
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inherent in the selection of an intermediary, C-1 presumably would 
have selected another intermediary were it concerned about J-l's in-
tegrity or solvency. 317 Allocation of subordination risk to 1-2 and L 
under current law imposes costs on them that they perceive as greater 
than the costs that C-1 would perceive to be imposed on it were such 
risks allocated to it. It follows that upper-tier claimants such as /-2 
and L would, in theory, be willing to pay lower-tier claimants, such as 
C -1, in exchange for a move from current law to UTP, an amount 
that would be readily accepted by lower-tier claimants. Moving from 
current law to UTP would, then, enhance efficiency.31 8 Under UTP 
lower-tier claimants would assume the negligible additional risk only 
as to their chosen intermediary, while the insolvency and misbehavior 
risks imposed on upper-tier claimants would be reduced as to many 
more market participants in many more transactions. 3 19 
d. Costs of Predicting and Imposing Loss Allocation 
From the perspective of the set of market participants addressed 
in this analysis, legal rules that reduce enforcement costs promote effi-
ciency for these participants. 320 Loss allocation rules that are definite, 
clear, and simple impose lower costs than rules that are uncertain, 
unclear and complex.321 It is difficult to imagine a priority rule more 
definite, clear, and simple than UTP.322 But a strict lower-tier priority 
(LTP) rule would be equally clear. Although certainty of meaning 
and application alone may promote efficiency, that tells us nothing 
about the merits of the proposed UTP rule. 
A simple, lower-cost loss allocation rule sometimes may even 
hinder efficiency. For example, if a rule were to impose the loss on 
317 Given the inherent risks of intermediary insolvency or misbehavior, it is desirable for 
market participants to avoid selecting risky intermediaries to control their securities. 
31!! Again, the Kaldor-Hicks notion of efficiency does not contemplate that I -2 and L would 
actually pay C-1. See supra note 272. It is sufficient that the benefits to upper-tier claimants 
exceed the costs imposed on lower-tier claimants. 
319 See supra note 57. 
320 Sec Cooter & Rubin, supra note 271, at 78: 
One feature that ... [enforcement] mechanisms share is that they are costly; ... 
To achieve effici ency ... the enforcement process should be as inexpensive as 
possible. 
The most inexpensive approach to loss imposition would be to allow the losses 
to fall where they may. 
In a priority contest, however, it is impossible to let the loss '·fall wher-~ [it) may." 111e loss 
does not " fali" any...-l'lhere except <'.S the allocation is directed by a priority rule as inierpreted 
and applied by a court. 
3:21 See id. 
322 Issues prf:Sent under current law, such as timing of transfers, tracing of interests in se-
curities, denomination of accounts with intermediaries, and the like disappe'li when the new 
model is substituted for current law. See generally supra Part P/ . 
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the higher-cost loss avoider or on the pru.iy that is the least able to 
spread or otherwise bear losses, the overall effect could be less effi-
cient. 323 Because UTP appears to be the more efficient rule based on 
consideration of other factors, the lower costs of imposing the loss 
allocation, when compared with costs of a property law construct, 
could further enhance the efficiency of UTP. It is probable that any 
priority rule for fungible bulks of securities that follows a property 
law construct would involve substantial complexity and uncer-
tainty.324 One might continue to explicate with layers of rules and 
exceptions, hoping that all of the possible scenarios would be covered, 
but one could never be sure that something had not been missed. 325 
Existing and proposed rules that purport to apply traditional property 
law doctrine in this context appear to fit this hypothesis in every 
case. 326 Although in theory the traditional approach could produce 
simplicity and certainty, it has not done so and I see no prospects on 
the horizon. 
A more successful model for loss allocation could reduce costs 
for securities market participants in circumstances other than the in-
frequent ex post resolution of disputes and the enforcement of rights. 
The most significant effect of a more clear and definite priority rule 
could be the resulting certainty and predictability, ex ante, necessary 
323 See Cooter & Rubin, supra note 271, at 84 (""\Vhen the principles converge, the best rule 
is obvious, but when they diverge, their relative economic effects must be compared to deter-
mine which legal rule minimizes their combined effect.") (footnote omitted). 
324 For example, an attempt to achieve the result of UTP could follow a property law con-
struct. The priority rule, to be applied inside and outside of insolvency preceedings, might 
provide that transfers of interests in securities to lower-tier clt>imants will always be subject to 
interests of upper-tier claimants a.-1d that transfers to upper-tier claimants will always be free of 
(or senior to) interests of lower-tier claimants. This is the approaci1 ta..\en by the Proposed 
TRADES Regulations, supra note 7, in the limited context of ' 'clearing lien p1iority." See 
supra note 233. If UTP produces the more efficient outcome, then such a priority rule would 
be an improvement over current law. But, the costs of impvsing and applying that rule might 
remain relatively high. If, at the times transfers were made to the uppu-tier and lower-tier 
claimilllts, there were sufficient securities controlled by the int\':rmediary to satisfy all ciaims, 
that priority rule would not resolve the dispute. It '.•!Ould be ntc:ess..-::trj to determine, also, 
whether securities that were transferred to bona fide purchasers prior to the intermediary's 
insolvency, and securities that remain, were the securities previous!;; transferred to the upper-
tier claimants or thO& transferred to the lower-tier claima11ts. Some sort of tracing system 
would be necessary . 
325 Layers of ·explic<ltion do not ne.~essarily add to cla..-ity, much le;;s simplici ty . See "t>.ian-
ning, HyperL:xis JJ.J.>d the Law of Conservation of A.mbiguity: T r.ought3 on &..->ction 385, 36 
Till Law. 9, 11 ( !982): 
Elaboration in drafting does not result in reduced 2n.1biguity . . .. In physics, 
we are all fainiliar 'hith the Law of Conservation of Enerzy; i:<1 law, th.:re is an 
analogous Law of Conservation of Ambiguity . 
326 See generaUy supra Part IV (discus:;ing dilfer.::nt-ticr pr:ior i<i<;;S und ;~r pa:- 1978 and 1978 
r\rticle 8, exi~tbrg Book-Entr.t 'Treasury Regulat!on~, a..11d Proi~-~JEei_1 ~f'R.A.DES Regulations). 
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for market participants to reduce costs and adjust their transactions 
and relationships accordingly. 327 In this respect, ex ante, UTP would 
provide much greater certainty than an L TP rule. Because it is im-
possible to discover the status of potentially conflicting claims to fun-
gible bulks of securities controlled by tiers of intermediaries on a real 
time basis, the only fact that a market participant can be sure of is the 
identity of the intermediary it selects to control securities on its be-
half. But, under an LTP regime, an upper-tier intermediary, such as 
I-2 (in Example 1), could not safely warrant good "title" to its cus-
tomer, such as L, 328 because J-2 could not, ex ante, determine the 
status of the lower-tier claims of I-l's customers.329 Under UTP, an 
intermediary, such as J-2, could extend broad warranties to its cus-
tomers by exercising care in the selection of its own intermediary, 
such as J-3, who it selects to control securities on its behalf. 
e. Observations 
The claim that moving from current law to UTP would lower 
costs for market participants and thereby promote efficiency (for 
those participants) seems to be supported by reasonable assumptions. 
But, as with many economic analyses of law, the absence of compel-
ling empirical data and the simplicity of manageable models means 
that this claim must remain uncertain. Yet lawmakers, unlike schol-
ars, must act based on available evidence, while recognizing that inac-
tion is itself an equally profound decision to leave the law as it is. 
Rejection of UTP because, like any priority rule, its wisdom is inher-
ently uncertain would be paralyzing. It would defer to existing law by 
default. Additionally, it would miss the point that there is little to 
commend the arbitrary and fortuitous results achieved under the cur-
rent property law construct that sometimes favors lower-tier claim-
ants and sometimes favors upper-tier claimants. 
2. Analogues and Comparisons Under Current Law and Doctrine 
The proposed UTP rule would not seek to trace property rights 
327 ~iiarJ.y lawyers have pointed out to me that the precess of preparing and negotiating legal 
opinions dealing with transfer and pledge of securities is very time consuming, expensive, and 
unsatisfying to them and their ciients. Presumably market participants would welcome reduc-
tions of these costs. I v.i li !eave to others the argument that putting lawyers out of work could 
have adver.;e consequences for society as a whole. 
328 A broad intermediary warranty would be an essential component of a UTP priority 
scheme. See infra Part V(B). 
329 In malr.Jng such a warranty in an LTP scheme /-2 would bear the solvency/integrity 
!isks as to every one of its customers who are also securities intermediaries for lower-tier 
claimants. 
.~ ......... 
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and sort out conflicting claims based on property law doctrine such as 
tracing, first-in-time, and bona fide purchase. Instead, it treads the 
route of the risk sharing formula that is the fundamental loss alloca-
tion principle among same-tier customers of an insolvent securities 
firm. Moreover, the result of a UTP rule is consistent in many re-
spects with results under current doctrine in other contexts. 
a. Negotiability and Bona Fide Purchase 
UTP would leave intact the current rule that a transferee of an 
interest in a fungible bulk through an intermediary cannot achieve 
bona fide purchaser status. 330 It would change current law by modify-
ing the baseline priority rule of first-in-time that applies as among 
non-bona fide purchasers. 331 
The essence of negotiability is that a transferee of a negotiable 
instrument can acquire it free of competing claims of ownership. 332 
The conventional wisdom is that the attributes of negotiability are 
essential to the market. 333 Even a critic of the broad application of 
the negotiability doctrine in Article 3 acknowledges that negotiability 
is useful in a market where instruments, such as securities, are ac-
330 See supra note 92. 
331 See generally supra Part IV. 
332 Under Article 3 a "holder in due course" of a negotiable instrument ta..\es free of con-
flicting claims to the instrument {and free of most of the obligor's defenses to payment). 
U.C.C. §§ 3-302, -305. Similarly, under Article 8, a certificated security is a "negotiable in-
strument" and a "bona fide purchaser ... acquires his interest in the security free of any 
adverse claim." U.C.C. §§ 8-105(1); 8-302{3); see supra notes 90-9 1 and accompanying text. 
A central component of the negotiability doctrine is the "merger" or "reification" of the obli-
gations of the obligor or issuer of the instrument with the pie---..,e of paper itself. See, e.g. , 
Gilmore, The Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase, 63 Yale L.J. 1057, 1064 (1954). 
333 See, e.g., Rosenthal, Negotiability-Who Needs It?, 71 Colum. L. Rev. 375, 376 (1971) 
("It is generally assumed, without careful inquiry, that protection of the good faith purchaser 
helps the flow of commerce."). For discussions of the historical development of the negotiabil-
ity doctrine for commercial paper and investment securities under common Jaw and later 
codifications, see Rogers, Myth, supra note 1 5; Gilmore, supra note 332, at 1062-76; Gilmore, 
Formalism and the Law of Negotiable Instruments, 13 Creighton L. Rev. 441 passim (1979) 
[hereinafter Gilmore, Formalism]. It seems obvious that requiring purchasers of securities to 
undertake an investigation of the provenance of the securities as a means of achieving assur-
ance of good title would impose substantial transaction costs and reduce efficiency. Nor would 
a filing or recording system make sense. See supra note 142. But, if protecting purchase;s 
were the only consideration in sorting out competing property claims, then perhaps other per-
sonal property, such as goods and chases in action, should be made fully negotiable. Because a 
bona fide purchaser cuts off adverse claims, the negotiability doctrine necessarily impairs the 
property rights of adverse claimants, including those with legitimate claims. Negotiability, 
then, intelferes with the interests of preeJt.isting claimants. When an owner of property does 
not have assurance that its interest is protected against subsequent claims, such as those of a 
bona fide purchaser, costs are imposed that can reduce the efficiency of a market. How the law 
deals with such conflicting claims ultimately must reflect a b2lance b.~tween the interests of 
purchasers and preexisting claimants. 
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tively traded. 334 Article 8 experts have proclaimed that negotiability 
is a central, even essential, element of a legal regime dealing with 
transfers of securities. 335 But, if negotiability is so crucial to the mar-
ket's operation, why do a large number of high-volume, high-value 
market participants forego bona fide purchaser status?336 
There are at least two good answers to this question. 337 First, the 
structure and operation of modern securities markets is incompatible 
with the notion that transferees will routinely become bona fide pur-
chasers. 338 Second, even if many important market participants do 
not routinely achieve bona fide purchaser status, it may be important 
that some securities intermediaries can become bona fide purchasers 
334 See Rosenthal, supra note 333, at 398 & n.97 ("[T]here appears to be a strong commer-
cial need to continue the protection of the good faith purchaser . .. [of] investment securi-
ties .. . [which] are expected to be transferred with some frequency.") (emphasis in original); 
see also Gilmore, Formalism, supra note 333, at 454 ("[T]he law of negotiable instruments 
reflects the market; if instruments, whatever their form, do not circulate in a market, the nego-
tiability idea becomes irrelevant."). 
3 3 .5 See, Aronstein, Haydock & Scott, supra note 5, at 895-96 (observing, in response to the 
question posed by Rosenthal, supra note 333, that "just about everybody that deals in securi-
ties" needs negotiability). 
336 Aside from the securities firms and banks that participate directly in a depository-clear-
ing system, and Dis with book-entry treasury securities accounts at the Fed, it is the norm for 
important market participants not to become bona fide purchasers. See generally supra Part I. 
337 A third answer is that negotiability is not crucial to the operation of the securities mar-
kets. See Rogers, Negotiability as a System of Title Recognition, 48 Ohio St. L.J. 197 (1987) 
[hereinafter Rogers, Title Recognition]; see also Rogers, Irrelevance, supra note 15. Rogers 
argues that negotiability does not operate as a title recognition system for Article 3 instruments 
drawn or made to order or for Article 8 certificated securities in registered form, primarily 
because the existence of a forged indorsement on such paper prevents a transferee from becom-
ing a holder in due course or a bona fide purchaser. Rogers, Title Recognition, supra note 15, 
at 211-14. In the c.ase of registered securities, Rogers explains that the risk of prior ownership 
claims are solved not by the bona fide purchase rule but by re-registrations of securities on the 
issuers' books, thereby allowing the transferee to take free of any claim of unauthorized in-
dorsement Id. at 214-1 5 & n.72; see U.C.C. § 8-311(a); pre-1978 § 8-311(a). Consistent with 
Rogers' thesis, DTC routinely reregisters deposited securities in its nominee's name. See DTC 
1989 Report, supra note 23, at 22, 35 ("Registration of securities deposits in DTC's Cede & 
Co. nominee name enables the depository to: Promptly determine whether certi.ficates are 
tnmsferablc or whether replacement secu1ities should be required from the depositing Partici-
pant. . . . On rer.-eipt of registered cert ificates, quick transfer into DTC's nominee name, Cede 
&. Co., allows for pro.mpt validation of certificates." ). !s:mers normally protect themselves 
against liability to prior owners by obtaining signature guarantees covering all indorsements. 
See Roger-s, Title Recogr>ition, supra, at 214 n.72; U.C.C. § 8-312(1); pre-1978 § 8-312(1). 
Rogers fails to confront the fact that payment settlement for securities trades normally occurs 
at or jn-ior tv the time of d·elivery, not at the time of a successful reregistration. However, his 
argument c<m 1Y= saved because a transferee who is unsuccessful in an attempt to reregister 
be.;ause of m1 unauthorized indorsement also can rely on a signature guarantee. That the 
systern r>C:Sts on uns.xured obligations of banks issuing signature guara;1tees further supports 
the c1e-~mph1'..5i3 of property rules and underscores the crucial role of financial institution credit 
in the &ecurities markets. 
33S &t supra notes 23-51 , 9D-95 and accompanying text. 
400 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12:305 
by taking physical deliveries or through book entries on the books of a 
clearing corporation. 
Transfers on the books of a clearing corporation provide the 
strongest analogic support for UTP. Although these transfers can 
confer bona fide purchaser status, 339 they seem to be equally as devi-
ant from the paradigm of physical delivery of a negotiable instrument 
as other transfers of interests in a fungible bulk effected on the books 
of an intermediary.340 Because securities transferred on the books of a 
clearing corporation generally consist of a fungible bulk controlled by 
the clearing corporation, the interest of a transferee would be subject 
to the proportionate property interest rule of section 8-313(2). 341 
Nevertheless, clearing corporations generally are not perceived to im-
pose credit and misbehavior risks on market participants as great as 
those imposed by other securities intermediaries. 342 
Conceptual distinctions and similarities aside, conferring bona 
fide purchaser status on clearing corporation participai'1t-transferees 
seems to provide benefits to the marketplace. Not only does the bona 
fide purchaser transferee take free of adverse claims of other partici-
pants in the clearing corporation, but it takes free of all adverse claims 
of all/ower-tier claimants in the chain below the transferor. The qual-
ity of the interest received by downstream customers of a clearing 
339 See U.CC. §§ 8-3l3(1Xg), 8-320; pre-1978 §§ 8-313(1)(e), 8-320; supra note 95. 
340 See U.C.C. § 8~3l3(1Xd)(ii)-(iii). The transfer of an interest in a fungible bulk of securi-
ties through, and on the books of, an intermediary (including a clearing corporation) bears 
little resemblance to the physical delivery of a specific certificated security to a transferee that 
becomes a bona fide purchaser. The transferee on an intermediary's books sees nothing but the 
intermediary's confirmation, and even a confirmation is not required in the case of clearing 
corporation book-entry transfers. U.C.C. § 8-313(1Xg); pre-1978 § 8-313(1)(e). A fungible 
bulk of securities is the antithesis of a discrete certificate, and the transferee lacks any meaning-
ful method of ascertaining the existence or size of the fungible bulk and the other claims that 
may be asserted to or against it. Because a clearing corporation normally has physical control 
of securities registered in its nominee's name, the transferee cannot effectively prevent the 
clearing corporation from later transferring superior rights to a third person. And, the trans-
feree must be concerned with the creditworthiness and integrity of the clearing corporation. 
See generally supra Part III. 
341 See U.C.C. §§ 8-313(2) (second sentence) (proportionate propercy interest of claimant to 
a fungible bulk), 8-313(4) (clearing corporation is a financial intermediary); pre- 1978 § 8-
313(2) (second sentence); supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text. Note that because DTC 
is a banking corporation (a New York limited purpose tmst company) and is not a registered 
broker-dealer, neither SIP A nor Subchapter III would impose the risk sharing formulation on 
customer property were DTC to fail. See supra notes 170, 199-200. 
342 No doubt that perception stems from the regulated nature of clearing corperations, their 
ownership, and the fact that they do not trade in securities for their own account. S.x U.C.C 
§ 8-102(3) (defining clearing corporation); pre-1978 § 8-102(3) (same); see also Aronstein, 
Haydock & Scott, supra note 5, at 909 ("To suggest that a clearing corporation would intc.:n-
tionally permit a participant or anyone else to acquire the power to transfer its secUlities fli;::s 
in the face of reality."). 
l 
; 
l 
; 
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corporation participant-transferee, and other lower-tier claimants in 
the downstream chain from that transferee, are indirectiy enhanced 
by the cleansing effect of a dearing corporation transfer at the top of 
the chain. 343 
UTP fits comfortably within the clearing corporation transfer 
paradigm. Indeed, the sharpest vision of seniority for clearing corpo~ 
ration pa..rticipant-transferees appears from recognizing such treat-
ment as a discrete example-a subset-{)f the more general principle 
of UTP. Although current law generally rejects bona fide purchaser 
treatment for transferees of interests in fungible bulks through in-
termediaries; transfers through clearing corporations are exceptional 
because they essentially occur only at the top tier. 344 It follows that 
the result for clearing corporation transferees under current law 
would not be changed by UTP. UTP would, however, confer senior-
ity on transferees on the books of any intermediary over claimants on 
lower tiers, recognizing that each tier is the "top tier" as to claimants 
through intermediaries on all lower tiers. 
UTP would complement negotiability as embodied in Article 8 
by providing a priority scheme, other than first-in-time, as among 
market participants that do not achieve bona fide purchaser status. 
343 Such downstream clai:ma.:1ts ~n..::t1t directly or indirectly from the shelter principle. See 
U.C.C. § 8-301(1); pre- !978 § 8-301(1); supra note 88. Moreover, clearing corporation partici-
pants would be unli.k.ely to undertake warranty and contractual obligations to customers in the 
absence of assurance that they have received good title to securities involved. See infra Part 
V(B) (discussing warra.11ty obligations of securities intermediaries). 
344 Assuming a cleariiJ.g corporation is at the top tier, the same result would be obtained 
under UTP whether or not bona fide purchaser status were conferred on clearing corporation 
book-entry transferees. Ho wever, s.xuritics transferred pursuant to 1978 and pre-1978 § 8-320 
can be controlled by a dearing corporation through a custodian bank or another clearing 
corporation and, consequently, are not necessarily at the highest tier. U.C.C. § 8-320(1)(a); 
pre-1978 § 8-320(1)(a) . Tius apyroach can be rationaliz_.-d on the basis of the inherent safety 
perceived to be associated with clearing corporation controi generally. See supra note 342. 
The wisdom of bona fide purchaser status for clearing corporation participant transferees has 
been questioned, apparentl;: on the basis that clearing corporations are conceptually the same 
as other fLmncial i~•ter.nediarie."\ . A:romt~in, Haydock & Scott, supra note 5, at 909-10 & n.99. 
But the vision of a cle.'lJing •::orpon.t~on 3.t the top tier effectively neutralizes this criticism. 
Bona fide purcha.oer status for a transferee under U.C.C. § 8-313(\)(c) (cu;;tomer nru:ne securi-
ties) a..-1d § 8-313(d)(i) {:rpecifio;_Uy ident&ed certifi ·~tfXi securities) also conforms to this vi-
sion. See U.C.C § 8-313( i ){c), (d)(i); pre-1978 § 8-3l3(l)(b)-(c). Because such a transferee';; 
interm.;>.dia!"'J (though it is not a clec;.:.""ing corpor:ottion) is in possession of a specific certificated 
sex:uri!y, that intenn•.!diuy is ::1t the top of the chain and th.~re ca..1 be no upper-tier daimani:s. 
To the extent that the de<;t,-ine of constmc1ive po~;::cssion applie:;, however, the analogy admit-
tedly is weakened. See supra note 22 1. fkYua fid;; pmchar>;;r treatment for transferees of 3p<Oeif-
ically identifiect s.<;,; ;J ri ti~ ruse has been :.:riiicized on the basis that risks are greater when 
securities an~ -:DntroJl.xJ by "c·rdinarj" irrtermcdiarics thai! by clearing corporations. Aron-
~tei.Il, I-Iaydct::k ~"t Scot i.; 3Uprc., at 91 C. But that treatrneni: CSJl be rationaliu.""<l by re.r_.og:nizing 
that such identifi cations ru ;;; un us•Ja1 ::.~:mJ norm'.'.lly occur only in the pro::ess of mf!.ki.ng a physi-
caJ d.etivcry to a cu.~tvr!.Jo: r . S-.:.-e i-\.pp-.:: :1dL-x. II, infra note 8. 
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And it would provide a clearer doctrinal rationale for Article 8's 
treatment of bona fide purchaser status in cases that do not conform 
to the physical delivery paradigm. 
b. Entrustment and the Like: Putting Goods and 
Securities "In Play" 
An "entrusting of possession of goods to a merchant who deals in 
goods of that kind" empowers the merchant "to transfer all rights of 
the entrustor to a buyer in [the] ordinary course of business."345 As 
between the entrustor and certain buyers, this rule recognizes that the 
loss should fall on the en trustor. The same can be said of the subordi-
nation of trust beneficiary claims to the rights of good faith purchas-
ers of trust property from trustees. 346 UTP embraces a similar result. 
By allowing J-1, its securities intermediary, to control its securities, a 
lower-tier claimant such as C-1 has put the securities "in play." UTP 
would subordinate the lower-tier claim to those of subsequent upper-
tier transferees like J -2 and L. 347 
Although UTP is faithful to the principle of the entrustment par-
adigm, it varies from it in certain matters of detail. 348 There are other 
U.C.C. analogues to UTP that subordinate or cut off the rights of 
those who put property in the control of others, 349 although these 
analogues also differ from each other in detail and context. UTP is 
somewhere near the mainstream of a general principle that appears in 
34:5 U.C.C. § 2-403(2)-(3); see U.C.C. § 1-201(9) (defining "buyer in ordinar; coursP. of busi-
ness"). See generally R. Brown, supra note 206, § 9.7, at 202-06; Leary & Speriing, The Outer 
Limits of Entrusting, 35 Ark. L. Rev. 50 ( 1981 ). For a critical view of the reach of the entrust-
ment doctrine, see Gilmore, The Good Faith Purchase Idea and the Unifonn Commercial 
Code: Confessions of a Repentant Draftsman, 15 Ga. L. Rev. 605, 618-19 (1981). 
346 See supra note 258 and accompanying text. 
3 47 C-1, by not ta.!Ung possession of A Co. and B Co. securities or causing them to be 
transferred to C-1 through an intermediary other than J-1, has put J-1 in a position to confer 
bona fide purchaser status on 1-2 and L. UTP would provide :s<:niority to 1-2 and L without 
their need to incur (and pass on to J-1) the costs of ~oming lxma fide purchasers. 
348 The differences flow from differences in context rather tha."l principle. For example, the 
entrustment rule favm-s a relatively narrow class of beneficiaries - "buyers in ordinary course 
of l>usiness." See supra note 345. UTP would prov1de seniority for any upper-tier transferee, 
including a secured party who could not qualify as a "buyer in ordinary coursi! of business." 
U.C.C. § 1-201(9). In effect, UTP would conclusively presume that transfers b-etween and 
among securities intermediaries and investors are ordinary course transactions. 
3 49 For example, one with property rights in goods that predate the bailment of the goods 
and the issuance of a negotiable document of title generally will reLun senior rights in the 
goods even if the document subsequently is duly n~gotiated. U.C.C. §§ 7-502(1), 7-503(1). 
But, when the earlier clairmmt to property rights has itself put the goods in the stream of 
commerce, its rights will be cut off by a sulY"_,e{juent daima:1< to whom the document is duly 
negotiated. U.C.C. § 7-503(1.). The interest of a consign::;r of gcorls delivered to another per-
son for sale also may be subordinated to claims of creditors of the person in possession of the 
goods unless the consignor complies with certain public notice requirements. U.C.C. § 2-326. 
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various contexts under current law--one who puts property in a 
stream of commerce may be exposed to having its rights cut off 
or subordinated by certain classes of later-in-time competing 
claimants. 350 
c. Money and Bank Accounts 
The treatment of money and bank accounts also lends support to 
a new model not based on a property law construct. 35 1 Money con-
sists largely of unsecured claims against banks--deposits. 352 The in-
adequacy of physical deliveries of currency as a means of payment in 
a commercial society is obvious. It is hard to imagine a legal regime 
that routinely would resolve the rights of bank depositors among 
themselves and others by tracing property interests in currency in or-
der to determine who ultimately "owned" the currency.353 The sys-
350 As to upper-tier claimants that are earlier-in-time, the subordination of lower-tier claim-
ants, resulting from denial of bona fide purchaser status under current law, is consistent with 
the nemo dat principle. See supra note 88. It also conforms to certain provisions of the U .C.C. 
and other law that may apply when a buyer leaves a seller in possession. For example, the 
better (but not uniform) view is that a buyer will not be entitled to "buyer in ordinary course of 
business" status unless it obtains possessory rights in goods (which normally means that deliv-
ery must have occurred). See Frisch, Buyer Status Under the U.C.C. : A Suggested Temporal 
Definition, 72 Iowa L. Rev. 531, 556-67 (1987). But see Tanbro Fabrics Corp. v. Deering 
Milliken, Inc., 39 N.Y.2d 632, 350 N.E.2d 590, 385 N.Y.S.2d 260 (1976) (buyer in ordinary 
course of business can take free of security interest under § 9-307(1) even though seller's se-
cured party is in possession of goods). The retention of possession by a seller also might con-
stitute a fraudulent conveyance. See, e.g., Mooney, supra note 124, at 726-29 and authorities 
cited therein. 
35 I Tracing the evolution of money and payment mechanisms from the exchange of tanzible 
currency (including privately issued negotiable instruments) to the exchange of unsecured 
claims against banks (deposits) is beyond the scope of this article. See generally W. Carlile, 
The Evolution Of Modem Money (1901 & photo reprint 1967); J. Hurst, A Legal History Of 
Money In The United States, 1774-1970 (1973); J. Galbraith, Money, Whenc.;: It Came, 'Nhere 
It Went (1975); J. Melitz, Primitive And Modem Money (1974). Yet even a superficial consid-
eration of the role of banks as intermediaries in the payment system may provide some insights 
for the securities world. 
352 A bank deposit normally creates a debtor-·creditor relationship between the bank and the: 
depositor (customer). See 5A Michie On Banks And Banbng 1 (1983 Replacement); 9 C .J.S. 
Banks and Banking § 267(c), at 546 (1938 & Supp. 1990). The new U .C.C. Article 4A-
Funds Transfers provides a striY-ing example of the extent to which claims against banks typi-
cally constitute money: A payment to a payee is completed when the payee's bank becomes 
obligated to the payee. U .C.C. § 4A-104(1) & comment 1 (1989). Article 4A also rer.ognizes 
the overarching significance of the selection of a particular intermediary bank by the sender of 
a payment order. U.C.C. § 4A..0,02(3) (1989) (sender who specifies routing through a particu-
lar intermediary bears risks of that intermediary's insolvency or legal inabiiity to complete 
payment order). 
353 T racing principles are applied, however, as a:rnong and between certain claimants to 
funds commingled in the same bank account. for critiques of these principles, see generl.'.l ly 
Oesterle, Deficiencies of the Restitutionary Right to Trace :Misappropriated Property in Equity 
and in U.C.C. § 9-306, 68 Cornell L. Rev. 172 (1983); Rogers, Negotiability, supra note 15. 
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tern for transfer and pledge of interests in fungible bulks of securities 
has come to resemble the system of bank deposits in that these trans-
fers and pledges typically take place through book entries on the 
books of intermediaries. Yet the legal regime continues to treat prop-
erty interests in fungible bulks of securities more like property inter-
ests in currency than accounts with intermediaries. 
The effects of intermediary insolvencies on securities customers 
and securities market operations are similar in several respects to the 
effects of bank insolvencies on depositors' claims and funds transfer 
systems. Small customer claims, like small depositor claims, are pro-
tected by a form of "insurance."354 If there are insufficient securities 
to satisfy customer claims, most customers will share pro rata , 355 as is 
the case for uninsured depositors in a bank insolvency who are treated 
as general creditors. 356 In many (but not all) cases claims of custom-
ers of a securities intermediary will be junior to claimants that are 
transferees on an upper tier, 357 and, in any event, tracing of property 
interests in securities is often impracticable. If a bank or a securities 
firm fails, depositors and customers alike may well be losers. 
Certainly there are important functional and legal differences be-
tween bank deposits and securities claimed through intermediaries. 358 
But consider that securities generally were not treated as negotiable 
instruments until this century.359 And only in last few decades have 
securities market practices and transaction volume demonstrated that 
physical deliveries and the routine establishment of issuer-beneficial 
owner relationships are not feasible. 360 Because the functional simi-
larities of bank-depositor and securities intermediary-customer rela-
354 Deposit accounts up to $100,000 are insured by the FDIC. 12 U.S.C. § 1817(i), 132l(a) 
(1989); 12 C.F.R. § 330.2, 330.10 (1990). See supra notes 8, 171 (S!PC protection for custom-
ers of registered broker-dealers). 
3 5 5 See generally supra Part HI. To the extent that SIPC satisfies customer dairns it is 
subrogated to those daims and, accordingly, shares pro rata with other customer d aims not so 
satisfied. Se;: SIPA, § 9(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78/li(9)(a). 
356 12 U .S.C. § 194 (1983); see fv:!acey & Garrett, ~upra note 297, at 217; Note, supra note 
297, tJ.t 617. Customer claims in respect of customer property, however, are senior to general 
creditor claims under SIPA and Subchapter HI. See supra notes 173-78 and accompanying 
text. 
3 5 7 See generally supra Part tV. 
3 58 Because all dollars are inherently fungible, depositors' claims aga.imt banks are different 
f;-om claims to specific types of securities controlled by securities intermediaries. Imked, 
;:10ney is the medium through wh!ch all claims ultimately can be satisfl.>::d. Moreover, banks 
aeate money; bank deposits are no t "backed up" by equal value in currency or other re--,erves 
of money-l ike qua.iity. See, e.g., M. Stigum , The Money Market 13-15 (rev. eci. 1983). To use 
Article 8 terminology, banks are analogous to " issuers" of deposit obligations. Securities, 
however, are not suppos.~d to i:>e "created" by securities intermooia.ries. 
359 See generally Gilmore, supra note 332, at 1072-76. 
J 60 See generally supra notes 23-5 1, 125 and accompanying text. 
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tionships are of such recent origin, it is not surprising that the 
property construct persists so strongly in the legal regime for transfers 
of securities. In this sense, a new model such as UTP can be viewed 
as an appropriate adjustment of the legal regime to the realities of 
market expectations and behavior. 
d. Observations 
Where UTP would override the first-in-time principle it finds 
support in analogous exceptions elsewhere in the U.C.C. Although 
the general conformity with analogous doctrine does not, alone, 
demonstrate the wisdom of UTP, this consistency in result does pro-
vide support for UTP when considered together with economic analy-
sis grounded on reasonable assumptions and the fact that the details 
of good faith purchaser treatment are something on which reasonable 
people can disagree. The harmony also indicates that UTP is viable 
on practical as well as conceptual grounds361 and is not likely to con-
flict with widely held normative views. 362 
B. The Corollary: Broad Intermediary Warranties 
UTP contemplates that the transferee of an interest in a fungible 
bulk of securities on the books of an intermediary may look only to 
that intermediary for satisfaction. As a general proposition, one 
would expect the intermediary to be legally obligated to make avail-
able to the transferee the benefits of ownership, free of adverse claims, 
of the securities transferred-in effect, a warranty of good title. 363 In 
361 Because UTP contemplates a change in law, it cannot claim complete support from the 
existing legal regime. But it can be characterized as an evolutionary step that would conform 
the law to existing practices and expectations. See Clark, Abstract Rights Versus Paper Rights 
Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 84 Yale L. J. 445 {1975). Clark analyzes 
the "paperizing" of abstract rights into a single piece of paper (such as a negotiable promissory 
note or a certificated security) and the more "advanced" "recording principle'" whereby priori-
ties are determined by a system of public notice. ld. at 478-79. Clark concludes that no partic-
ular p1inciple for ordering priorities is necessarily superior in all contexts. Id. at 479 ("One 
must look instead for the priority rule which, within a mixed system and in particular context 
of commercial practices and expectations, will most efficiently reduce .. . costs."). 
362 See Phillips, Culpability, supra note 205, at 29{) ("[T]he commercial culpability scale [a 
normative pattern in the U .C.C.] can be a powerful tool both to understand current commer-
cial law and to identify areas for legislative reform."). 
363 For simplicity of exposition this discussion addresses "warranty of title" obligations of 
intermediaries as a corollar; of UTP, although a different means of expressing the intermedi-
ary's oblig.~.tions could be employed were UTP and its corollary codified. In general tenns, the 
warranty should be such that, if honored, the transferee would receive all of the benefi ts of the 
interest to be transferred. The warranty should not extend to defects or defaults where the 
issuer is at fault, since the qualities of the issuer and the issuer's behavior comprise ri:;ks prop-
erly assumed and borne by the transferee. It would seem to follow that when securiiies that 
are invalidly issued by the issuer are included in a fungible bulk-arising from ::L> overisstH:, for 
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the absence of such a broad obligation, the existence of a senior upper-
tier adverse claim could leave the transferee with no remedy at all, 
even though its intermediary remained solvent and viable. 364 The ra-
tionale for allocation of loss to lower tier claimants rather than upper 
tier claimants requires, as a baseline rule, the ultimate allocation of 
loss to the intermediaries of such lower-tier claimants. 
A broad warranty of good title would recognize that an interme-
diary, rather than its transferee-customer, could reduce or avoid 
losses arising from adverse claims for a lower cost. 365 It would en-
courage an intermediary to control securities in a manner that reduces 
the risks and costs of adverse claims. 366 And the warranty received by 
an intermediary from its own upstream intermediaries would enhance 
the ability of the intermediary to give and honor its own warranty to 
its transferee-customer. That is, subordination of lower tier claims 
would make warranties by intermediaries less tisky. 367 
Article 8 now imposes certain warranties on transferors of securi-
example-an intermediary should not bear the loss. See U.C.C. § 8-104 (effect of overissue). 
Hmv the various claimants to a fungible bulk through intermediaries would share in such 
losses must be addressed, but that matter is not developed here. 
Another form of risk posed by intermediary control of securities also warrants attention. 
Assume thar a securities issuer pays dividends, principal or interest to security holders of rec-
ord and thereby is discharged of its obligation. Assume further that a disruption in the pay-
ments syst,:;m (perhaps caused by a bank failure) prevents a lower tier claimani's intermediary 
from n:ceiving that payment for redistribution to its customers. It is not clear who would bear 
the loss under current law. 
3M The obligations of the intermediary also could be made the subject of a contract with its 
customer. In many situations an intermediary will be required by applicable law and regula-
tions outside of the U.C.C. to majntain control of customer securities free of adverse claims. 
See sup:-a notes 61-62 and accompanying text. 
263 See supra note 286. By taking possession and exai11ining the securities to ensure that a 
; o-:.J deli very has b....o.en made, or by receiving a transfer to the account of th·~ intermediary with 
a clearing corporation, the intermediary could ensure that it achieved bona fide purchaser 
statu:; . Or, che intermediary (such as 1-1) could choose to receive a transfer of the s.':Curities in 
its account with anoiher intermediary (such as I-2) that is not a clearing corporation. In the 
htt~r case, the interrnedia,-y could protect itself (and the transferee) by choosing its upstream 
irHerrn.~di[!PJ with cure. A transferee such as C-1, however, would have little or no cnntrol 
(except by contract with the intermediary) over the means of protecting against adverse claims. 
366 T1v: abxnce of such warranTy obiigations could present a moral hazard problem. The 
inr,;rm<Xiia.ry c:oulJ choose to conirol its transferees' securities in the least costly manner, even 
if it were risky, i:s order to reduce its own costs. The existence of adverse claims would be 
riskkss w ihe intermedi;;•ry. ln addition to inducing care on the pan: of intel-mediaries, a broad 
statm ory warranty also might encourage innovation in the markctpiace that would further 
ted uc.<: tih-:: lncid~nce of adverse claims. 
3,'1 -i UTP would award seniority to I-2 and to L (as I-2's transferee) as agains~ lower ti~r 
d aims <;ustomers of f-l. I -2, then, would incur less risk in rna,\.ing a broad warranty in 
fo•.vor of L lJO::<ms.: J-2 could ignore the prospect of lower tier ad•err.e claimants, such as C- i, 
·.;..·ho h t."..' c.t airllii.~. g r.itrou~h 1-1. 
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ties, 368 but in at least three respects Article 8 may fail to conform with 
the broad warranty necessary for a UTP regime. First, Article 8 does 
not provide expressly that a transferor of a security gives a warranty 
of good title. Rather, a transferor of a security warrants to a pur-
chaser for value that the "transfer is effective and rightful." 369 Prop-
erly construed, however, "rightful" should encompass a warranty of 
good title and freedom from adverse claims. 370 
Second, and more troublesome, it is not clear that an intermedi-
ary effecting a transfer on its books is, itself, necessarily a trans-
feror. 371 Consider the transfer of a security interest to L in Example 
1. The underlying secured loan was between I -1 an.d L, although the 
transfer occurred on the books of I-2 (who was not a party to the 
underlying transaction). But all aspects of effecting the transfer to L 
were within the sole control of J-2. 372 L knew only that it received a 
confirmation from 1-2 and that, under its agreement with l-2, I-2 was 
368 See U.C.C. § 8-306 & pre-1978 § 8-306. See generally Guttman, supra note 4, at 6-5 to 
6-9, 6-21 to 6-25. 
369 U.C.C. § 8-306(2)(a) (transferor of certificated security); U.C.C. § 8-306(9) (transferor 
of an uncertificated security, who does not "originate an instruction"). The transferor of an 
uncertificated security who "originates an instruction," however, warrants to a purchaser for 
value that "the transfer ... will be registered by the issuer free from all liens, security interests, 
restrictions, and claims other than those specified in the instruction;" and, in additjon, that 
"the requested transfer. .. will be rightful." U.C.C. § 8-306{7)(cXii)-(iii). Does this imply that 
"rightful" is a wholly separate concept that does not encompass good title and freedom from 
adverse claims? (Tne concept of "good title" is not mentioned in § 8-306.) The Offic ial Com-
ment indicates that no such impiication should be drawn. See U.C.C. § 8-306 comment 7 (The 
"warranties [under § 8-306(7)] are similar to those made by one transferring a certificated 
security, subsection (2), the principal difference being the absolute warranty of validity" ); set: 
also Reporter's Comment, supra note 5, § 8-306, at 968 ("Subsection (7) .. . is essentially 
identical to the warranty of the transferor of a certificated security under subse,;tion (2) ."). 
370 See Morgan Guar. Trust Co. v. New England Merchants Nat'l Bank, 438 F. Supp. 97 , 
101-02 (D. Mass. 1977) (when bona fide purchaser of security retransferred to second trans-
feree, second transferee took free of adverse claims and, therefore, § 8-306(2) warranty of 
"rightful" transfer to second transferee was not breached). Other provisions in Article 8 sup-
port this conclusion. See U.C.C. §§ 8-302(2) (defining "adverse claim" to inci.ude "'a claim 
that the transfer was or would be wrongful"), 8-304(3) (purchaser's notice that s-..acu ri ty held 
for third person or registered to or indor.,ed by fiduciary "does not create a duty of inquiry into 
the rightfulness ot the transfer or constitute constructive notice of adverse claims"), 8-315( 1) 
(remedies of a person "against whom the transfer of a security is wrongful ") & 8-315(2) (reme-
dies of owner of securi ty when "transfer is wrongful because of an unauthorized indors.::-
ment"); see also TJ.C.C. § 8-30,) comment 7 (quoted supra note 369). Provisions e!stwhere in 
the U.C.C. also are supportive. See U.C.C. §§ 2-312(l)(a) (warranty by sdkr of :;oo<ls that 
"title conveyed shall be good, and its transfer rightful"); 3-417(2)(a) (t ransferor of instrurn~m 
warnmts rhat "he has a good title to the instrument ... and the transfer is other'i'iise rightful"). 
Guttman agrees with the conclusion stated in the text, ;)Ut he e:uracts a warrant)' of freedom 
from adverse claims from the word "effective." See Guttman, supra note 4, at 6- 7. 
37 1 The warranties to such a transferee are made by the person who transfers the securi ci,~s . 
u.c.c. § 8-306(2), (9). 
372 St.>: U.C.C. § B-313(l )(d)(ii)-(iii). 
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required to reflect the transfer on its books. Was I-2 the transferor to 
L ? Was I -1 the transferor to L? Were they both transferors to L? 
Was i -1 the transferor toi-2 and wasi-2, in tum, the transferor toL? 
Article 8 provides no clear answers to these questions. 373 As in the 
underlying priority contest, the transferor-transferee property law 
construct of Article 8 fits poorly with transactions in fungible bulks of 
securities controlled by intermediaries. 
Even if J-2 was not a transferor, I-2 probably would make the 
warranties made by a transferor because I-2 appears to have been a 
broker, acting for L, in this transaction. 374 But if an intermediary 
effecting a transfer on its books were not a transferor, 375 it would not 
make any warranties if it were not acting as a broker. The definition 
of "financial intermediary" contemplates that some financial in-
termediaries will not be "brokers. " 376 Thus, it is possible that a finan-
cial intermediary effecting a transfer on its books may be neither a 
transferor nor a broker. 
373 Although Article 8 expressly provides for transfer of interests in fungible bulks of secur-
ities by intermediary book entries, it fails to specify who is the transferor for purposes of trans-
feror warranties. 
374 U.C.C. § 8-306(10) provides: 
A broker gives to his customer and to the issuer and a purchaser the applicable 
warranties provided in this section and has the rights and privileges of a purchaser 
under this section. The warranties of and in favor of the broker, acting as an agent 
are in addition to applicable warranties given by and in favor of his customer. 
"Broker" is defined as "a person engaged for all or part of his time in the business of buying 
and selling secm;ties, who in the transaction concerned acts for, buys a securiiy from, or sells a 
security to, a customer." U .C.C. § 8-303. 
375 U.C.C. § 8-306(10) implies that an intermediary effecting a transfer on its books is not 
necessarily a transferor; otherwise, imposing transferor warranties on a broker, as such, would 
not be necessary. 1-2 would be acting merely as an agent of L, a disclosed principal, and also 
as an agent for 1-1, another disclosed principal. But it is also plausible that I-2 would be 
t!·eated as a transferor. Imposing warranty liability on intermediaries acting as brokers may be 
merely a mea i1S of overriding any arguments based on agency that an intermediary should be 
relieved of otherNise applicable warranties. 
376 U.C.C. § 8-313(4). Although it would seem that a financial intermediary effecting a 
transfer on it5 books would normally be "act[ing] for . .. a customer," some financial in-
termediaries, such as certain custodian banks and clearing corporations, may not be "in the 
business of buying and selling securities." See U.C.C. § 8-303 (defining " broker") (quoted 
supra note 374). Yet it would be anomalous if such an intermediary, normally viewed a.; the 
safest type of intermediary, would not be held to any warranty liability. Cert..ain intennediaries 
are relieved of transferor warran.ty liability pursuant to U.C.C. § 8-306(3) when "a certificat.::d 
security is deiivered by an intermediary known to be entrusted with deliver; of the security on 
behalf of another. . .. " Such intermediaries warrant only their "own good faith and author-
ity," U.C.C. § 8-30C(3). See generally Guttman, supra note 4, at 6-22 to -24. But U.C.C. § 8-
30t{3) would not apply in the normal book-entry transfer that involves no "delivery." Consid-
ering thz.t even the.>e intermediaries make some warranties, it seems unlikely that Article 8 
would enti rely absolve non-broker intermediaries effecting transfers on their books from war-
trusty liability. Tbus, the better interpretation is that such intermediaries are transferc.;s when 
they effect transf-::rs by book entry. 
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Third, transferor warranties extend only to "purchasers for 
value."377 UTP is grounded on the notion that a claimant can best 
protect itself by careful selection of its intermediary. Consider, then, 
the claimant who becomes concerned about, or otherwise dissatisfied 
with, its intermediary, and instructs its intermediary to transfer secur-
ities credited to its account to a different intermediary. Surely it is 
just as crucial to the claimant that it receive warranties of good title 
from the new intermediary, even though the claimant has not given 
value (other than a transfer fee, perhaps) in connection with the 
"free" transfer. The new intermediary is (as was the old) in exclusive 
control of the means of effecting a transfer and controlling the 
securities. 378 
Warranties imposed by the Proposed TRADES Regulations for 
Treasury securities also are problematic. 379 Those proposed regula-
tions contain an unusual prohibition on disclaimers and limitations of 
warranties. 380 Warranties under Article 8, on the other hand, gener-
ally may be varied by agreement. 381 Broad warranties provide 
fallback rules that, when modified, force affirmative disclosure and 
explication of deviations from the standard, but they need not be in-
flexible. Some risks might more properly be attributed to the inherent 
characteristics of the securities themselves rather than to matters that 
377 U.C.C. § 8-306; see U.C.C. § 1-201(44) (defining "value"). 
378 For an extreme example, suppose that the new intermediary chose io allow the old inter-
mediary to continue to control the securities as part of a fungible bulk by merely crediting the 
new intermediary's account with the old intermediary. If the securities were already subject to 
an adverse claim, the claimat1t could be disadvantaged because the new intermediary chose not 
to receive securities in a manner that would afford bona fide purchaser status to the new 
intermediary. 
379 Unless the bcok-entry custodian is itself a "transferor," the warranty made by a book-
entry custodian " (i]n connection with any transfer of a S....""Curity" covers freedom from adverse 
claims granted by the custodian (unless disclosed) and those of which the custodian has knowl-
edge--but it falls short of a complete warranty of gooJ title and freedom from adverse claims. 
Proposed TRADES Regulations, supra note 7, § 357.17(a). If the book-entry custodian is the 
transferor, however, it additionally "warrants to the transferee that the transfer is rightful and 
effective" (i . .:., a warranty of good tiile and freedom from ad verse claims). Id. § 357.l7(b); s....<>e 
supra note 366. A transferor who is not a book-entry custodian also makes the "rightful and 
effective" warranty. Pwposed TRADES Regulations, supra note 7, § 357. i 7 (c). Presumably, 
when two parties to a trade are lmown to each other the transferring party will be a (non-bcok-
entr; custodian) transferor for purposes of that warranty. But the TRADES framework fails 
to illuminate the circumstances that will cause a book-entry custodian to be a transferor to its 
customer. Presumably, if the book-entry custodian is a dealer, or, perhaps acting as a broker 
for its customer, it will be a t ransferor, but there is no ana.iogue to U .C.C. § 8-306{10). See 
supra not-e 374. The TRADES approach strongly suggests, however, that a clearing bank or 
custodian that acts only to re<::eive transfers of securities for its customer will not be a trans-
feror and, consequently, wili not make a warranty of gocd tiile and freedom from adverse 
claims. 
380 Proposed TR.A.DE.."l Regulations, supra note 7, § 357.17(f). 
331 U.C. C. § 1-102(3). 
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an intermediary could be expected to control. For example, some se-
curities issued by foreign issuers must remain under the control of a 
foreign depository or custodian, notwithstanding trading activity in 
the United States markets. When proper disclosure is made, risks as-
sociated with the foreign depository or custodian might better be allo-
cated to United States investors instead of to their intermediaries. At 
least as among professional market participants, the matter of warran-
ties should be left to variation by explicit agreement of the parties. 
The scope of transferor warranties does not appear to have given 
rise to many problems or disputes. The warranty provisions under 
Article 8 have figured in few reported decisions relating to freedom 
from adverse claims. Perhaps market practices and mores dictate that 
solvent and honest intermediaries do not seek to pass on risks of ad-
verse claims to their transferees and customers. 382 And when an in-
termediary becomes insolvent a warranty claim would be only an 
unsecured claim in any event. But the paucity of litigation does not 
undermine the importance of the corollary. The rationale for alloca-
tion of loss to lower-tier rather than upper-tier claimants requires, as 
a baseline rule, the ultimate allocation of loss to the intermediaries of 
such lower tier claimants. 
C. Treatment of Non-Innocent Upper- Tier Transferees 
So far the examination of UTP has left open the treatment of 
no_n-innocent upper-tier claimants. Based on moral grounds, a non-
innocent transferee ought not to be awarded with a senior claim and 
also be left unsanctioned. 38 3 It is wrong to knowingly divest a person 
3 82 Transferor warranties, per se, are only part of the picture. In organized markets a form 
of broad warranty generally prevails among market participants. When a market participant 
transferor fai ls to conform to standards of "good delivery" the transferee is granted a right of 
"reclamation." See generally Guttman, supra note 4, at 8-31 to -37. And following a transfer 
that complies with all applicable warranties and delivery standards, customer protection rules 
dealing with segregation and control of securities by intermediaries afford additional protec-
tions. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text. 
383 James J. White has suggested to me that because one goal of UTP is a clear and certain 
rule, saJJctions against a noninnocent upper tier transferee might be the " exception that swal-
lows the rule." The response must be that in some cases certainty and efficiency should give 
way to other values. Moreover, UT P is justified to some extent by the assumption that it is 
difficult or impossible for upper-tier claimants to discover adverse claims. Sanctions against a 
noninnO<'..ent claimant would assume that the claimant already has knowledge of a lower tier 
ciaim. Some might not agree that sanctions against noninnocent transferees always would be 
proper. For example, priorities as among secured creditors claiming personal property collat-
eral are generaily believed to turn on the time of filing or perfection irrespective of knowledge 
by a secured party of an unperfected security interest that is prior in time. See U.C.C. § 9-
312(5)(a); compare Carlson, Rationality, supra note 142, passim (arguing that knowledge stan-
dard should he applied on normative grounds and that the U.C.C. can be construed to embrace 
a knowledge standard notwithstanding common assertions to the contrary) with Baird & Jack-
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(the lower tier claimant) of its property rights, especially when acting 
in complicity with a party (such as the lower-tier claimant's interme-
diary) that is violating its obligations to that person. Beyond this gen-
eral notion, however, adopting a UTP scheme could suggest some 
alternatives to current law for treatment of non-innocent upper-tier 
claimants. 
What should be the standard for non-innocence? One obvious 
alternative is the current standard for determining whether a pur-
chaser has notice of an adverse claim for purposes of bona fide pur-
chaser status. 384 Arguably, the standard should be actual knowledge 
of wrongfulness where fungible bulks are concerned. 385 
What sanctions should apply to non-innocent claimants and in 
whose favor should the sanctions be applied? The usual property law 
construct embodied in priority rules would allow a lower-tier claim-
ant, such as C-1, to recover the securities, or the value of the securi-
ties, from a non-innocent upper-tier claimant, such as /-2 or L.386 In 
the context of fungible bulks of securities, however, a lower-tier claim-
ant, such as C-1, may not be the appropriate party to recover the 
securities or damages. Because the priority contests arise by virtue of 
J-1's insolvency,387 if the A Co. and B. Co. securities had not been 
transferred wrongfully by /-1 to /-2 and L, those securities would 
have been subject to the SIP A/Subchapter III risk sharing distribu-
tional rule. 388 It would seem to follow that /-1 's trustee in the insol-
vency proceedings should succeed to the claim against a non-innocent 
son, supra note 142, at 314-18 (arguing that knowledge standard should not be applied basP...d 
on excessive costs and nonequivalence of knowledge and bad faith). 
384 See U.C.C. §§ 1-201(25) ("A person has notice of a fact when ... from all the facts and 
circumstances known to him at the time in question he has reason to know that it exists."), 8-
304(3) (modifying notice definition of U.C.C. § 1-201(25) for purposes of notice of ad·>erse 
claims under Article 8, to the effect that notice that security is held for or registered to thi rd 
person does not create duty of inquiry and knowledge that transaction is in breach of duty does 
constitute notice of adverse claim:;). 
385 In Example I, /-2 may be in possession of much information concerning /-1 and its 
customers as a result of trade tickets, subaccounts, and the like. Charging J-2 with k.nowleclg<e 
of that information would miss the point that J-2 normally would not be equipped !o pay 
attention to such information, even if it could be extracted and computed from its records. 
The problem is greatest when an upper-tier intermediary serves a clearing or carrying function 
for a downstream intermediary. 
386 Where immediate and mediate innocent transferees from the non-innocent claimznt are 
concerned, however, the principle of UTP would give seniority to all innocent upper-tier claim-
ants, even those who derive their interests from a non-innocent person. 
387 If a lower-tier claimant's intermediary were not insolvent, that claimant probably would 
be satisfied by its intermediary, either on a warranty theory or ba.-~ on the intermediary's 
obligation to control securities free of adverse claims on behalf of the lower-tier claimant. 
Thus, were the intermediary not insolvent, it is likely that the lower-tier claimant would ne·~er 
discover a wrongful upper-tier transfer. 
388 See generaUy supra Pa11 III. 
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/ -2 or L for the benefit of all of J-l's customers.389 
That result would be a fundamental departure from current 
bankruptcy law that permits a trustee to succeed only to the avoid-
ance powers of actual unsecured creditors. 390 But it is fully consistent 
with the risk sharing distributional rules in securities firm insolven-
cies. It is anomalous that current law does not permit the insolvent 
intermediary's representative to recover such damage claims. 391 
CONCLUSION 
The pervasive phenomenon of intermediary control of securities 
in fungible bulk in the securities markets meshes poorly with tradi-
tional property law doctrine. Much of this article is devoted to an 
analysis of transfer, pledge, and priority under Article 8. The enor-
mous uncertainty, complexity, and difficulty of interpretation and ap-
plication must be seen, in tedious detail, to be appreciated. 
Disagreements and misunderstandings are not surprising. The evi-
dence is convincing that the results and implications of current prop-
erty law as applied to securities controlled by intermediaries in 
fungible bulk have not been thought through. These considerations 
389 AJlowing J-l's trustee, rather than C-1, to recover from the non-innocent /-2 and L 
would not violate C-l's property rights because including the recovery as a part of customer 
property would allow C-1 to recover no less than it would have recovered if the wrongful 
tra.;1sfers had not occurred. The trustee also might be more favorably situated to pursue such 
claims because of better information and economies of scale. Moreover, the trustee would not 
necessarily be required to prove that the upper-tier transferee's conduct was wrongful as to any 
particular customer's securities. A lower-tier customer, however, would be forced to demon-
strate, such as through tracing, that its property was wrongfully tra.<J.sferred to the upper-tier 
transferee . 
390 See 11 U.S.C. § 544(b) (1988) (trustee in bankruptcy can avoid tr&Ilsfer of property or 
obligation incurred by debtor that can be avoided by an actual unsecured creditor under appli-
cable law). This avoidance power extends to the entire interest in property transferred and is 
not limited by the extent to which an actual unsecured creditor could so avoid a transfer. 
Moore v. Bay, 284 U.S. 4 (1931). AJthough a tmstee in a Subchapter ill proceeding can 
exercise avoidance powers with respect to prepetition transfers of property that would have 
been customer property, the claims of lower-tier claimants to securities in the hands of upper-
tier claimants would not be unsecured claims, an d damage claims would not be avoidance 
powers. Therefore, recovery under 11 U.S.C. §§ 544{b) would not be allowed. 11 U.S.C. 
§§ 54--il,.o), 749(a). The results under SIPA would be the same. See SIPA, §§ 6(b), 7(a), 
8(c)(3), 15 U .S.C. §§ 78:iff(b), 78lff- l (a), 78fff-2(c)(3) (1988). Bu t if the transfers were made 
with actual fra>xlulent intent, or if the transfers were not made for vaJue and the transferees 
were not in gC'Od faith, then a trustee could re--...A)ver the securities or their value from the 
transferees under current law. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 548(a){l), (c), 550{a){ l). 
391 SimiJar anomalies exist with respect io preferences under SIPA and Subchapter HI. See 
supra note 196. Note that in some ca...<:e& it will be SIPC that can assert a claim agaimt an 
upp;::r tier cl::limani because, under current iaw, SIPC is subrogated to customer ciaims to the 
exte:c! it h:.\5 advanced funds to satisfy such claims. SIPA, § 9(a), 15 U.S. C.§ 78fff-3(a) ( 1988). 
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alone are reason enough to commend thoughtful contemplation of a 
simpler and more rational legal regime. 
The solvency and integrity of an intermediary is the touchstone 
that largely determines how the interest of a claimant to securities 
through that intermediary will fare under current law (and any other 
system that I can think of). For this reason, intermediary solvency 
and integrity should lie at the core of the treatment of fungible bulk 
transfer, pledge, and priority. Recognition of this touchstone also has 
a powerful explanatory effect. Its acceptance and recognition as real-
ity in the market no doubt account for why securities market settle-
ments systems function as well as they do, notwithstanding confusion 
and disagreement concerning application of current law. 
The distributional rules for customers under SIP A and Sub-
chapter HI provide a model for same-tier claimants grounded on 
equality of treatment rather than a property construct. Where those 
regimes do not apply, as in bank insolvencies, a conforming sharing 
principle should be imposed by a change in applicable state law. But 
even under SIP A and Subchapter III, current law relating to prefer-
ences and avoidance powers can yield anomalous results. 
\Vhere different-tier claims are involved, current law is unprinci-
pled and arbitrary. The UTP (upper-tier priority) principle advocated 
here is a pror-'Osal for a non-property law construct rule to resolve 
different tier priority contests. But its details are less important than 
moving the legal regime toward a more precise vision of the sui 
generis characteristics of the (not-quite-property, not-quite-unsecured 
claim) relationship that results when interests in fungible bulks of se-
curities are transferred on the books of intermediaries. The need for a 
new model concerns not only the substa1ce of codified rules, but also 
recognition of interr.o.ediary risk as a central determinant of appropri-
ate doctrine. The proposal for UTP, properly grasped, is a step to-
ward the development of a theoretical and normative basis for 
transfer and pledge by intermediary book-entry. A new model, di-
vorced from common law and U.C.C. property law constructs, also 
could form a more plausible base for unification of law on the interna-
tional leveL An approach not rooted in longstanding domestic doc-
trine might provide a more likely basis for harmonizing widely 
va.~.;ing doctdne in other nations. 
Thoughtful articulation of a better conceptualization also might 
ward otT unsound proposals such as the last-in-time good faith trans-
feree :rule of the Proposed TRADES Regulations. Perhaps it also wi11 
encourage ;exploration of non-property oriented approaches in other 
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markets and other contexts where the baggage of a property law con-
struct may not be appropriate. 
Finally, there is another story, not fully told, that is implicit in 
this article. Legal rules for private property rights, such as Article 8, 
the Book-Entry Treasury Regulations, and the Proposed TRADES 
Regulations, are unlikely media for fully addressing concerns about 
the protection and safety of those who receive transfers and pledges of 
securities through intermediaries. Financial institutions that serve as 
securities intermediaries have special roles and characteristics. A pnl-
dent regulatory approach to inherent intermediary risk, coordinated 
with property law, may provide a more feasible route to enhanced 
safety. In addition, future innovations in technology and settlement 
systems might increase direct relationships between market partici-
pants and issuers and permit less reliance on intermediary control. 
But, to repeat, that is another story. 
r 
r' 
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APPENDIX I 
The following is a copy of Section 8-313 of the U.C.C. as it ap-
pears in the 1978 and current version of the official text. The text in 
brackets represents the deletions made from the pre-1978 version and 
the underlined text represents 1978 additions. 
U.C.C. Section 8-313. 
When [Delivery] Transfer to (the] Purchaser Occurs: [; Pur-
chaser's Broker] Financial Intermediary as [Holder] Bona Fide 
Purchaser; "Financial Intermediary". 
(1) [Delivery] Transfer of a security or a limited interest (including a 
security interest) therein to a purchaser occurs only [when]: 
(a) at the time he or a person designated by him acquires posses-
sion of a certificated security; [or] 
(b) at the time the transfer, pledge, or release of an uncertificated 
security is registered to him or a person designated by him; 
(c) [(b)] at the time his [broker] financial intermediary acquires 
possession of a certificated security specially indorsed to or is-
sued in the name of the purchaser; [or] 
(d) [(c)] at the time [his broker] a financial intermediary, not a 
clearing corporation, sends him confirmation of the purchase 
and also by book entry or otherwise identifies [a specific secur-
ity in the broker's possession] as belonging to the purchaser [; 
or] 
(i) a specific certificated security in the financial intermedi-
ary's possession; 
~ quantity of securities that constitute or are part of a 
fungible bulk of certificated securities in the financial in-
termediary's possession or of uncertificated securities reg-
istered in the name of the financial intermediary; or 
(iii) a quantity of securities that constitute or are Dart of a 
fungible bulk of securities shown on the acco_!::!:Tlt of the 
financial intermediary on the books of another financial 
intermediary; 
~ [(d)] with respect to an identified certificated security to be de-· 
livered while still in the possession of a third person, not a fi-
nancial intermedia~ [when] at the time that person 
acknowledges that he holds for the purchaser; [or] 
(f) with respect to a specific uncertificated security the oledge o~ 
transfer of which has been registered to a third ~rsm~,_ not a 
financial intermediary, at the time that oerson acl<-.i'10wl.;dges 
that he holds for th~urchaser; 
{gj [(e)] at the time appropriate entries to the account of the -eur -
chasef or a person designated by him on the books of a clearing 
corporat1on ar-e made under Section 8-320[.]; 
(h) with re:s_pect to the transfer of a security 1nten;st _vvl~ere i:h~ 
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debtor has signed a security agreement containing a descriP: 
tion of the security, at the time a written notification, which, in 
the case of the creation of the security interest, is signed by the 
debtor (which may be a copy of the security agreement) or 
which, in the case of the release or assignment of the securit>: 
interest created pursuant to this paragraph, is signed b>: the 
secured party, is received by 
(i) a financial intermediary on whose books the interest of 
the transferor in the securit>: appears; 
(ii) a third person, not a financial intermediary, in possession 
of the security, if it is certificated; 
(iii) a third person, not a financial intermediary, who is the 
registered owner of the securit>: if it is uncertificated and 
not subject to a registered pledge; or 
(iv) a third person, not a financial intermediary, who is the 
registered pledgee of the security, if it is uncertificated 
and subject to a registered pledge; 
(i) with respect to the transfer of a security interest where the 
transferor has signed a securit>: agreement containing a descrip-
tion of the securit>:, at the time new value is given by the se-
cured party; or 
(j) with respect to the transfer of a securit>: interest where the se-
~ured part>: is a financial intermediary and the security has al-
ready been transferred to the financial intermediary under 
paragraphs (a), (b), (c), (d), or (g), at the time the transferor has 
signed a secmity agreement containing a description of the se-
curity and value is given by the secured party. 
(2) The purchaser is the owner of a security held for him by [his bro-
ker] a financial intermediary, but [is not the holder) cannot be a 
bona fide purchaser of a security ::.0 held except [as] in the: circutn~_ 
~~~_nces specified in [subparagraphs] paragraphs [(b)] (c), {d)(i), and 
( (e)] i.g2 of subsection ( 1 ). [Where] If a security so held is part of a 
fungible bulk, as in the circumstances soecified in para~phs (d)(ii) 
~nd ( d)(iii) of subsection ( 1 ), the purchaser is the owner of a propor-
tionate property interest in the fungible bulk. 
(3) Notice of an adverse claim received by the [broker] financia1 inter-
mediary or by the purchaser after the (broker] financial interrnedi-
~ takes deliveP; of a certificated security as a holder for value or 
after the transfer, pledge, or release of an uncertificated security has 
been registe~ed free of the daim to a financial intermediary who has 
given value is not effective either as to the [broker] financial inter~ 
mediary or as to the purchaser. However, as between the [broker] 
financial intermediar; and the purchaser the purchasu may de-
mand (delivery] transfer of an equivalent security 2..s to 'Which no 
notice of [an] adverse claim has been received. 
0) A "fina.ncial intermediary" is a bank, broker, clearinf-f__Eor:p:(_?_radon 
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or other person (or the nominee of any of them) which in the ordi-
nary course of its business maintains security accounts for its cus-
tomers and is acting in the capacity. A financial intermediary may 
have a security interest in securities held in account for its 
customer. 
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APPENDIX II 
Drafting History of U.C.C. Section 8-313 1 
1. First Draft 
Section 13 of the first public draft of what was to become Article 
8 (then called Article V) provided: 
Section 13. When Delivery Effective To Complete 
Negotiation. 
( 1) Except as otherwise provided in this Section, delivery complet-
ing negotiation is received by a transferee when he or his agent 
acquires physical possession of an investment instrument, but a 
broker for the transferee is not his agent for this purpose unless 
the instrument is negotiated by special indorsement to the cus-
tomer or by new issue in his name. 
(2) Where a broker does not receive an instrument in the name of 
his customer or specially indorsed to him, delivery to the cus-
tomer occurs when the broker sends confirmation of the 
purchase and also by book entry or otherwise identifies a spe-
cific instrument in his possession as belonging to the customer. 
In the absence of such identification the broker is the holder of 
the instrument despite confirmation of purchase or book entry 
or other indication that the instrument is part of a fungible 
bulk held for customers and despite the customer's acquisition 
of a proportionate property interest in such fungible bulk. 
(3) When an identified instrument is in the hands of a third party 
the transferee receives delivery on attornment to him by the 
third party. 2 
The Note to section 13 of the First Draft stated, in pertinent 
part: 
This section deals with the kind of delivery which is necessary 
to effect a formal negotiation under Section 9 . . . . 
In this section the emphasis is put upon the receipt of physical 
possession of the instrument except in the case emphasized in sub-
sections 2 and 3. 
Subsection 2 conforms with the practice in brokerage houses 
1 Although the following discussion dwells mainly on § 8-313 and its forebears, nothing in 
the drafting history of related sections, including §§ 8-301, -302 and -306, suggests conclusions 
different than those reached here. 
2 Uniform Commercial Code, Preliminary Tentative First Draft- Article V § 13 (April 
22, 1946) reprinted in 3 Uniform Commercial Code Drafts 20 (E. Kelly ed. 1984) [hereinafter 
First Draft]. Stock certificates were given attributes of negotiability under the Uniform Stock 
Transfer Act. Unifo.rm Stock Transfer Act, 6 U.L.A. 1 (1922) (withdrawn). For a discussion 
of negotiability of invesiment securities prior to the U.C.C., see Gilmore, The Commercial 
Do·~trine of Gooo Faith Purchase, 63 Yale L.J. 1057, 1072-76 (1954). 
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so far as we have been able to determine what that practice is. We 
understand, however, that this particular practice applies in vol-
ume to only a very small percentage of the number of purchases 
made by a broker and that normally no such precise identification 
of an instrument takes place until such time as the customer de-
mands delivery from the broker. Subsection 3 deals with the case 
where an identified instrument is in the hands of a third party. 
It should be noted that so far as transfer of an instrument is 
concerned, notice of confirmation of a purchase should normally 
be sufficient to create ownership rights in the transferee even 
though the instrument itself may be merely in a fungible bulk safe-
keeping account or may in fact not be in the hands of the broker 
3 
419 
The First Draft incorporates four important and related princi-
ples that shed light on the meaning of both the pre-1978 and 1978 
versions of section 8-313. 
a. First Principle: A broker is not an agent for purposes of delivery 
except in the case of specially indorsed and customer name 
instruments. 
Section 13(1) first states a general rule that delivery to a trans-
feree occurs when "he or his agent acquires physical possession of an 
investment instrument," thereby incorporating and acknowledging 
general principles of agency. 4 That rule is followed by an exception-
a broker is not the transferee's agent except when the instrument in-
volved is specially indorsed to the customer or issued in the cus-
tomer's name. 
b. Second Principle: Only a "specific instrument" in a broker's 
possession can be delivered to a broker's customer by 
confirmation and identification. 
Section 13(2) provides another exception whereby delivery to a 
customer can occur while a broker retains actual physical possession. 
The exception depends on the broker's "confirmation of the 
3 First Draft, supra note 2, note to Section 13, reprinted in 3 Uniform Commercial Code 
Drafts, supra note 2, at 4D (emphasis added). 
4 Id. supra note 2, § 13(1) (emphasis added). This clause is the forebear of both pre-1978 
§ 8-313(1)(a) and U.C.C. § 8-313(1)(a). Except for substituting the word "se;;urity" for the 
words "investment instrument" and the words "a person designated by him" for "his agent", 
the first clause is essentially identical to the operative language of pre-1978 § 8-313(1 )(a). 
Changes in style and terminology in the 1978 version were not intended to change the sub-
stance of paragraph (l)(a). S..""e U.C.C. § 3-313(l)(a); U.C.C. § 8-313(1 )(d)(i); U.C.C., app. 1, 
§ 8-313, Reasons for 1977 Change, at 977 ("The rules of the present statute [pre-1978 § 8-
313(1)] are preserved in subparagraphs (a), (c), (d){i), (e) and (g) [of U.C.C. § 8-3 13{! )].") 
"] 
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purchase" and identification of "a specific instrument in his posses-
sion as belonging to the customer."5 The language "specific instru-
ment" could hardly be more clear. In the absence of a good reason 
for a different interpretation, "specific instrument" could only be con-
strued to mean a particular piece of paper that is somehow distin-
guished from every other piece of paper in the world. The second 
sentence of section 13(2) specifies that unless "such identification" is 
made, it is the broker, not the customer, that would be the "holder."6 
The second sentence clearly implies that an "indication that the in-
strument is part of a fungible bulk" is not an adequate identification 
so as to constitute a delivery under the first sentence. 7 
The Note to section 13 further supports this construction of what 
constitutes a "specific security." Such an identification was presumed 
by the drafters to occur only in "a very small percentage" of broker-
age transactions and in the process of making an actual, physical de-
livery upon a customer's demand. 8 
c. Third Principle: An instrument can be delivered to a transferee 
through attornment by a third party (who is not the 
transferee's broker) only if it is an "identified 
instrument. " 
This principle, which springs from section 13(3) of the First 
Draft, 9 addresses two separate issues. First, who can be a "third 
party"? In view o:f the references to a transferee's and a customer's 
broker in subsections (1) and (2), a "third party" could not include 
the transferee's own broker.10 Presumably, however, the transferor's 
broker could be the "third party." Second, what is the meaning of 
.. identified instrument"? The most piausible answer is that an "iden-
tified instrument" in subsection (3) has the same meaning as a "spe-
cific instrument" that has been "identified" under subsection (2). 11 A 
s First Draft, supra note 2, § 13(2) (first sentence). 
6 First Draft, supra note 2, § 13(2) (second sentence). 
7 First Draft, supra note 2, § 13(1) (second sentence). Certainly a book entry specifying a 
customer's interest in a sp....->cill.::d quantity of a particular issue. of which a.'1 instrument is a 
part, would be inadequate to constitute such a.;1 identification of a "specific instrument." 
When a fungible bulk is inmlved, proesurnably the quantity being transferred to a customer 
would always be indicated. And instruments comprising a bulk would not be fun gible at all 
Uf'Jess the instruments were of the same issue. 
s See First Dra:ft, supra note 2, Note to Section 13, 3upra note 4. 
9 First Draft, supra note 2, § 130). This subsection was the ancestor of what became pre-
1978 § 8-3 13( l)(d) <11.nd U.C.C. § 3-313( l)(e). 
lO It would be anorn?.Jous if a transfer by a broker to its customer could take two different 
forrns--conli.rmation pursua.-'1t to section 13(2) and attornment pursuant to ~->ction 13(3). 
1 1 Tbe first sentence of suhsection (2) refers to a broker that "identifies a specific instru-
ment." Tne second sentence then refers to "such id.entincation." Because these are the only 
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contrary rule that required a stringent test for identification of a "spe-
cific security" in the case of a broker's delivery to its customer, and a 
more relaxed standard for attornment by a "third party" to one not 
its customer, would make little sense. 
d. Fourth Principle: Transfer to a broker's customer of a property 
interest in instruments controlled by the broker can occur 
without a delivery of the instrument. 
The drafters contemplated that in the typical brokerage transac-
tion, where no delivery by identification of a "specific instrument" 
occurs, a transfer of ownership rights to the broker's customer never-
theless would occur.12 The second sentence of section 13(2) demon-
strated the drafters' awareness of the distinction between transfer of a 
property interest and delivery of an instrument. As drafted, however, 
the provision did not provide expressly that such a transfer would 
occur. Instead, it merely contemplated that such a transfer would 
occur, presumably under common law outside of Article V. 13 In such 
non-delivery transfers, the broker would be the "holder" of the instru-
ment even if the "instrument is part of a fungible bulk held for cus-
tomers" and even if the customer acquires "a proportionate property 
interest in such fungible bulk." 14 Thus, if no specific instrument were 
identified, the customer would not receive an ownership interest in 
any particular instrument and the customer's interest would be only 
in the fungible bulk. 
2. Second and Third Drafts 
Section 30 of the second public draft was substantially un-
other reftre:nces to the concept of identification, "ideniified instrument" in subsection (3) 
would appear iO carry the sa.-ne meaning. 
12 F irst Draft, supra note 2, § 13(2) (second sentence). 
13 Se,~ First Draft, supra note 2, Note to § 13(2) (quoted supra text at note 4) ("notice of 
confirmation of purchase should normally be sufficient to create ownership rights"). No other 
section of the First Dra.fi contained any provision dealing with the method of non-delivery 
transfer of a property inter~t. See also State of New Jersey, Commission to Study and 
Rerport upon the Uniform Commercial Code for New Jersey, Second Report to the Governor, 
The Senate and Tne Assembly of the State of New Jersey 642, § 8-313 New Jersey Study 
Comments (1960), discussing pre-U.C.C. New Jersey common law: 
It i5; cleariy accepted that the moment a broker acquires securities for his 
customer, be it fo r a cash Of similar consideration or on margin, the title to these 
securities vests in the customer, the broker retaining a right to be reimbursed for 
co.rn.mission or balance of purchase price .... [T]he fact that title vest.s, must be 
considered subject to the broker's power to pledge fungible bulk. He need not 
deliv<:r a sp::~ific ~urity, but only a similar security, until the security becomes 
spe-::il'ied . 
(cit<1tions omitted). 
14 ~..f irst l):a.ft , supra note 1, § 13(2) {s~vand sentence). 
• 1 
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changed from section 13 of First DraftY The Second Draft did not 
disturb the four principles of First Draft. 16 Moreover, the Second 
Draft clearly identified the purpose of delivery and holder status under 
the statutory scheme-eligibility for bona fide purchaser status so as 
to cut off competing claims. 17 The third public draft contained no 
material changes. 18 
3. Fourth and Fifth Drafts 
Section 26 of the fourth public draft provided: 
Section 26. When Delivery To The Purchaser Occurs; Pur-
chaser's Broker As Holder; "Attornment". 
(1) Delivery to a purchaser occurs when: 
(a) he acquires possession of the security; or 
(b) his broker acquires possession of a security specially 
indorsed to the purchaser or issued in his name; or 
(c) his broker sends him confirmation of the purchase 
Is Uniform O:lmrnercial Code, Tentative First Draft No. !-Article V (May 10, 1947) 
[hereinafter Second Draft], reprinted in 3 Uniform Commercial Code Drafts, supra note 2, at 
286. The only material changes from section I 3 of the First Draft were the deletion, in subsec-
tion (I), of the words "completing negotiation is received by a transferee" and the substitution 
of the words "to the purchaser occurs" therefor, and the deletion, throughout the section, of 
the terms "transferee" and "investment instrument" and the adoption of the substitute terms 
"purchaser" and "security," respectively . 
16 In particular, the note to section 30 of the Second Draft underc<cored the drafters' per-
ception that transactions involving identification of a "specific security" were not the norm: 
Generally under this section [30] the emphasis is placed upon actual receipt or 
physical possession of the security. Subsection (2) is designed to fit the practice in 
brokerage houses when an identified security is immediately set asicle for the cus-
tomer. This is far from the common practice, however, sin-::e normally no identifi-
cation takes place until delivery is demanded by the customer. In such cases 
confirmation of the sale is sufficient to create ownership rights in the customer but 
he does not become a bona fide purchaser under Section 18 until specific identifica-
tion of the security. 
Second Draft, supra note 15, Note to Section 30, reprinted in 3 Uniform Commercial Code 
Drafts, supra note 2, at 313. 
17 The Second Draft provided that a bona fide purchaser would acquire "a perfect title to 
the security." Second Draft, supra note 15, § 18(2), reprinted in 3 Uniform Commercial Code 
Drafts, supra note 2, at 281. The definition of "bona fide purchaser" in the Second Draft was 
limited to purchasers that take delivery of a security. Id . § 18(1), reprinted in 3 Uniform 
Commercial Code Drafts at 280-81. A "holder," similarly, was limited to one "in possession 
of a security." Id. § 16(2), at 280. In view of this effect of delivery and holder status, the 
purpose of limiting delivery and denying holder status except in the case of actual physical 
delivery, specially indorsed and customer name securities, and securities that ar~ specific-ally 
identified by a broker or attorning third party, under § 30 of the Second Draft, is made clear. 
The First Draft contemplated a similar operative rule thai would be denominakd "due negoti-
ation." See First Draft, supra note 2, §§ 10, 17. 
18 U.C.C. , Tentative Second Draft No. 2-Article V, §§ i6, 18, 30 & notes (August 28, 
1947) [hereinafter Third Draft), reprinted in 3 Uniform Commercial Code Drafts, supra note 
2, at 526-27, 53 1-32, 553-54, 559 (1984). 
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and also by book entry or otherwise identifies a spe-
cific security in the broker's possession as belonging 
to the purchaser; or 
(d) attornment is made by a person other than the trans-
feror with respect to an identified security. 
(2) A broker not within paragraphs (b) or (c) of subsection 
( 1) is the holder of the security despite a confirmation of 
purchase and a book entry or other indication that the 
security is part of a fungible bulk held for customers and 
despi te the customer's acquisition of a proportionate prop-
erty interest in the fungible bulk. 
(3) "Attornment" is the acknowledgment of a person in pos-
session of a security that he holds the security for or on 
behalf of the purchaser. 19 
423 
Although significant style and structure changes were made to 
the former section 30, paragraph ( 1 )(b) of Fourth Draft section 26 left 
the first principle intact by affirmatively providing for delivery to a 
purchaser of specially indorsed and customer name securities in a bro-
ker's possession.2° Likewise, the second principle, delivery by a bro-
ker's identification of a "specific security," was preserved. Indeed, for 
most purposes the story of the second principle can end here. The 
language of section 26( 1 )(c) is identical to the version of pre-1978 sec-
tion 8-313(1)(c) that was eventually promulgated. 21 Moreover, except 
for dealing with transfer (instead of delivery) and expanding the scope 
beyond brokers to embrace financial intermediaries, 1978 section 8-
313( 1 )( d)(i) also made no substantive change. 22 Although the 1978 
version no longer provides the requisites of a delivery, it reaches the 
same result by providing that a transferee pursuant to 1978 section 8-
313(d)(i) can become a bona fide purchaser.23 It follows that the in-
terpretation given to delivery by identification of a "specific instru-
ment" under the F irst Draft'24 applies equally to identification of a 
"specific security" under pre-1 978 section 8-313( 1 )(c) and 1978 sec-
tion 8-313(1 )(d)(i). 25 
19 Proposed Final Draft No. !-Article Y, § 26 (April 26, 1948) [hereinafter Fourth 
Draft], reprinted in 4 Uniform Commercial Code Drafts, supra note 2, at 340-41. 
20 Fourth Draft, supra note 19, § 26( l )(b). Paragraph (I )(a), however, dropped <my men-
tion of the agency conv;pi. Id., § 26{l)(a). 
21 For discussioHs of the vatious official texts of the U.C.C., :-;.~ infra notes 30-45 and 
accompanying te;,t. Pre-1978 § 8-313(1){c) remained unchanged through all of the various 
official texts of the U.C.C. until § 8-313 was substantially rewritten in the 1978 Article 8. Jd. 
22 See U.C.C., app. 1, § 8-313, Reasons for 1977 Change, at 977 (quoted in part supra note 
4). 
23 U.C.C. §§ 3-30l(!)(c), -313(2). 
2 4 See supra notes 4- 7 a.nd accompanying text. 
2:5 T he :mb::.equen ~ prepromulgation drafts, the notes to those drafts, the various promul-
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The changes in style embodied in section 26 also preserved, with-
out change in substance, the third principle, attornment only as to an 
"identified security,"26 as well as the fourth principle, transfer of a 
property interest through a broker in the absence of a delivery.27 Sec-
tion 27 of the fifth public draft was identical to section 26 of the 
Fourth Draft. 28 
4. Subsequent Drafts Leading to 1952 Official Text 
The Investment Securities article was first denominated Article 8 
in the sixth public draft. 29 The next six public drafts, culminating in 
the 1952 Official text, resulted in no material changes of substance in 
section 8-313 or the comment thereto. 30 Thus, the four principles of 
the First Draft section 13 emerged in the 1952 Official Text, following 
a series of drafts spanning more than seven years, without dilution or 
change in substance. 31 
gated official texts of the U.C.C., and the official comments to those texts, reveal nothing that 
would indicate a different interpretation by the drafters. 
26 Fourth Draft, supra note 19, § 26(1)(d); see also§ 26(3) (adding a definition of "attorn-
ment"). Although the drafters did not elaborate on the style changes incorporated in section 
26, the Notes to Fourth Draft stated that section 26 was "in substantially the same form as 
when before the Institute last year" (referring to Second Draft, supra note 15). Fourth Draft, 
supra, notes to Sections 26, 27 28, reprinted in 4 Uniform Commercial Code Drafts, supra note 
2, at 382. 
27 Fourth Draft, supra note 19, § 26(2). 
28 Proposed Final Draft No. 2-Article V, § 27 (August 9, 1948) [hereinafter Fifth Draft], 
reprinted in 5 Uniform Commercial Code Drafts, supra note 2, at 203. 
29 U.C.C., May, 1949 Draft, Article 8-Investment Securities [hereinafter Sixth Draft], 
reprinted in 8 Uniform Commercial Code Drafts, supra note 2, at 203-57. The May, 1949 
Draft was the first publication of the U.C.C. that included Article 1 and that was complete 
with Comments. 
30 See U.C.C., Text Only Printing F...;\cept for the Article on Sales (Article 2) and the Arti-
cle on Effective Date and Repealer (Article 11), § 8-313 (March 1, 1950), reprinted in 9 Uni-
form Commercial Code Drafts, supra note 2, at 132; U.C.C., Proposed Final Draft, Text and 
Comments Edition, § 3-313 & comment (Spring 1950), reprinted in 11 Uniform Commercia.l 
Code Drafts, supra note 2, at 175-77; U.C.C., Proposed Final Draft No. 2, Text Edition, § 8·· 
313 (Spring 1951), reprinted in 12 Uniform Commercial Code Drafts, supra nore 2, at 232; 
U.C.C., Final Text Edition,§ 8-313 (November 1951), reprinted in 13 Uniform Commercial 
Code Drafts, supra note 2, at 220; U.C.C., Official Draft, Text and Comments Edition,§ 8-313 
& comment (1952), reprinted in 15 Uniform Commercial Code Drafts, supra note 2, at i5~-56; 
U.C.C., Official Draft, Text and Comments Edition§ 8-313 & comment (1952) (with ch!illges 
and modifica tions approved by the Enlarged Editorial Board at meetings held on Decem~r 
29, 1952, February 16, 1953, May 21, 1953 and December ll, 1953), reprinted in 17 Uniform 
Commercial Code Drafts, supra note 2, at 154-56 [hereinafter 1952 Official Text]. 
31 Commenting on§ 8-313 of the 1952 Official Text, it was observed: 
[S]ubsection !(b) merely describes an ordinary baiL-nent situation, where the bro-
ker, acting as agent for a disclosed principal, has received, and holds, a securi ty 
issued or indorsed to his principal. ... 
A similar situation occurs when the broker, by book entry ... or otherwise 
... (physical segregation) ... (tagging) identifies a particular security as belonging 
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5. 1962 and 1978 Official Texts 
Section 8-313 was revised two more times, 32 pursuant to the 1962 
Official Texe3 and the 1978 Official Text. 34 The revision of section 8-
to the customer. It appears that, as far as it goes, subsection (!Xc) does not affect 
present Jaw. 
Subsection (l)(d) contemplates the situation where the selling broker, or some 
other person, appropriates the security for the customer with his assent. ... Since 
(l)(d) applies to specific, identified stock, title would pass, according to the pre-
sumed intent of the parties, at the time the offer to buy is accepted by the sending 
of the confirmation .... 
In subsection (2), however, the exclusionary effects of subsection (1) are set 
· forth. It provides ... that unless the broker has a security indorsed to or issued in 
the customers name, or identifies a specific security as belonging to the customer, 
the customer does not hold any specific security. In other words, there is no deliv-
ery of a security not indorsed to or issued in the customer's name unless the broker 
confirms the purchase order and picks a particular certificate. 
[T]he implication from Section 8-313(2) that the customer acquires a "prop-
erty interest in fungible shares, even though he is not a holder of any particular 
certificate, may actually mean this: that title to the share passes immediately to 
the customer on notification, but delivery requires "earmarking". As suggested 
above, this is not a change in the law. 
3 State of New York, Law Revision Commission, Study of the Uniform Commercial Code 
1962-63, 1965 (1955) (emphasis in original). The quoted analysis was prepared for the New 
York Law Revision Commission by Edward Greenbaum, Research Assistant to the Commis-
sion. I d. at 1957 n. •. 
32 The text of and (with one exception) the comment to§ 8-313 in the 1957 Official Text 
and the 1958 Official Text were identical to those in the 1952 Official Text. U.C.C., 1957 
Official Text with Comments, § 3-313 & comment, reprinted in 20 Uniform Commercial Code 
Drafts, supra note 2, at 95-96; U.C.C., 1958 Official Text with Comments, § 8-313 & com-
ment, reprinted in 21 Uniform Commercial Code Drafts, supra, at 347-48. The penultimate 
sentence of comment 3 to the 1957 Official was revised to state more directly that a customer 
can refuse to accept delivery from a broker when the customer receives notice of an adverse 
claim prior to delivery to the customer but after deiivery to the broker. 1957 Official Text, 
supra, § 8-313 comment 3; see Supplement No. 1 to the 1952 Official Draft of Text and Com-
ments of the U.C.C. 169-70 (January, 1955), reprinted in 17 Uniform Commercia i Code 
Drafts, supra, at 487-88 (explaining th.is change to comment 3). 
33 U.C.C. 1962 Official Text With Comments,§ 8-3 13 & comment, [hereinafter 1962 Offi-
cial Text] reprinted in 23 Uniform Commercial Code Drafts, supra note 2, at 354-57 . The 
1962 Official Text added a new paragraph (l)(e) to§ 8-313, dealing with transfers on the books 
of ci<'..aring corporations, added a new subsection (3), dealing with notice of adverse claims in 
the brokerage context, and substan tially revised the wording of subsection (2), but with no 
apparent change in substance. See 1962 Official Text, supra,§ 8-313(l)(e), (2), (3) & comment 
3, reprinted in 23 Uniform Commercial Cr...de Drafts, supra, at 355-56. The revised subsection 
(2) provided: 
(2) The purchaser is the owner oi a security held for him by his broker, but is 
not the holder except as specifii' .. d in subparagraphs (o), (c) and (e) of subsection 
( 1 ). Wbere a security i.> part of a fun gible bulk the purchaser is the owner of a 
proportionate property interest in the fungible bulk. 
1962 Official Text, supra, § 8-313(2), rep rimed in 23 Uniform Commercial Code Dr&fts, supm, 
at 355. The new subsection (2) accommodated dearing corporation transfers under paragraph 
(!)(e) and anointed dearing corporation p<!.rticipam-tra .. nsfen:.-es with holder sta tus. The other 
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313 in the 1978 Article 8 changed its focus from that of delivery to an 
exclusive listing of means of transfer. 35 Although it is clear that the 
drafters intended to preserve the four principles incorporated in the 
various pre-1978 versions of section 8-313,36 some of the wording of 
1978 section 8-313 is less than felicitous in this connection. 
As to the first principle, it remains the case that a transferee's 
financial intermediary cannot be a "person designated" as used in par-
agraph (1)(a). 37 The fourth principle, transfer of an interest in securi-
ties without a delivery, also is preserved. 38 But the second and third 
principles have been obscured. The pre-1978 versions of paragraphs 
( 1 )(c) and ( 1 )(d), as well as their Article V forbears, used the words 
"identify" and "identified" only in the context of identification of a 
"specific" security-a particular piece of paper. 39 The 1978 section 8-
313(1)(d) now also employs the concept of identification for the iden-
tification of quantities of securities in fungible bulk.40 This forces the 
word "specific" in paragraph (1)(d)(i) to shoulder the entire burden of 
providing that only a discrete piece of paper can be an identified spe-
cific security. Moreover, this drafting approach masks the meaning of 
the word "identified" in 1978 paragraph (1)(e)--the successor to pre-
1978 paragraph 1 (d)-which, properly construed, contemplates the 
same notion of a "specific" security.41 To make matters worse, 1978 
principal change was the addition of affirmative statements of ownership by a broker's cus-
tomer who is not a holder in lieu of the mere implication of this result under the prior versions. 
However, the first sentence of the revised version should not be read to provide that a non-
holder customer "owns" any particular security. Rather, the ownership of a non-holder cus-
tomer in both sentences of the revised subsection (2) contemplate an ownership in a fungible 
bulk. 
34 U.C.C., 1978 Official Text With Comments, § 8-313 [hereinafter 1978 Official Text]. 
The text of and the comment to§ 8-313 of the 1966 Official Text and the 1972 Official Text 
were identical to those in the 1962 Official Text. U.C.C., 1966 Official Text With Comments 
§ 8-313 & comment; U.C.C., 1972 Official Text With Comments§ 8-313 & comment. 
35 See supra, Part II, notes 77-83 and accompanying text. 
36 See supra note 4. For this reason this Appendix does not deal with the various interim 
drafts that culminated in the 1978 Article 8. 
37 Because only certain transfers can result in bona fide purchaser status under U.C.C. § 8-
3 i 3(2) when a financial intermediary controls securities for a transferee, paragraph (1 )(a) can-
not be used to bootstrap such a transferee into receiving actual possession under agency princi-
ples. See U.C.C. §§ 8-302(1); -313(2). 
38 U.C.C. §§ 8-313(l)(d)(ii) & (iii); -313(2) (first sentence). That i ransferees on interests in 
fungible bulks cannot become bona fide purchasers indicates that no delivery occurs. 
39 See Aronstein, Security Interests in Securities: How Code Revision Reflects Modern 
Security-Holding Practices, 10 U.C.C. L.J. 289, 298 (1978) ("The requiremenis of a 'specific 
security' in paragraph (c) [of pre-1978 § 8-3! 3(1)] and an 'identified security' in paragraph (d) 
rule out their application to situations where there is no particular piece of paper representing 
the rights to be transferred but where all other relevant considerations are identical.") (empha-
sis added). 
40 U .C.C. § 8-313(l)(d)(ii), (d)(iii). 
41 Se.e supra note 11 and accompa.;•ying text . U.C.C. § 8-313{1)(e), however, does not ap-
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paragraph (1)(f) provides for transfer by a (non-financial intermedi-
ary) third person's acknowledgment "with respect to a specific 
uncertificated security."42 Finally, the change from a delivery-based 
section 8-313(1) makes it unclear whether a transferee of a specific 
identified security pursuant to paragraph (l )(e) receives a delivery so 
as to qualify for bona fide purchaser treatment. 4 3 The 1978 section 8-
302 Official Comment indicates that a transfer achieved by a non-
financial intermediary third party acknowledgment, under 1978 sec-
tion 8-313(1)(e), cannot confer bona fide purchaser status, but no rea-
sons are given as to why a change was made from the result under 
pre-1978 section 8-3 13( l)(d).44 
To say the least, the language of 1978 section 8-313 is insensitive 
to the second and third principles that had survived so long through 
so many drafts and official texts. Hopefully the courts will honor the 
drafters' declared intent that the substance of prior law was pre-
served. 45 Unfortunately, it is virtually impossible to read 1978 section 
8-313 correctly without guidance from prior law and its drafting 
history. 
ply when the "third person" is a financial intermediary acting as such, unlike pre-1978 § 8-
313(l)(d), which was not so limited (except that paragraph (! )(d) did not apply when the 
"third person" was the transferees's broker). See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
42 U.C.C. § 8-313(1Xf) (emphasis added). Martin Aronstein, the Reporter for the !978 
Article 8, has suggested to me that "specific" in paragraph ( 1 )(f) is intended to limit its opera-
tion to circumstances where the uncertificated security registered to the third person can be 
traced to a particular initial transaction statement. Under this reading, a third person that is 
the registered owner of a large number of fungible uncertificated securities could not transfer 
an interest in a fractional portion thereof by acknowledgment to a transferee. 
43 It was clear under the pre-1978 version of§ 8-313( 1 )(d) that a third person acknowledg-
ment could result in a delivery and, therefore, bona fide purchaser treatment. See, e.g., pre-
1978 § 8-313 comment I ("When the factual situations described in subsections (!)(b), (c) and 
(d) occur delivery to the purchaser is complete, and no intervening notice of adverse claims 
before he takes actual physical possession of the security can divest him of his rights."). 
Although the exceptions in pre-1978 § 8-313(2) addressed only deliveries under paragraphs 
(l)(b) and (c), not (!)(d), those exceptions applied only to purchasers whose securities were 
controlled by their broker. The acknowledging third person under pre-1978 paragraph (l)(d), 
of course, could not be the purchaser's broker. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
44 See U.C.C. § 8-302, comment 2 (" [T]ransfers effected through the acknowledgment of a 
bailee who is not a financial intermediary . .. do not confer bona fide purchaser status."). The 
statement in the comment does not seem to follow from the language of the statute. The 
exceptions made in U.C.C. § 8-313(2) expressly allow bona fide purchaser status for certain 
transferees (pursuant to U.C.C. § 8-313( l)(c), (d)(i), and (g)) of securities controlled by fi nan-
cial intermediaries in fungible bulk. But TJ. C.C. § 8-313(2) says nothing about acknowledg-
ments by non-financial intermediary bailees who are in possession of specific certificated 
securities as contemplated by U.C.C. § 8-313(1 )(e). 
4 5 See U.C.C., app. !, § 8-313, Reasons for 1977 Change, at 977 (quoted in part supra note 
4). 
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